

ANTI-TANK DEFENSE OF ANZIO BEACHHEAD

1. Planning Phase.

a. Operation Shingle.

- (1) VI Corps was withdrawn from the vicinity of VENAFRO in the early part of January 1944 and began planning for Operation "Shingle". High lights of coordination of AT defense included:
 - (a) Coordination with G-3 as original beachhead objective was not suitable for AT defense. As a result, the projected line was extended to the LOLETTA River which gave a more suitable road net and at the same time afforded a better natural obstacle on the left flank.
 - (b) Coordination with the Engineers as to priority of demolitions, mine laying and roadblocks.
 - (c) Coordination between British and American units to insure adequate protection of boundaries.
 - (d) Directives to units to insure that they embarked adequately equipped with AT means; to assist units having insufficient equipment.
 - (e) Assurance that the landing plans were such that AT weapons would be unloaded early in the landing.
 - (f) Check on ammunition supply and recommendation as to the ratio HE to AP. It was decided that 80% HE and 20% armor piercing (with base detonating fuze) would be a proper percentage. This allotment of types has proved satisfactory throughout the operation.
 - (g) Plans for AT defense from units to determine that all avenues of tank approach were adequately covered.
 - (h) Close liaison with all units to insure dissemination of all pertinent information.
- (2) As a result of this phase of Operation Shingle the necessity for the following appears:
 - (a) The Anti-tank section of either division or corps should be included in any planning group from beginning to completion of plans.
 - (b) Constant association of the AT Officer with G-3, G-2, and G-4 are imperative in order to advise the General Staff of capabilities and limitations of TD's, of other AT means, and to assist them in their planning estimates.
 - (c) The anti-tank units involved must be informed promptly of changes and modifications in plans, since the smallest change in plans will affect AT dispositions.
 - (d) All units involved in an operation must be informed of the AT plans of the other units so that complete, detailed coordination can be attained.
 - (e) The Anti-tank defense portion of the Corps Order must include specific instructions as to locations of demolitions, mines and other passive means of defense.

2. Operations Phase.

a. Landing Phase.

- (1) Only one TD Bn, the 601st TD Bn attached to the 3rd Division, landed in the assault wave just after dawn. The first 24 hours were spent in unloading and assembling the battalion in the area designated. Due to the soft, marshy ground, considerable work was required before all guns reached the area. Dewaterproofing was accomplished and by the morning of D-1-1 the Bn was ready for operations. During this period the British 81st AT Regiment was in floating reserve and quickly available in case of need.
- (2) During this phase organization of the beachhead was the primary concern. Reconnaissance of the area by all units was made, positions located, and occupied, and AT positions along boundaries closely coordinated. As new units landed constant readjustment of gun positions and boundaries was necessary.
- (3) The landing of the 894th TD Bn on 26 January coincided with the enemy counterattack on the 1st Inf Div (Bn) in the CARROCCETO area with approximately 20 tanks. Two companies of the 894th (under Corps control) were placed in support of the 1st Div and Ranger force who were operating in the CARROCCETO area. Two days later the third company was placed on the left flank under corps control.

b. Offensive Phase.

- (1) On the 28th of January the 1st Inf Div (Dr) started its drive toward the north with C Co, 894th attached. M-10's were employed as assault guns as well as anti-tank guns and worked with the infantry battalions. During this period fighting was heavy with numerous counterattacks; the lines fluctuated; units were cut off and then contact rejoined.
- (2) On the 30th of January the 3rd Division began its attack on CISTERNA. The 601st TD Bn supported the attack as assault guns as well as anti-tank.
- (3) In both instances targets of Tank Destroyers included personnel, houses, strong points, machine guns, vehicles, guns, tanks and SP guns. 50 cal. machine guns were used by M-10's constantly and the M-10's were employed in the front lines of the infantry continuously.
- (4) Beginning 4 February 1944, offensive operations, other than counterattacks, ceased and the VI Corps assumed the defensive.

c. Defensive Phase.

