AFTER ACTION REPORT
No. 6

From: 010001 Apr 1945
To: 300400E Apr 1945

Unit: 771 TD BN
Date: 1 May 1945
Place: LINDSTEDT, Germany

RESTRICTED

MARS: GSGS 4416, Sheets 15 (Salzwedel), N6 (Wittenberge), N3 (Linden), N4 (Hannover), N5 (Braunschweig), N6 (Stendal), P1 (Bocholt), P2 (Münstert), P3 (Detmold), and Q1 (Essen). Scale --- 1:100,000.

1. ENEMY
   a. The Battalion crossed the RHINE River in the early morning of 1 April and moved through to the Ninth US Army left flank with the 11th Cavalry Group to screen between the Second British Army and the 5th US Armored Division. For the first time since being committed on 5 November 1944, the Battalion met no major unit as such in an advance, reaching the ELBE River against only scattered resistance. In the middle of the period, however, it was recalled to reinforce the 5th US Armored Division when the XIII Corps Headquarters and rear areas and the MSR were threatened by the sudden appearance of the short-lived (13 days) Von Clausewitz Division, hastily formed from units of the Feldherrnhalle, SS Viking and Großdeutschland Divisions and operating under the XXXIX Panzer Corps.
   b. During the period, members of the vaunted Wehrmacht appeared finally to have seen the light and the sight of a lonely jeep caused men from 15 to 58 years of age--Army, Navy, and Marine--to surrender. Wehrkreise VI, XI and III were well represented by the administrative, replacement and training units, as well as small battle groups, commanded by SS men, the Home Guard, airfield staffs, AAA and searchlight batteries, and convalescents. Even an artillery regiment devoted to the launching of V-2s supplied POWs. The more important units recorded were as follows:
      15th Reconnaissance Battalion
      6th Artillery Replacement Battalion
      3rd Parachute Regiment
      64th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
      6th Anti-Tank Battalion
      902nd Artillery Regiment
      Von Clausewitz Division
   c. Intensive and minute searching and screening was the order of the day, as the period ended, with stragglers, deserters, and would-be evaders in civilian clothes being rounded up and materials, material and buried weapons being uncovered in yards, buildings, forests, and fields.
   d. Enemy killed and captured and enemy equipment destroyed and/or captured during the period follow.

   Killed: 40 FE
   Prisoners of War: 12 Off., 876 EM (many unreported)
   RN V ------------- 1
   RN I ---------------------- 10
   75mm SP Guns ------------- 1
   Armored Ammo Thieves ------------- 2
   Machine guns -- -- -- 1
   44mm Multiple AA Guns -- -- -- -- -- 12
   Half track ------------- -- -- -- 3
   20mm AA Guns -- -- -- -- -- 3
   Staff Cars -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1

RESTRICTED
2. **OWN SITUATION**

a. See Overview Not Applicable.

b. See Overview Not Applicable.

c. See Overview Not Applicable.

At opening of period entire Bn was enroute from bivouac in KREFELD to assembly area in vic DARUP, Germany. Route of March was: ST. TONIS, ALDERKIRK, NEWIRK, SEVELEN, ISSUK, WESSEL, BRUNEN, RÆSPELFELD, ERLE, LENBECK, WESSERDORF, KL. REKEN, LETTE, assembly area vic DARUP. The head of the column reached WESSEL on 1 April at 0445, and lead vehicle crossed the RHINE at 0445. Entire column had cleared the RHINE by 0600.

Due to congested traffic conditions, column was held up for several hours in vic ERLE and LENBECK. Assembly area was reached by 1400 and new CP opened in vic 698702 (sheet P1). All Co. were closed in assembly area by 1600. Co. CP’s were as follows:

- Hq. 738720
- Ron. 735702
- A 721700 
- B 728695
- C 728698

As of 1630 on the same day, Co’s A and B were attached (VOCO) to the 36th and 44th Cav. Squadrons respectively.

