ATTACHMENT REPORT

No. 1

From: 050001 Nov 1944
To: 302400 Nov 1944

Unit: 771 TD Bn
Date: 3 Dec 1944
Place: K913601

1. ENEMY

a. None positively identified by our troops.

b. G-2, 102d U.S. Infantry Division, reported following enemy divisions, or elements thereof, in zones in which our troops operated:

(1) 133rd Infanterie Division (Volksgrenadier)
(2) 340th Infanterie Division (Volksgrenadier)
(3) 363rd Infanterie Division (Volksgrenadier)
(4) 7th Panzer Division
(5) 15th Panzer Grenadier Division
(6) 10th Panzer Division
(7) 42nd G.A. Infantry Battalion

2. OWN SITUATION

(a) See overlay and par. (d) below.

(b) See overlay and par. (d) below.

(c) See overlay and par. (d) below.

(d) 5 Nov. 1944 on Div. order, the Bn. (less A,B, and C Co.) moved to the wooded area E of SCHINVEL, and est. C.P. at 771642. A and B Co. remained in assembly area in the vicinity of NAUL. C Co. was attached to the 113th Cav. Gp. and moved with one (1) plat. Rcn. Co. to take up positions for primary mission in the vicinity of GENET-TUVEREN, and remained in these positions for period 5 Nov.-14 Nov.

On 6 Nov. 1944 B Co. (less one (1) plat. was placed in direct support of 162d. Inf. Div. in primary positions in the vicinity STAH.-GILNATH-NEDSTRA-B-TEVEN. One (1) plat. was placed in indirect fire position in vicinity of SCHINVEL. A Co. (less one (1) plat.) took up positions in the vicinity of PRELENG-TEVEN-SCHERZEBEL. 3rd. Plat. remained in indirect firing position from 6 Nov.-13 Nov. firing night harassing and interdictory missions.

Under cover of darkness on 8 Nov., B Co. took up firing positions in the vicinity of BIRGDEN, and at dawn on 8 Nov. fired forty (40) rounds at a church steeple (possible OP) in the vicinity of Schierwaldenrath, which resulted in the destruction of church steeple.

Using similar tactics of movement during night of 8 Nov., two destroyers of A Co. moved into firing positions in vicinity of FELLENBERG and at day break opened fire on enemy OP located in a large cement tower in vicinity of GEINERKIRCHEN, fired 42 rounds and destroyed tower. Movement of destroyers was covered by artillery fire delivered on known enemy positions in that vicinity. Artillery cooperated further by laying down concentrations just prior to time TD's opened fire on the enemy OP.

During period 8 Nov.-12 Nov. both A and B Co. (less one (1) plat. each in indirect firing positions) continued on primary mission in support of 102d Inf. Div. One (1) plat. each Co. continued to fire interdictory and harassing missions on order of Div. Artillery.

Final of Bn. during period 5 Nov.-11 Nov. inclusive remained in Bivouac area in the vicinity of SCHINVEL.

On Nov. 12 Bn. (less C,A, 1 plat B Co., 1 plat. Rcn. Co.) moved on Div. order to an assembly area in and around HEERLEN.
on 14 Nov., C Co. joined at BN assembly area in HEDENBURG.

During period 14 Nov. to 17 Nov., C Co. remained in direct fire positions, sectoring Div. sector.

During period 14 Nov. to 17 Nov., C Co. remained in BN assembly area in vicinity of HEDENBURG. On 16 Nov., per Field Order No. 2, 102d Div., this unit (C) was attached to 406th RCT, and left assembly area in vicinity of HEDENBURG on 170745 Nov. on Div. order to occupy positions at:

(a) CP --361618
(b) 1st. Plat. --861618
(c) Sec. Plat. --397618
(d) 3rd. Plat. --372609

to act in direct Anti-Tank support of the 406th RCT.

At 171200 Nov. 1944, C.C. of C Co. (Capt. Beaver) was ordered to contact plat. of 702d TD Bn., then located in HEDENCH. Upon arrival C.C. contacted Exec. Officer, "B" Co., 702d, and was informed that 702d plat. there had two (2) TFs out of action and that assistance was needed.

Capt. Beaver of C Co. reconnoitered the area for possible gun positions; thereafter returning to his own CP. He was ordered on his return to his own CP to contact C.C. of 380th FA; after making that contact, he was told by the C.C. of 380 FA that his entire Co. was needed in the vicinity of HEDENBURG. When he returned to his own CP he was met by Maj. Jolley (102d Div, Anti-Tank officer). All platoons were alerted for movement, while Capt. Beaver and Maj. Jolley made a further reconnaissance for suitable gun positions for the three (3) platoons in the vicinity of HEDENBURG.

The positions chosen were recommended to the C.C. of 406th R.C.T. and approved.

On 171800 Nov., 1944, Co. moved into the following positions:

(a) CP 902626
(b) 1st. Plat. --904628
(c) Sec. Plat. --999626 (to be held in reserve)

and held these positions until 131550 Nov., 1944, at which time 2nd plat. was pulled out of reserve and supported the Infantry attack into AFWEILER, taking up positions at 917650.