- (1) During this period most of the hostile tank action occurred in the ANZIO-ALBANO axis from the 2nd to the 19th of February the enemy employed elements of six divisions on a 3000 yard front, and gained approximately 10,000 yards. An estimate of the enemy armor employed is 125-150 tanks, including both Mark IV and Mark VI types.
- (2) From the 2nd to 16th the 894th TD Bn had two companies employed in the ANZIO-ALBANO sector. Guns were placed well forward to cover vital roads and avenues of approach. Hostile artillery and mortar fire was intense. By the 5th of February, C Co, which had been in heavy action since the 29th of January was depleted to approximately 50% in strength in both M-10's and personnel. The balance of the Company was near exhaustion. B Co took over some of the positions of C Co so that some relief could be affected. A lull in fighting took place for a few days and from the 11th to the 16th the 645th completed relief of the 894th in this sector.
- (3) From the 16th through the 19th the Germans made an all out effort. During this period all 36 M-10's of the 645th battalion were employed with seventeen of them lost. As a result of these losses one platoon of A Co, 894th, which was still committed on the left flank was attached to the 645th. Also A Co of the 701st (A & C Company arrived on 9th Feb, balance of Bn on 23rd) was placed in direct fire positions in vicinity of the overpass to reinforce the 645th. In addition, the balance of A Co, 894th was alerted and B Co 894th was attached to the 56th Div (Dr) which was on the left flank of the 45th Division. The 645th TD Bn destroyed 25 tanks in these 3 days and the 701st destroyed six. In addition, all TD's fired at enemy personnel with 50 cal. MGs and 3" guns. Other targets were houses, machine guns and mortars.
- (4) On the 19th the 1st Armored Division counterattacked with C Company of the 701st attached to overwatch the tanks. The action was successful and C Co destroyed two tanks.
- (5) After the counterattack the enemy fighting was reduced to local attacks and patrol skirmishes until the 28th when the enemy had regrouped and struck the 3rd Division along its whole front. The usual enemy tactics of tanks supporting infantry was employed. The attack lasted for five days during which approximately 75-100 tanks were employed by the enemy. The 601st destroyed 25 during this period with the loss of no M-10's although some were damaged.
- (6) Due to the wide front of the 3rd division and the amount of armor available to the enemy, C Co of the 701st TD Bn was attached to the 601st to provide depth to the defense as all guns (36) of the 601st were committed in direct fire positions. On 4 March one platoon of B Co was sent to 3rd Div area to protect the canal crossing NE of CONCA. Thus, a total of 43 M-10's were available in the sector of the division. (C Co, 791st had only 8 guns). In addition, C Co of the 894th was alerted for possible employment, and the balance of the 701st TD Bn was in reserve.
- (7) From 5th of March until 25th March only local actions have taken place. As of 25 March TD units in VI Corps are with units as follows: B Co of the 894th is attached to the 5 Inf Div (Dr) on the left flank, A Co of the 894th is attached to the 1 Inf Div (Dr) on the right flank of 5 Div (Dr) and C Co is in Corps Reserve prepared to back up either forward Company. The 645th is with the 45th Div.

The 601st with C Company of the 805th TD Bn (which arrived on the beachhead March 11th) is attached to the 3rd Div. The 805th TD Bn (-C Co) is attached to the 1st SS Force on the extreme right flank. The 701st TD Bn is attached to the 1st Armored Division, in Corps Reserve with the Division. This arrangement of units covers all avenues of approach and provides an adequate TD reserve.

d. Conclusions.

- (1) One of the important points brought out in this operation has been the necessity for rotation of TD personnel. Formerly the conception of the role of Tank Destroyers has been that of a mobile reserve to deepen the static anti-tank guns and to move to the area where the greatest threat developed. In the perimeter defense of the ANZIO Beachhead it has been necessary to place M-10's in the front lines often under intermittent rifle, MG, mortar and artillery fire. The continuous presence of enemy tanks in the area necessitated that TD crews be alert constantly. Losses in crews and M-10's were heavy. As a result considerable reserve had to be maintained not only to reinforce, but to replace individual guns or units.
- (2) The use of TD's as anti-tank guns sited behind a house or in a hull defilade position waiting for tanks to appear has been the chief method utilized. Terrain of the beachhead is frequently bare of cover and ground is often marshy. This condition has restricted TD movement chiefly to roads and prevented movement to meet the tanks has been impracticable. Against the mass of artillery, mortar, SP and tank fire that the enemy employed during his attacks the only sure way to cover a route of enemy tank approach was to actually have the AT gun dispersed in mutually supporting positions to cover approaches.
- (3) It is pertinent here to point out a weakness in our present anti-tank means. We assume that an infantry anti-tank gun once placed in position will be there when the enemy tanks approach. However, no provision is made to maintain communication (other than visual) with these guns. Thus, if a 57mm crew or gun is knocked out or overrun there is no way of knowing about it and an approach that seems to be well covered may actually have no protection. Wire is not satisfactory as it cannot be maintained. Accordingly, it appears advisable that each infantry or towed anti-tank gun crew be equipped with a radio to enable communication with the platoon and company commander. In the case of the Tank Destroyers a radio in each M-10 provides this necessary communication.
- (4) Another problem of anti-tank defense is the necessity of giving close support to advancing or withdrawing troops. It has proven impractical to move towed anti-tank guns in forward areas in daylight due to thin skinned prime movers and inadequate protection for crews while going into positions. During the hours of darkness only can the towed anti-tank guns be placed in forward positions.
- (5) Another problem is the limited traverse of the towed anti-tank gun. In several instances attempts have been made to move the trails to fire in another direction with the result that the gun crew was destroyed or neutralized by hostile fire. With emphasis on concealment and minimum of movement it must be appreciated that the towed gun generally can only fire in the direction in which it is sited at time of attack. It follows therefore that the M-10 is the most economical AT weapon due to its ability to fire promptly in any direction.
- (7) The tactics of the enemy in employing infantry and tanks together necessitate our placing a large number of anti-tank guns and TD's on or near the front line in order to be in range of the tanks following the infantry. In many cases the German tanks follow at a distance of approximately 1000 yards and as many were Mk VI's only the 3" gun could fire on them with effect. During the major German attack, enemy infantry overrun the anti-tank positions before they could fire a round at enemy tanks. Also, several attacks were made at night with no tanks involved and AT gun crews were overrun. As a result, two suggestions are made which might alleviate this difficulty.