Co’s of Companies A and B contacted Sq. Commander to whom their unit was attached, for further instructions.

36th Cav. Sq. prepared to move out on night of 1 April, with mission of screening XXIII Corps left flank to N of MUNSTER.

36th Cav. Sq. with Co. A, 771 TO Bn. attached moved out of assembly area at 2030 on 1 April. Co. A CP was established in vic O31651 in vic VOSEL. 3rd Plat established road blocks in area between 847787 to 889785 (sheet P2).

Co. B was to move out during early morning of 2 April in support of 44th Cav. Sq.

Gp. and Bn CP’s were to move 2 April providing MUNSTER was cleared.

Quartering party from Gp and Bn. Hq. left at 1000 on 2 April to secure billets in vic TELGTE (sheet P2).

As of 021200 April 1945, the status of M-36’s in the Bn was as follows:

- Co. A 11 Destroyers operational
- Co. B 11
- Co. C 11

Lt. Fackler (assist. S-2, acting Liaison Officer) left Bn. CP at 1300 to contact Co. A, whose CP had been reported at O31651. Orders were received at 1700 on 2 April 1945 to remain in present location. The town of TELGTE and vic had not been taken and cleared.

Co B had not left assembly area at time planned; but did move out at 1300 on 2 April 1945. As of 022000 April, they had established CP in vic HOHENHOLTE at 8178 (sheet P2). Information was received from questioning of displaced persons that there were organized groups of SS troops in vic of HOHENHÖLTELTE. This was sent to Co B.

Co C during this period remained under Bn. control to act as area security for both 11th Cav. Gp. Hq. and 771 TD Bn. Hq. One (1) Ron plat was attached to each firing Co.

No further word was received from Co’s A or B; or from Lt. Fackler (Liaison Officer) who had been sent out to contact Co A. It was decided to leave Rear ech. in NOTTULN until CP had been established. One (1) plat, Co C was left as security.

Verbal orders from Co with Cav Sq were received at Bn. Hq. on 3 April at 0900 to change CP locations. Route of march was as follows: NOTTULN, HAVIXECK, ALTENBERGE, GREVEN, SCHERDENHAUSEN, OSTBEVER. During the previous evening Capt. Clarke and Capt. Van Tassel had covered a portion of the route as far as GREVEN to ascertain whether or not the bridge at GREVEN was still in over the Ems Canal. Their reconnaissance disclosed two destroyed enemy trenches in vic 795775, which were blocking the road.
Information was received that these tanks had been removed so column could proceed to destination with no change in planned route. When column reached this point, the tanks were found to be blocking the road; reconnaissance was made and an alternate route was chosen. Column reached GREVEN at 1200.

The GREVEN bridge was in British controlled zone. British troops and convoys were crossing when Bn column arrived; and even though the Bn. was previously given to understand that clearance for the Bn's crossing had been secured, the British refused permission to cross over the Ems Canal by the GREVEN bridge. Co of 771 TD Bn visited British Corps FwD Hq to obtain permission to cross. However, British Corps Hq. said that they had previously informed XIII Corps Hq. that it would be necessary to stop American traffic on the Greven Bridge. They called and talked with a Mjr. Sessions of XIII Corps Hq., who instructed the unit to return and cross the Ems Canal to the south of MUNSTER. A Lt. Colonel Fitzgerald, Brit. Provost Marshall rendered the above information to the Bn Commander. At this time the Bn. could not contact the 11th Cav Gp by any means.

Bn. CO decided unit would return to vic of HAVIXBECK and remain there pending orders from CC 11th Cav Gp. Enroute back to HAVIXBECK the Bn. CO received radio call from Bn. Liaison officer with 11th Cav Gp stating that CO 11th Cav Gp wanted the remainder of the Bn. to proceed by quickest possible route without any further delay to vic OSTBEVERN. Route decided upon was HAVIX-BOCK, TILLECK, ROBSOHEN, SENDEN, AMLEBUHREN, HILTRUP. Ron Co. CO was given mission of reconnoitering for bridges crossing Ems Canal to south of MUNSTER. He was to report to Bn. CO in vic HILTRUP. Remainder of route of march was to be decided upon after canal had been crossed.