On 18 Nov. 1944 at approximately 0850A, the 3d Platoon advanced to 918629 and took up firing positions there.

On November 1944 at approximately 0700A, enemy armor consisting of 4 Pzkw IVs and 4 Pzkw Vs were sighted at 918632 and taken under fire by 2d and 3d platoons, commanded by 1st Lt Kollar and 5/Sgt Bertucci, respectively. All enemy armor was destroyed, with the loss of one (1) H-10 Destroyer.

On 19 Nov. 1944 at 1100A, a counterattack was staged by enemy armor at about 906643. All TD platoons took enemy under fire from firing positions located at 918631 and 916632. Four (4) Pzkw Vs were destroyed.

On 19 Nov. 1944 at 1300A, two (2) enemy armored vehicles and one (1) half-track, with a towed Pak 38, were destroyed at 918635, the TD platoons being located in the same positions as above.

On 19 Nov. 1944 at 1800A, the 2d and 3d Platoons, moved back into "ready" positions at 917650 and 918629, remained there until 200045A Nov. 1944, at which time they occupied firing positions at 919631 and 916632.

On 20 Nov. 1944, at approximately 1135A, during an attack on GREONSWEILER, three (3) Pzkw VIs appeared at 916654 (about 3,000 yards from plat. firing positions) and were taken under fire by the 1st plat., the plan being to divert attention from tanks moving in support of the 406th Inf. Regt., who were staging attack on GREONSWEILER. Enemy armor disappeared into a draw at 919654 only to reappear at about 915646, where they were again taken under fire. Direct hits were scored, but the armor was too thick to penetrate. Tanks were halted and remained in position while artillery was brought to bear on them. However, on 210700A Nov. 1944, the Hx VII had been removed. (TD platoon lost two (2) H-10s in this action.)
At approximately 001200A Nov 1944 two (2) Mk VI appeared at K921642 and were taken under fire by 2d and 3d Platoons. Again direct hits were scored but enemy armor could not be pierced. Action resulted in stopping of tank attack but two (2) M-10A were lost at about 001600A Nov 1944.

Four (4) PzKw VI later appeared at 917630 and were taken under fire by all destroyers which remained in the three platoons. Two (2) additional M-10A were destroyed as well as two (2) PzKw VI.

At 001600A Nov 1944, all remaining I-10 were consolidated at occupied positions at 917630 in preparation for enemy counterattack.

From 001600A Nov 1944 to 011500A Nov 1944 destroyers remained in positions at K916628, at which time they were assembled at 001626.

On 16 Nov 1944 Company B on Division order was attached to 407th RCT and established command liaison with the 36th, 407th RCT. Company B was then placed on two-hour alert status.

On 16 Nov 1944 Company A was attached by Division order to RCT 405.

On 17 Nov 1944 Company A moved into positions generally on the line FRELENBERG-WAURICHEN and remained in this area in direct support of the 405th RCT until 20 Nov 1944.

At approximately 001200A Nov 1944, 2d platoon, Company A, commanded by 1st Lt Deckwitz, was in position northwest of WAURICHEN near GAILLENKIRCHEN road, when two Mk VI tanks emerged from orchard on east side of RHUMMERN at K902643. These tanks were taken under fire and destroyed with several direct hits, with no loss or damage to TD platoon.

On 21 Nov 1944 Company A was given the mission of supporting the attack of the 405th RCT on the high ground to the north and east of IMMENDORF. H-hour was set for 1030A. At 1000A the 3d platoon, under command of 1st Lt John Horton, left the assembly area in GERKONSWEILER and occupied firing positions in the locality of K925639 at 1030A.

Within a short time after taking up these positions, small arms fire was ranging shots, for immediately following SA fire 88mm guns opened fire from high ground between BEECK and LINDEEN and from southeastern edge of BEECK. Weapons could not be clearly observed, but appeared to be dug-in PzKw VI or 88mm guns (AA-AT). First round from enemy gun was a direct hit on destroyer of platoon commander, killing platoon leader and two enlisted men, by name, Lt. Horton, t-5 Deecoco, and Pvt. Jebavay, Sgt. Hedrick assumed command of the balance of the platoon and delivered fire against the enemy gun positions, constantly moving in the vicinity of the original positions. A hit by enemy fire was sustained on turret of TD commanded by Sgt. Osipovich and turret traverse was jammed. Platoon continued fire against enemy guns until they ceased fire. Smoke was observed rising from enemy positions but visibility was too poor to be certain of results of TD fire. Entire action lasted approximately fifteen (15) minutes, and at 1045A balance of platoon took up positions to rear of firing positions and continued to watch for multiple targets, but none appeared.

During the period 14 Nov-21 Nov., the balance of the Bn. remained in assembly area in the vicinity of HEERLEN.

Company B was relieved by Co. B ( one (1) plat.Ron. attached) on 210000Nov. and Co. B passed to control of RCT 406th and occupied positions in area APWEILER-GERKONSWEILER. Co. C returned to vicinity of IMMENDORF for refitting and replacement of losses.

During period 22 Nov. - 23 Nov. all companies remained in static positions.