- (a) Every anti-tank gun should be able to fire on enemy personnel with HE. Approximately 10% of the fighting personnel of a regiment are anti-tank crews. The added fire power in support of the infantry might save a critical situation and keep the gun in operation.
- (b) Anti-tank guns must be able to fire at night. To permit observed fires, some type of flare should be devised in order to see what the enemy is doing at night and allow AT gunfire as in the daytime. It is pertinent that the enemy has a yellow flare which lights up an area for about five minutes.
- (7) One of the most interesting developments in tactics is the artillery-Tank Destroyer team. Throughout this campaign tank destroyer OP's frequently observed for division and corps artillery on all types of targets. In one instance a TD Company Commander, while his TD's were firing on tanks at closer ranges, adjusted corps artillery on tanks out of range of his own TD's and in 3 days destroyed 15 tanks and damaged several others. In another instance the artillery and TD's were tied in so well that the artillery fired a concentration on enemy tanks and infantry to cover the TD's who moved into firing position and destroyed 3 tanks and dispersed the rest. Wherever the enemy uses tanks and infantry together such TD-Artillery teamwork is essential to break up a determined attack. This is also a reason for the reserve company of a TD Bn to be in indirect fire positions so that it can cover the forward companies who are in direct fire positions.
- (8) As teamwork is the essence of success, the attaching of a TD Bn to each division on a continuous basis is essential. Only by constant working together can the tricks of combat be refined and confidence in one another be established. For example, a TD Company had destroyed several tanks but the enemy was retrieving them during the night. By getting together with the infantry a trap was laid, on the next night, when the Germans attempted recovery the infantry mortars put up some flares while the TD's shot up the enemy recovery crews. Another example is the employment of this same Company's guns on roving gun missions during the night. Prisoners of War state it is very effective.
- (9) This operation provides innumerable examples of the TD's being used in other than anti-tank roles. It has been a frequent occurrence for an infantry company commander to ask the TD's to shoot up a house containing enemy personnel. This is accomplished by indirect fire when possible, otherwise from direct fire positions. Utilizing HE-delay fuze, armor piercing with a base detonating fuze and HE-fuze-quick, excellent results are obtained. Such missions should be encouraged so that full advantage of the weapon can be taken.
- (10) A variety of communications are essential to obtain maximum coordination and efficiency. Every TD Bn can be reached by telephone through two different channels. The Corps Anti-tank Warning Net is maintained 24 hours a day with all battalions in the net. Each Bn is on the division net with the divisions to which attached. Liaison officers with radios are at these headquarters also. In addition, roving liaison officers contact all other TD units daily. An average of 3 OP's per battalion are also maintained. All of these channels of communication are desirable to keep Tank Destroyers abreast of the situation.
- (11) Passive means of anti-tank defense have been used extensively here. In the constant shifting and regrouping of units required in any similar operation, indiscriminate mine laying, demolitions and road crating must be closely controlled. Careful planning and wide distribution of information is necessary to ensure against casualties of our own personnel and equipment. Responsibility for executing demolitions must be clearly defined and all persons operating in the area informed of the plan.

3. Summary.

- a. Regardless of the echelon involved, it is essential that the following be recognized:

- (1) The AT Officer must be informed promptly of enemy information, of contemplated operations and plans, and must be included in all planning. Conversely, the recommendations of the AT Officer should be required in all matters pertaining to anti-tank defense. Otherwise his

usefulness as a staff officer is nil; confusion and inefficient protection will result. The foregoing necessitates frequent consultation of the AT Officer by the commander and action on the part of the various staff sections to insure that the AT Officer is continuously in the picture. This cannot be accomplished by the energy and initiative of the AT Officer alone.