When main column reached junction at 871636 (sheet P2) at 1600, traffic congestion prevented further movement. The bridge crossing the Canal at this point was controlled by 5th Armored Div. and was being used at the time by the supply trains of that Div. Column was halted for two hours. Recon elements were located in vic HILTRUP, as was Lt. Eckler (Liaison officer who had been sent out previous morning to contact Co A). He was ordered to return to the Bn CP with the Ren. CO. Bn. CO returned to point where column was halted and the bridge at 871636 being cleared at the time, it was decided that column would be allowed to cross. K-36 Destroyers of Co. C were running very low on gas at this point. A messenger was dispatched to the rear echelon to bring needed gas supplies to OTTMARSBOCHOLT; where Bn. column was to halt for resupply. OTTMARSBOCHOLT was reached by 1900. Lt. Knight was sent out at this point to endeavor to contact Liaison Officer with 11th Cav Gp. Radio contact was established between the two liaison officers and when situation was explained to the CO 11th Cav Gp, he ordered the Bn. to remain in place until a definite route and time were given. All areas in vic OSTBEVERN, it was stated, had not been cleared.

One half-track (Capt. Paddock, the Bn. S-2) had been left in GREVEN to endeavor to establish contact with 11th Cav Gp. He could not do so, and returned to Bn. CP in OTTMARSBOCHOLT at 2230. CP was established at 867583. Bn. HQ., Ron CO Hq., Ron. Pioneer Plat, and two (2) firing platoons of Co C were billeted in this area for the night of 3 April and morning 4 April 1945.

At 0900 on April 4 word was received from 11th Cav Gp that Bn was to proceed to OSTBEVERN immediately. Route of march as designated was: DAVINSBERG, ASCHEBERG, RINKEROD, ABERALON, WOLBECK, ALKESKIRCHEN, EVERSINKEL, OSTBEVERN; crossing Ems River to be made in vic 31750 (sheet P2). When column reached EVERSINKEL, radio contact was established with Capt. Van Tassel, liaison officer with 11th Cav Gp, who informed Bn that only bridge suitable for crossing was one to the east of WAENDORF. Column continued to OSTBEVERN by way of FREHENHORST, WARENDORF, and MILTE.

Upon arrival in OSTBEVERN, the CO of Co A was located and word received as to activities of that unit from 2 April to that time.
On morning of 2 April Co A moved without incident to GREVEN and crossed bridge over Ems Canal. Lost one (1) K-36 at 879793 with burned-out clutch. Upon approaching OSTBEVERN, their column was halted by fire coming from woods in vic of and from the town of OSTBEVERN. Units concerned (including Co. A) were ordered to dig in on the outskirts of town and remain there during the night of 2 and early morning of 3 April. On morning 3 April the 36th Cav Sq, supported by Co. A, assaulted the town and swept it clear of the enemy. Road blocks were then placed by Co. A and Cav units to cover all possible entrances into the town. During the afternoon of 3 April, Cav Gp Hq. had moved into town; and established CP.

On 4 April at 0100, a number of German foot troops attempted a break thru from the N-W entrances to the town. Fire was withheld by Cav and TD units because both units were expecting their supply trains, enroute from GREVEN to OSTBEVERN, and the German SP's were thought to be part of these trains. Fire was withheld because positive identification could not be made. One M-36 in vic 066827 was destroyed by enemy fire. Fire was found to be coming from wooded area near LEHRHEIM and WESTBEVERN.