On 24 Nov. A and C Co. remained in approximately the same positions, whereas Co. B left five (5) TD's in APWEILER and moved six (6) to the vicinity of EDEREN, in direct support of 406th RCT. Balance of the Bn. moved on Div. order to vicinity of PALMBERG. CP est. at K55005999.

On following day, 25 Nov. A Co. moved to the vicinity of APWEILER, and remained in direct support of the 405th. Co. B moved one (1) plat. into indirect firing positions in vicinity of LUC/HAHN, and six (6) TD's remained in position at EDEREN, ENTRE 26, passing under control of the C. O. 407th. Co. C still undergoing refitting.
of 25 Nov to 1 (attached 405th) was placed under operational control of the 25th Div for attack on 41-45.
3. To continue in direct support of the 407th in assigned sector.
4. To achieve the balance of the forces.

On 25-27 Nov 0 (directly) expelled 96 rds.
On 27-28 Nov 1 (indirectly) expelled 96 rds.

On 28 Nov 1 (directly) expelled 96 rds.

These platoons were relieved at 0817 to 1st platoon of 3. This platoon fired 96 rds.

To the balance of the battalion during period 28-29 Nov.
7. 10th 1944 to 1 occupied the following positions:

- 1st Pl., - 216427
- 2nd Pl., - 246426
- 3rd Pl., - 366262

combined with First and Second.
7. In support of the attack on the north on the high ground to the north.
3. The following targets were engaged by the second platoon under direction of 40th Whitt. 216423:
1. Informed battalion vehicle destroyed on road leading from 216423.
2. -1 st platoon at 216424, 24644, and 246422, were fired upon using both .30 and .50 shells.
3. -2 nd platoon at 216424, 24644, and 246422, were fired upon using both .30 and .50 shells.
4. All shells were aimed to close up on cease fire, enabling the Inf to place demolition charges at 21644. Few of pillboxes came out to surrender.
5. The platoon was ready on call of the rest of the Inf to support final phase of attack on Li-Whit.}

The 3rd platoon was on alert, being ready to move on call of the I. O. 406th to support final phase of attack on Li-Whit.

During the period 24-28 Nov, there were no new units.

3. The current strength:

3a. Status of strength of personnel and replacement needed.

(1) Officers and warrant officers

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<tr>
<th>Authorised</th>
<th>Assumed</th>
<th>Shortage</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Capt.</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maj.</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capt.</td>
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<td>Capt.</td>
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(2) Enlisted men

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b. Casualties:
   (1) Officers and Warrant Officers

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<th>Captured</th>
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<td>F. Co.</td>
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<td>C. Co.</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Med. Det</td>
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   (2) enlisted men

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<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Captured</th>
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<td>Med. Det</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Prisoners captured - None

d. Evaluation of the greater proportion of casualties has been through regimental level this year, medical installation.

e. Officers and men of:
   F Co. Lt. Col. David D. Smith
   F Co. Capt. Frank F. Wilkins
   F Co. 2Lt. James J. Alterus
   F Co. Capt. William A. Padlock
   F Co. Capt. Robert J. Petersen
   F Co. Capt. Charles K. Gruber
   F Co. Capt. Louis A. Lobes

   C Co. Capt. Verne G. Winfield
   C Co. 2Lt. Frank J. Richardson
   C Co. 1Lt. Albert W. Flook
   C Co. 1Lt. James W. Fagan, Jr.
   C Co. 2Lt. Robert E. Lee

   B Co. Capt. Willard F. Mansfield
   B Co. 2Lt. Frank J. Richardson
   B Co. 1Lt. Stanley C. Raskill
   B Co. 1Lt. Joseph F. Guerin
   B Co. 2Lt. Dean C. Knight

   A Co. Capt. Walter C. Weaver
   A Co. 2Lt. John F. Johnson
   A Co. 1Lt. George F. Killmer, Jr.
   A Co. 2Lt. Robert C. Lemley
   A Co. 2Lt. Preston E. Farrow

   F Co. Capt John E. Clarke
   F Co. 1Lt. Herbert F. Hallet
   F Co. 2Lt. R. P. Crowell
   F Co. 2Lt. Milton B. Peeples
   F Co. 2Lt. William E. Morrow
   F Co. 2Lt. John C. Sturgis

f. Decoration awarded during month of Nov. 1944

   Purple Heart
   a. Officers 2
   b. Enlisted 3
G. Status of Supply:
(1) One day emergency rations on hand
(2) Full combat load of ammunition on hand
(3) Two days supply of gasoline and diesel oil on hand

4. General:
   a. Operations were generally successful during the period but were somewhat hampered by inadequate replacement of tires and vehicles.
   b. Poor communication due to age and extended use of organic radio equipment and inadequacy of T/O and T/E in provision for laying and maintenance of wire network. Operations with Infantry units supported could be facilitated by the addition of four (4) SCR 300 sets per firing Company.
   c. The slowness with which vehicle casualties were replaced maintained the companies below maximum operational efficiency.
   d. General morale of the unit is excellent.

   (Signature)  
   Art. Cpt. FA.  Commanding