- (2) In order to be efficient the defense against hostile armor must be a planned disposition which incorporates all available means after weighing enemy capabilities. Medium protection will only result: from careful utilization of terrain for siting of weapons and as obstacles to enemy tanks; from careful integration of all anti-tank weapons in accordance with their capabilities; from maximum use of demolitions and mine fields carefully coordinated with weapon locations and natural obstacles; from the closest cooperation on the part of local infantry groups; and from intimate integration not only into the artillery plan but, equally important, the fire plan of all infantry weapons.
 - (3) In order to accomplish the foregoing it should be exceptional for Tank Destroyer units attached to a division to be further attached to regiments or lower units. The anti-tank defense of the division must be a divisional disposition in which all division weapons are disposed according to their capabilities to include the bazookas, the 37mm and 57mm guns and the cannon companies.
- b. Missions should be given to tank destroyer unit commanders in terms of areas, routes or localities, and the disposition of the guns left to the TD Commander. Otherwise improper use of the TD guns will result. Local infantry commanders are prone to dispose TD guns in localities which limit fields of fire, or in exposed positions which do not permit the advantage of hull defilade.
 - c. AT defense between adjacent units and localities must be carefully coordinated to include definite fixing of responsibility, mutual assistance by fire, constant liaison, communication and interchange of information.
 - d. Where operations are likely to be continuous and prolonged, a portion of each TD Battalion should be retained in reserve to permit rotation either of single M-10's or platoons for purpose of rest of crews and maintenance of equipment.
 - e. It is imperative that TD units participate in combined training with infantry and artillery to the maximum extent possible prior to active operations. Wherever practicable the same TD battalion should habitually operate with the same division in order that the most intimate acquaintance and understanding may be developed and maintained.
 - f. This operation has brought out the following regarding training of TD personnel:
 - (1) All crews should be proficient in indirect fire.
 - (2) Trained wire men should be provided in each company.
 - (3) Replacements for every job must be trained.
 - (4) Definite steps must be taken to insure that the pioneer platoon is trained in maintenance and construction of roads to gun positions and construction of positions.
 - (5) The maximum number of commanders should be trained and all TD personnel trained to read maps and operate FM radio.
 - (6) Insure that TD personnel know enemy tricks.
 - g. Equipment changes or additions as follows have been indicated by this operation.
 - (1) Some added armor protection should be added on bottom of M-8 and M-20.
 - (2) Ball-mounted .30 or .50 caliber MG is needed on M-10, for fire against ground targets.
 - (3) Armor protection for radiator of M-10 is needed.
 - (4) Chevron type tread on M-10 will improve the capability of the vehicle.
 - (5) An independent battery charger for each M-10 is seriously needed.
 - (6) Armor plate battery box in M-10.
 - (7) Provide uprights in ammunition racks of M-10s.

h. The following points regarding employment of TD units should be emphasized;

- (1) Infantry must insure local security of M-10.
- (2) Wherever possible, reconnoiter and prepare positions for M-10s prior to occupation; reconnaissance by CO of unit to occupy.
- (3) Insure that AT guns are mutually supporting.

/s/
/t/ RUFUS S. RAMEY
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Anti-Tank Officer.

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APPENDIX I.

HEADQUARTERS
601ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 464 U. S. Army

SUBJECT: Report of Operations for period 22 January - 9 March 1944.

a. Summary of Our Operations:

During the period 22-31 January 1944, the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion attached to 3rd Division, VI Corps landed and assisted in establishment of beachhead vicinity ANZIO-NETTUNO, Italy, according to Operation "Shingle". The battalion operated aggressively in close support of infantry units to which attached, engaged enemy infantry, machine gun nests, anti-tank guns armored vehicles, and tanks at every opportunity. Indirect fire missions were conducted with excellent results in conjunction with 3rd Division Artillery. (See Annexes 1 and 2.)

b. Summary of Enemy Operations:

During this period the German has shown that he can utilize hastily assembled units to effect a strong defense of his important lines of communication. Our landing on Red Beach south of NETTUNO was unopposed by any sizeable force and we proceeded inland for four miles of "D" Day without encountering any enemy force. It was surprising to note the absence of mines, AT guns, and German armor. After several days, the German plan of Defense became evident. It used houses, ruins and the natural cover provided by canals, stream beds, and ditches, as positions for strong points. Strong points often consisted of 5.0 or 7.5 cm AT guns, complemented by MG's and riflemen. Frequently, the Boche would permit our forces to penetrate through this network of strong points and then fire upon them from the rear. Houses, and, in CISTERNA DI LITORIA, a tower and a steeple were used for OP's. At night 170mm and 88mm guns were brought up close to our front lines to harass installations in our rear. On two occasions harassing fire fell in the vicinity of our trains. The enemy has sniped at our M-10's on many occasions. Crews in M-10's operating in several areas had to keep well inside the TD at all times to avoid being hit by rifle fire. Two men were wounded by sniper fire when they raised themselves up in the turret to observe. On one occasion German riflemen penetrated two miles behind our lines at night, crossed the CANAL LUSOLINI, fired at houses and vehicles and withdrew before daylight. Our M-10's were able to reduce German strongpoints by firing 3" APC and HE delay ammunition into the houses and when the enemy attempted to flee, he was cut down by 3" HE with fuze quick and .50 cal MG fire.

c. Situation at End of Period:

The Battalion at end of period was engaged in stiff action south of CISTERNA, Italy, providing close support for attacking infantry units and defending the Division front against threat by armor.

d. Status of Personnel and Material:
Excellent.

e. Comments and Lessons Learned:

1. M-8 Scout Cars are unsuitable for cross-country reconnaissance on beach-head due to poor flotation on marshy ground.
2. Shell 3" APC - BDR produced excellent results.
3. M-10's are unsuitable for close support of infantry while under enemy small-arms fire due to lack of vision slits in turret for tank commander. Recommend turret periscope.