Another M-36 was also hit by bazooka in same vic as one above, but not destroyed or rendered unserviceable. Co. A expended 15 rds HE 90mm and succeeded in destroying the following:

- 75mm (German TD) SP
- 20mm Tank Destroyer
- 40mm Gun
- Multiple Barrel AA Guns
- 27 German soldiers killed and 50 PWS taken
- 3 40mm guns
- 3 20mm guns

Co. B during this period had continued in support of 44th Cav Sq. in screening of XIII Corps left flank. They were covering an area as far east as GLANDORF. One (1) K-36 was lost from enemy bazooka fire which landed inside the turret. Co B captured one (1) enemy half track and 40 PWS. As of 041700 April the Co. CP was at 165962 (sheet P2).

En Cp as of 041600 April was opened at 073823 (sheet P2). Co. A and Co. C in conjunction with 36th Cav Sq set up perimeter defense of town of OSTBEVERN. Enemy road entrance was blocked with tanks and TD's.

At 2000 on 4 April orders were received that En. was to be prepared to move the following morning at 1000 hrs to vic MELLE.

At 0730 on 5 April, orders were received to move; destination MELLE. Closed CP at 0900 and proceeded by way of WESTENDORF, GLANDORF, LEER, ROTHEFELDE, NOLLE, NUVER, and ALTENWELLER to MELLE.

Route of march was change at DISSSEN area because head of column was receiving small arms fire. Column continued by way of HINPER and DRAKENT to MELLE. Opened CP in vic 490908 (sheet P3) at 1400 on 5 April. At 1500 unit was alerted for further movement to the East; destination to be LUBECKE. Further developments and enemy activity in the area Gp. was then located in made it advisable to move that afternoon.

Orders were received that Gp. and En would move at 0830 on 6 April.

Co's A and B continued mission of supporting Cav Sq in the screening of XIII Corps left flank from GLANDORF to LUBECKE to MINDEN. At 2000 hrs on 5 April Co. B moved out for MINDEN area. Co. C was still in reserve and remained with En. and Gp. Hq. Co. C patrolled town of MELLE during the hours of darkness. During the afternoon word was received that Co. A had destroyed seven (7) multiple mt. 40mm guns and three (3) multiple at 20mm guns.

At 0645 on 6 April 1945, order was received from 11th Cav Gp Hq. to send out a patrol to vic HERFORD to look for one (1) 2 ton and several 1 ton trucks which had been sent out the previous afternoon to transport prisoners. Patrol recalled after one (1) hour because truck and jeeps had returned to Gp. Hq.

At 0900 the Sn (less A and B) left KALLE for LUBECKE (sheet N3). Route of march - NENTER, WHERINGOR, LAMBS BRINKE, RODINGHAUSEN, HEDDINGHAUSEN, BLASHEN, LUBECKE. CP opened in
- insert at line 18-Several 75mm SP guns entered the town.
LUBBECHE at 1230 on 6 April. Co. C with attached Recon platoon, set up road patrols in the town and established road blocks at main roads into town.

Capt. Clarke, CO Recon Co., called at 1500 and stated that enemy foot troops had been located in woods south of LUBBECHE in vic 605105 (sheet N3). Troop C of 36th Cav Sq, the Recon platoon, and Co. C of 771 TD Bn succeeded in flushing the enemy out of the woods. 87 FMs were taken.

At this time Co. B was in MINDEN performing road patrols and setting up road blocks. Fired 10 rds HE 90mm at suspected machine gun nests in vic 816100; directly across the river from MINDEN. Destroyed four (4) buildings in which machine guns were believed to have been located.

Co. A had opened CP in BIELSEN as of 1200, but opened a fwd CP at 1500 in vic SUNDE. Continued support of screen on XII Corps left flank between KELLE and LUBBECHE.

On 7 April Bn (-) continued outpost and road block LUBBECHE, and Co's A and B continued in support of screening mission by also establishing road block and patrols.

36th Cav Sq with Co A in support and attached was to cross WESER River south of MINDEN and to screen XII Corps left flank from MINDEN to SACHSEHAGEN.