4. Shaft of turret traversing mechanism on M-10 has broken on several occasions due to structural weakness.

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5. Smooth rubber block tread of L-10 has proven itself unsatisfactory for any type of cross country movement. Recommend issue of steel or rubber chevron tread.

6. Recommend immediate issue of "Army Tim" radio generator for all M-10's. On several occasions we have almost lost M-10's through enemy action after battery failure, despite constant motor charging during radio operations.

7. If TD's are to be used as assault guns, recommend a coaxial .50 cal MG mounted in turret facing forward.

x. The planning and mounting operation "Shingle" was based on rapid displacement of the Battalion once the landing was effected. Space on ten ships was used, carrying 83 vehicles and 373 EM and Officers. 3 LCT's carried 3 platoons of TD's and 3 sections of Reconnaissance Company. 6 of the 7 LST's carried 6 platoons of TD's. Other vehicles of the Battalion were carried on the 7th LST. This dispersion allowed protection from complete loss and early landing of some elements. Units converged by Platoon on previously map-reconnoitered firing positions, rather than on dewaterproofing assembly areas, which were found to be unnecessary.

23 January 1944:

B Co 2nd Platoon destroyed Tank with APC, MG nest in house with HE delay.

27 January 1944:

B Co 2nd Platoon 1000A destroyed 7.5 cm Assault Gun PAK 40 at 1000 yds with 3 rds HE delay and 3 rds APC, 1200A, Destroyed 7.5 cm assault Gun PAK 40 at 1500 yds with 3 rds HE delay and 3 rds APC.

B Co 3rd Platoon destroyed tank behind house at 300 yds with APC. Shell pierced 2 walls of house and KO'd tank. Destroyed 2 MG nests and a 7.5 cm assault Gun PAK 40 at 1700 yds with HE and APC. Destroyed a 20mm Flak wagon and the vehicle that was towing it with 5 rds HE at 1700 yds (014254). When inspecting the KO'd vehicles later the Company C.O. saw 3 dead Germans by them. A Co 2nd Platoon captured 2 Germans who had infiltrated too far through our lines.

28 January 1944:

B Co 3rd Platoon 0900A destroyed an Armored Car and Tank at 030269 with APC. C Co 2nd Platoon 1230A destroyed Armored Car at 2000 yds with 5 rds (coords. 995295).

29 January 1944:

Co C 1st Platoon attached to 504th Parachute Inf. wounded 3, killed 15 enemy infantry, KO'd 3 MG nests and took 5 prisoners vicinity 043265. Direct fire at 1500 yds was employed.

30 January 1944:

B Co 1st Platoon fired into houses vic 004277 and KO'd 2 MG nests. B Co 2nd Platoon 1200A destroyed one MK III tank, 3 - 77mm AT guns (at 50, 800, and 500 yds) and captured a German medical soldier armed with a P-38 pistol. (Coord: 010290, 016294, 006295). A Co 2nd Platoon 1525A took 7 prisoners vic 980298. C Co 3rd Platoon 2130A took 1 prisoner vic 992287.

31 January 1944:

A Co 1st Platoon destroyed 2 MK IV tanks with 6 rds APC and a Scout Car with 4 rds HE delay, vicinity 005325. KO'd 6 MG nests and personnel vic 996316 using 90 rds HE.

B Co 3rd Platoon 1645A put 3 rds APC in turret of MK VI tank at 1000 yds vic 023295 and KO'd tank.

C Co 3rd Platoon 1645A firing indirect fire missions for 41st FA Bn destroyed 3 or possibly 4 MG nests at 8000 yds. Fired 81 rds HE. Forward observer reported excellent results obtained.

C Co 1st Platoon destroyed a Volkswagon at 1800 yds vic 055262.

Rcn Co 3rd Platoon 2330A inflicted many casualties on enemy infantry counter-attacking 043253. 37 mm HE was used firing point blank at 200 yds.

Feb. 1 - 1st and 2nd Flats, "A" Co attached to 7th Inf; 3rd Flat, "B" Co attached to 509th Para Bn; 1st and 2nd Flat, "B" Co attached to 15th

Infantry; 1st Plat, "C" Co attached to 504th Para Regt 3rd Plat, Rcn Co attached to 504th Para Regt. 3rd Plat, "B" Co stopped 7 tanks attempting to break through our lines - KO'd 1 Mk VI with 3 APC at 1000 yds at G-023295. 1st Plat, "C" Co killed 15 enemy inf, 3 wounded, took 5 prisoners with direct fire using HE shell. 1st Plat, "A" Co KO'd 2 enemy tanks Mk IV at G-005325. 3rd Plat, Rcn Co engaged enemy inf during counter-attack, causing many casualties. 1st Plat, "A" Co KO'd 2 tanks (type unknown), 1 Scout Car vic F-992-315. 3rd Plat, "A" Co flushed enemy from houses assisting tanks and inf in capturing 100 men.

Feb. 2 - 1st Plat, "C" Co KO'd Pill Box at G-042248, range 1800 yds. At 1100 hrs 3rd Plat, "C" Co fired 35 rds HE at enemy inf vic G-027298, range 1000 yds inflicting casualties.

Feb. 3 - 3rd Plat, "C" Co KO'd Mk III tank at 1000 yds with 5 rds APC vic G-026297.

Feb. 4 - "B" Co using delay scored 5 direct hits at 4700 yds on left Bell Tower and 2 direct hits on center Bell Tower in Cisterna with excellent results. "A" Co assisted 509th Para Bn in blasting houses containing enemy inf.

Feb. 5 - 2nd Plat, "A" Co fired 83 rds HE on OP's and MG nests scoring 2 direct hits vic F-946352 - 1630 to 1800 hrs. 1st Plat, "C" Co fired 15 rds HE on enemy inf vic G-040290 with good results.

Feb. 6 - Rcn Co established OP's at F-980300, G-010282, G-037268 and G-038256; listening post vic CR at G-013236. 3rd Plat, "C" Co moved to indirect fire position at F-990240. Continued organization in depth and AT Warning System.

Feb. 7 - 3rd Plat, "C" Co hit bridge at G-069285 - 5 times in registering plat for harassing fire during night. 1st Plat, "A" Co moved SW of PONTO ROTTO.

Feb. 8 - "A" Co fired 70 rds of HE at houses vic G-000307. "C" Co fired 100 rds of HE at targets of opportunity; 504th Para Sector.

Feb. 9 - Continued to improve positions.

Feb. 10 - 2nd Plat, "B" Co fired 100 rds HE on houses occupied by enemy vic G-012298 at 1730 hrs. 1st plat, "B" Co fired 38 rds HE on enemy in woods vic G-026297 with excellent results.

Feb. 11 - 1st Plat, "C" Co fired 200 rds HE harassing fire during night on Hwy #7 from CR at G-058296 to vic G-045308. "B" Co enabled to get 2 aimed rds of HE on targets illuminated per 60mm flare. Windy night caused flare to drift too much.

Feb. 12 - "B" Co fired 50 rds HE on houses containing enemy vic G-025296 during night. "C" Co fired 224 rds HE harassing and interdiction fire on Hwy #7 between 35 and 38 grids, and area NE of CISTERNA.

Feb. 13 - 2nd Plat, "C" Co fired 607 rds HE interdiction and harassing fire in area G-013349, G-007346, G-024325 and G-029325 and on vic bridge at G-050351. 3rd Plat, "C" Co destroyed MG nest at range of 800 yds during night.

Feb. 14 - "C" Co fired 200 rds HE harassing fire during night on Hwy #7 NW of CISTERNA and gullies between CISTERNA and CORI. 3rd Plat, "C" Co fired 19 rds on 2 houses in 504th Para Sector - knocked down.

Feb. 15 - "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire vic CISTERNA and along Hwy #7 to the NW. 1st Plat, "A" Co fired 34 rds HE North of house at F-999000 at Kraut strong point. 2nd Plat, "A" Co fired 84 rds N OF CA'ZANO at woods and house containing enemy (F-956343).

Feb. 16 - "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire during night Vic CISTERNA and RJ'S at G-006348 and F-998359. "C" Co fired 100 rds indirect fire on woods at F-955392. "C" Co fired 100 rds on road from G-046278 to Canal 1st Plat knocked down a PW-190.

Feb. 17 - "C" Co fired harassing mission during night of 100 rds HE in gullies and wooded areas vic F-956380, F-990300, F-99370 and F-956366; 100 rds East of line G-046278, G-057266, G-045239. 3rd Plat, "A" Co fired 27 rds HE at houses and tanks vic F-973312. 2nd Plat, "B" fired 12 HE, 15 APC at enemy tanks, range 2200 yds, vic G-022304.

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Feb 18 - 1st Plt, "C" Co moved to F-965276 on Riv left flank to strengthen AT defense in that sector. "C" Co fired harassing fire during night; 100 rds E of Canal in front of 33rd and 504th Sector between 23 and 38 Easting. 3rd Plt, "A" Co fired 90 rds HE at houses occupied by enemy and used as OP vic F-976218. 2nd Plt, "B" Co fired 64 rds HE at house occupied by enemy vic G-030300.

Feb 19 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 100 rds harassing fire during the night.

Feb 20 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night. 3rd Plt "A" Co engaged tanks in their sector - KO'ed one (type unknown) at F-966325. 3rd Plt "B" Co fired 44 rds HE into house held by enemy. One M-10 KO'ed by enemy fire.