44th Cav Sq with Co B in support and attached was to cross in same vic and screen from SACHSEHAGEN to WUNSTORF. Bn (-) was alerted for movement at 1600. Prepared to move out at 2040.

Several postponements due to traffic congestion set Bn departure to 0430 on 8 April. Route of march: EILHAUSEN, EICHRORST, DUSSEN, cross WESER River in vic 805060, PETZIN, TALLENSEN, KESPE, NEEHAN, SACHSEHAGEN, crossed WESER River at 0830.

Shortly before crossing was made CC 11th Cav Gp called for the Co's of 771 TD Bn to proceed as rapidly as possible to help CO 11th Cav Gp maintain right resistance throughout here.

Resistance was overcome without need of Co. C, so Co. was ordered to maintain its place in column.

Bn opened CP at 1200 in vic NIEDERNWOHRN at 960182 (sheet N3). Co. C opened in vic 960175. Co. A opened vic 955185. Co. A and Co B remained attached to respective Cav Sq's. As of 08 April Co. C (less one (1) plat) was attached to 36th Cav Sq. One (1) plat was to remain in vic of Gp and Bn. CP and established road blocks.

Per Letter of Instructions #41 dated 8 April 1945 issued from 11th Cav Gp to 36th Cav with Companies A and C of 771 TD Bn, attached would move across the Bordeneau Bridge over the LEINE River; cross the same in conjunction with the British, move south, seize and hold the bridges in vic RICKLINGEN and the autobahn; would reconnoiter in vic PRIELINGEN and HOSSELT; would extend reconnaissance screen from LEINE river to the East on XIII Corps left flank. Would continue constant contact with British on left and elements XIII Corps on right after the crossing of the river. 44th Sq with Co. B 771 TD Bn attached would screen XIII Corps left flank from NIEDERNWOHRN to LEINE River (exclusive) continue liaison and contact with British on left and 84th Inf Div on right.

At 1910 report was received that one (1) M-36 from Co. B had been knocked out in vic 202272 from direct fire from an enemy SP gun. 12rds HE and 6 rds APC were expended on fleeing SP gun.

Early during the morning of 9 April, two (2) passengers returned to Bn CP with word that an artillery shell had struck the CP of Co. A in vic BOREDAU. One (1) officer Co. C was killed and two (2) officers (including CO) were injured. Several members of A Co. CP were injured at the same time. Capt. Beaver (CO Co. C) was replaced by Capt. Van Tassel.

Word was received from 11th Cav Gp at 0600 on 9 April that as of 101000 April, the En (less one (1) Co.) was to revert to operational control of 1028 Inf Div.

Bn Co. C and 8-3 visited CP of 1028 Inf Div in WERTHER. Received instructions to assemble Bn (-) across the LEINE River in vic OSTERWALD and proceed with maintenance and rehabilitation before returning to Div for further operations.
During day of 9 April 1945, Co. C expended 20 tons of 14 rds 75mm on direct fire at enemy tanks.

CP at NIETENWAGEN closed at 1430 and was scheduled to open in HORNWIST but destination was changed to WUNSTORF. CP was opened in vic 162265 (sheet N4) at 1530 on 9 April 1945.

Report was received that Co. B had destroyed one (1) enemy tank in vic 316300 (sheet N4).

On 101000 April Bn (less one (1) Co. with attached Rcn plat) reverted to 102d Inf Div control as previously instructed. Bn (-) closed CP in WUNSTORF and proceeded to cross LEINE River.

Co. C assembled in vic HEITLINGEN with CP at 1434 hrs and was scheduled to open in Potsdam destination WUNSTORF and Bn (-) closed CP in WUNSTORF at 1330 hrs was to move southwest of HANNOVER to vic RONNENBERG and join Div in that area.