Feb 21 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night. Rcn OP at F-937313 received heavy shelling during period.

Feb 22 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night.

Feb 23 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night. 2nd Plt "B" Co fired 50 rds at G-012287 in support of 15th Inf attack in that area.

Feb 24 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night.

Feb 25 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire during night. One section, 1st Plt, "B" Co fired harassing fires S and SE of CISTERNA from roving gun positions in the 15th Inf Sector. One section, 1st Plt, "B" Co registered on enemy occupied houses vic G-23296. Rcn Co established OP's in houses at F-970264 and F-961276.

Feb 26 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 100 rds harassing fire at CR at G-044345 and 100 rds in woods and gullies W and NW of CISTERNA. 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired indirect on enemy guns and personnel F-893341 with good results. 1st Plt, "B" Co fired 200 rds HE on roving gun mission in front of 15th Inf Sector. OP's established at F-980296 and F-953276. Gun silenced at F-893341.

Feb 27 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night. 2nd plt, "B" Co fired 30 rds in and around CISTERNA. One Section, 1st Plt, "B" Co fired 57 rds registration at G-034290 and G-020295, at enemy strong points; Fired 130 rds vic CISTERNA and Hwy 7 SE CISTERNA; fired 125 rds at houses vic G-023297. One section, 1st Plt, "B" Co fired 200 rds HE on roving gun mission in front of 15th Sector. Ammunition dump hit and house destroyed.

Feb 28 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night. "B" Co fired 416 rds indirect at houses along road in front of 15th Inf and 504th Para Sectors; 91 rds direct at houses SW of CR at G-021295, 14 enemy casualties seen removed from house; 200 rds direct fire roving gun mission in front of 15th Inf Sec "C" Co fired 16 rds indirect at enemy tank vehicle at F-961357, results unknown.

Feb 29 - 2nd Plt, "C" Co fired 200 rd harassing fire during the night. 2nd Plt, "B" Co fired 200 rds harassing fire in front of 15th Inf Sector. 1st and 2nd Plt, "B" Co fired 461 rds at targets in front of 15th Inf Sector. "C" Co, 701st TD Bn attached to 601st TD Bn. (9 guns) 2nd Plt, "A" Co KO'ed 2 enemy tanks vic CARANO.

On the morning of 29 Feb, the enemy attacked with a platoon of inf supported by tanks on the right flank of the Division at 0630; at 0700 and attack by a company of inf, one Ferdinand and five Mk VI tanks down the CISTERNA - ISOLA BELLA road; at the same time an attack of a battalion of inf supported by tanks in the PONTE ROTTO sector followed by a two battalion attack by inf supported by armor in the vic of CARANO which was the main effort. Our guns managed to knock out the first one or two tanks in each group and artillery reduced the inf to a slight threat. All ground given to the enemy was restored by our counter-attacks. Tanks attempted several times in the next few days to approach our front line positions as is indicated by following reports but were stopped or seen to withdraw from our fire. The Bn Comdr placed the 2nd Plt, "C" Co in support of "B" Co positions and had previously sent the 3rd Plt, "C" Co to support the left flank positions near CARANO. Eventually "C" Co, 701st moved into positions of depth behind 1st and 3rd Plts, "B" Co with 5 guns. Four guns of "C" Co, 701st were placed in depth support of left and center positions. One Plt "B" Co, 701st was placed in depth positions on the right flank and one Plt, "B" Co, 701st held in reserve in indirect fire positions.

Mar. 1 - One plat, "C" Co, 701st fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night. Rcn Co, established night patrol on roads in Div forward area. 2nd Plat, "A" Co KO'ed 1 tank vic CARANO. 1st Plat, "C" Co KO'ed 1 Mk VI, 3 Mk IV's, 1 probable - 85 rds expended. 2nd Plat, "B" Co KO'ed 2 tanks, one Mk IV (1 type unknown), 1 probably destroyed - 100 rds expended. "C" Co, 701st knocked down house E of CARANO using HE and AP assisting inf to advance.

Mar 2. - One plat, "C" Co, 701st fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night, Coordinated Field Artillery and TD fire on tanks and SP guns; FA fire neutralized area while TD's moved around houses, fired and pulled back. Excellent results. Rcn Co provided night road patrol in Div area. 1st Plat, "B" Co KO'ed a tank at F-999306. 3rd Plat, "B" Co KO'ed 2 tanks at G-013297. 3rd Plat, "B" Co KO'ed 2 additional Mk IV tanks N of ISOLA BELLA.

Mar. 3 - "B" Co, 701st T.D. Bn. attached to 601st T.D. Bn. (8 guns). Rcn Co provided road patrols during the night in forward areas. 3rd Plat, "A" Co KO'ed 3 tanks vic F-9832. 3rd Plat, "B" Co KO'ed 3 tanks and one SP gun (Ferdinand) N of ISOLA BELLA. 2nd Plat, "A" Co fired 18 rds APC at enemy occupied house vic CARANO. 2nd Plat, "C" Co fired on enemy tank recovery crews trying to recover KO'ed tanks. Inf flares illuminated targets, Results excellent. 1st Plat, "A" Co KO'ed tank at F-998305 at 1000 hrs.

Mar. 4 - Rcn Co OP's adjusted 2 indirect fire missions - (1) 2 SP guns or tanks vic F-908345, fire neutralized (2) arty btry vic F-914341, results unknown. Rcn Co night patrols covered Div road net. One Plat, "B" Co. 701st reverted to 1st AD control. 1st Plat, "B" Co and 1st Plat, "A" Co covered counter-attack by 7th Inf toward PONTE ROTTO with direct fire. 1st Plat, "A" Co moved with tanks to cover Inf and Engineers working on road towards PONTE ROTTO during night. 1st Plat, "C" Co, 701st fired 9 rds HE on house at F-998308 - personnel ran from house. 2nd Plat, "C" Co KO'ed tank behind house at F-998308; fired 40 rds APC, 50 rds HE; fired 20 rds at house at G-008297 enemy strong point; fired 30 rds HE at house at F-998306; fired 10 rds and KO'ed tank (type unknown) at G-011298. 1st Plat, "B" Co fired 90 rds at tanks vic PONTE ROTTO (2 probables).

Mar. 5 - Rcn night patrols covered Div road net. 1st Plat, "B" Co attempted to destroy bridge at F-993311, fired 85 rds scoring numerous hits on SE side of bridge - damage unknown. KO'ed vehicle with 6 hits coming SE from PONTE ROTTO toward bridge during firing. 3rd Plat, "B" Co, 701st fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night. 2nd Plat, "C" Co KO'ed tank at G-034288 at 1530 hrs.

Mar. 6 - 2nd Plat, "C" Co adjusted fire on enemy inf at G-017309 and G-018306 with excellent results; adjusted fire on enemy inf at G-000310 with excellent results; enemy set on fire at same vic by arty fire. 1st Plat, "A" Co moved forward to cover inf vic F-988305. Enemy mortar dropped through open turret killing 2 and seriously wounding 1 member of the TD crew. 2nd Plat, "A" Co fired 15 rds HE at enemy held houses vic CARANO.

Mar. 7 - 3rd Plat, "B" Co, 701st fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night. 1st Plat, "A" Co covered inf vic F-988305. 2nd Plat, "B" Co fired on enemy held houses in 15th Inf Sector. 3rd Plat, "A" Co engaged and KO'ed 3 enemy tanks in front of 7th Inf Sector (F-963325).

Mar. 8 - 3rd Plat, "B" Co, 701st fired 200 rds harassing fire during the night. One section of "C" Co, 701st moved to vic of F-988305 to cover inf during night. 1st Plat, "A" Co, 601st relieved by Plat, "C" Co, 701st during period. 1st Plat "B" Co fired 14 rds. "C" Co, 701st fired 40 rds AP and HE on enemy held houses vic F-994312. Rcn Co conducted motor patrols during night in Div Sector.

Mar. 9 - 3rd Plat, "B" Co, 701st fired 200 rds along roads SW of CISTERNA and in area NW of CISTERNA during the night. One section, "C" Co, 701st moved to vic F-998305 during the night to cover inf. Rcn Co conducted motor patrols during night in Div Sector. 3rd Plat, "A" Co KO'ed Mk IV tank at 0730 vic F-094316 and knocked down German aircraft at 1120 - pilot picked up vic CP, 2nd Bn, 7th Inf.

Annexes

- #1- Summary of Damages inflicted on Enemy and Casualties incurred by this battalion.

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ANNEX NO. 1

OPERATIONS REPORT:

SUMMARY OF DAMAGE INFLICTED ON ENEMY
PERIOD: 22 January - 31 January 1944

	*A Co.	*B Co.	*C Co.	* Total
Tanks and SP'S	* 2	* 8	*	* 10
	*	*	*	*
Armored Cars & $\frac{1}{2}$ Tracks	* 1	* 2	* 1	* 4
	*	*	*	*
M.G.'s	* 6	* 5	* 6	* 17
	*	*	*	*
Artillery & AT Guns	*	* 3	*	* 3
	*	*	*	*
Prisoners of War	* 9	* 1	* 6	* 16
	*	*	*	*
Miscellaneous	*	*	* Volks-	* 1
	*	*	* Wagon	*

CASUALTIES INCURRED BY 601ST TD BN
PERIOD: 22 January - 31 January 1944

	"A"	"B"	"C"	HQ	Total
EM (SWA, MIA, LWA, KIA)	*	*	*	*	*
	* 4	* 1	* 1	* 6	
Officers (MIA)	*	*	*	*	*
	* 1	*	*	* 1	
M-10's (KO'd not repairable in 24 hrs:)	*	* 2	*	*	* 2
	*	*	*	*	*

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