On 12 April at 0900 word was received that Bn would not join the Div in RONNENBERG, but at LEHOTE. (sheet N4) Co. C was to join the 406th RCT as it passed thru HANNOVER. (sheet N4). Co. A was to join 405th as it passed in vic GR: IDRCP. Co. B was to remain with 11th Cav Gr. Route of march for Bn (-) was as follows: OSTERWALL, HANNOVER, ANDERTEN, ROVER, HENHOF, LEHOTE.

CP opened in LEHOTE at 523214 at 1230.

Co. A joined 405 RCT in vic LEHOTE. Co. C joined 406th RCT as planned. As of 1800 Co. A was disposed as follows: CP at 819278; A-1 in vic RITTHEN; A-2 in vic ROTGESUESSL; A-3 in MEINE; all plts were prepared to continue the advance in the zone of the 406th.

Co. C closed in vic GIFHORN at 1900; prepared to continue advance to the N and E in the zone of the 406th.

As of 0930 on 13 April, Bn CP closed in LEHOTE and opened in GIFHORN.

Word received that one (1) M-36 from Co. C had broken bridge in vic HILLEN; M-36 was partially submerged; two (2) men killed; three (3) men injured. One (1) A Co. M-36 caught fire in vic 827235. Completely burned.

Co. C moved forward in its zone in support of 406th RCT to vic KOBELITZ (sheet N5).

Co. A moved forward in its zone in support of 405th RCT to vic KOCATE and PECKFITS (sheet N5).

Bn CP opened in vic WENZE (sheet N5) at 1800. Column endeavored to cross the WESER-ELBE Canal in several places, succeeded in doing so in vic 230365 (sheet N5). T-2 (recovery vehicle) broke bridge at 255360 and had to be left there under guard.

As of 1900 Co. C had one (1) plat attached to a task force set up by 5th armored Div. Also received word at this time that Co. C had two (2) M-36s unoperational in vic ZETTLINGEN due to lack of bogie wheels. Co. C CP opened in vic KLOZE (sheet N5).

No word was received from Co. B.

Bn. closed CP in vic WENZE (sheet N5) and opened vic BISMARK (sheet N6) in vic 588585 at 1200 on 14 April 1945. Route of march was WENZE; TEIFLIGGEN; PECKFITZ; JEGGAN; BREITENFELDE; SCHWEBAU; ZICHTAU; GR. ENGERHEN; GALEB; NEUENDORF; HOMBURG; TRARITZ; BISMARK.

The Bn CO decided to continue to vic STENDL and establish CP there. CP was closed in BISMARK at 1330 hrs and opened in STENDL (788528) (Sheet N6) at 1530 hrs.

Co. C completed at this time, was assembled in vic OSTERBERG.

Co. A CP and second plat. was in vic GARDENEN (sheet N6) and 1st plat. in vic STENDL; 3rd plat. in vic BORSTEL.

On 15 April Co. A CP moved to vic STENDL. Sec. plat. remained in vic GARDENEN. Orders were received that Bn (-) was to initiate a rigid program of maintenance and rehabilitation in
preparation for planned crossing of ELBE in the future.

On April 16, 3n Liaison officer with 102d Div arty brought information that Co. A would come under operational control of 379th FA BN and Co. C under 380th FA BN. Co's of Cos A and C were to contact Co's of 379th FA BN and 380th FA BN, and were to be in position to render supporting fires on night of 18 April 1945.

Companies A and C were also instructed to reconnoiter for direct fire positions in support of a probable river crossing by the 102d Inf Div.

Co. A placed one (1) plat in indirect fire position in vic 851517 by 1900 on 16 April in preparation to support fires of 102d Div Arty. Co. A had one (1) plat in BORSTEL and one (1) in vic GARDELEN.

Word was received from Co. B that Co. had assembled in vic ARENDSE (sheet N6). One plat was on west side of lake and one on east side of lake.

Co. C remained assembled in vic OSTBERG (sheet N6). On 17 April Co. C reconnoitered for both direct and indirect fire positions in assigned sector. (see overlay #2). There was no change in any locations as of 1701 on 17 April 1945.

At 1800 on 17 April, call from XIII Corps ordered Bn. to move out in support of 5th Armored Div. Bn. (less one (1) Co.) was to be attached operationally to 5th Armored Div for mopping-up operations. Co. C was to join CCB (5th Arm Div) at TANGELH; Co. A to join GCR in vic BRUNAU. Remainder of Bn. was to proceed to area via STOCKHEIM. Route of march: STENDAL; BISMARCK; BRUNAU; CHEINITZ; ROHRBORG; STOCKHEIM (sheet N5). BN. CP closed in STENDAL of 2300 on 17 April and opened in STOCKHEIM at 0630 on 18 April. Mission as assigned Bn. was to support 5th Arm Div in preventing attacks on north flank of XIII Corps.

Co. A was located vic WINTERFELD (sheet N5), temporarily. Co. C was located in vic AHLUM (sheet N5).

Co. B sent word that Co. was disposed as follows: CF and 3rd Plt. at 530627, 2nd Plt. at 517851 and 1st Plt. in SALZWEDEL (N-5).

All companies had established road blocks and sent out area patrols. Co. C placed 3rd Plt. in vic HANUM (sheet N5) to road block and outpost the town in conjunction with the Armored Inf. The remainder of Co. C performed the same mission in vic AHLUM (sheet N5).

Received word from Co. A that entire Co. had moved as of 1520 to vic 345765 (N5). 1st Plt. Co. A moved at 2000 to vic 745645 (N5).

On 19 April 1945 Co. C placed 2nd Plt. in vic MELLIN (sheet N5) to establish road blocks. 3rd Plt. remained at HANUM performing same mission.

Co. B remained in position as indicated above.

Co. A—CP, 2nd Plt., and 3rd Plt. in vic 345675 (sheet N5).

1st Plt. was left in position at 245645.

On dr during the night of 18th April and morning of 19th April 3rd Plt. Co. C in vic HANUM (sheet N5) had to destroy one (1) American half track complete with German soldiers, who attempted to break thru the road blocks. Also destroyed two (2) German Staff cars and two buildings occupied by German soldiers. Expended 12 rounds HE 90mm.

5th Arm Div was scheduled to attack to the North on morning of 20 April. However, the scheduled attack was postponed 24 hrs so that cleaning up operations could be completed before attacking to the North. GCR and CCB were to work directly to the north to the ELBE River, the 29th Div. following them and cleaning out rear areas. Co. C was to support attack of CCB with direct fire from vic HANUM.

At 2000 on 19 April Bn. S-3 talked with G-3 5th Arm Div. and was informed that Bn. less one (1) Co. would be attached for
operational purposes to the 11th Cav Gp as soon as 5th Arm Div
attack to the North took place.

Co. C maintained one (1) plat in HANUM; one (1) section in
AHLUM; one (1) plat in MELLIN; one destroyer in STOCKHEIM (GF
protection). All M-36's except one at STOCKHEIM were being used
as road blocks.

There was no change in positions of Co's A and B.

On 20 April there was no change in positions of Co's A and C.

However Co. B attached to 11th Cav Gp had shifted positions.

One (1) plat was in vic TRITTIGLEBEN; one (1) in vic KUSEY and
one (1) plat. in vic NEUFERCHAU remained with Gp. Hq. All
platoons were used in setting up road blocks.

As of 1800 on 20 April Bn (-) was attached to 11th Cav Gp.

Co. B was attached to 44th Cav Sq and Co. C to 36th Cav Sq.

Co. A was to remain with 5th Armored Div. who in turn attached
the Co. to the 202d FA Gp. 1st plat to 2d FA Bn; 2d plat
to 561st FA Bn and 3rd Plat to 261st FA Bn. Mission was to pro-
tect the artillery En from enemy armor threats.

On 21 April quartering party left for NEUFERCHAU (sheet N5).

Bn left vic STOCKHEIM at 0900 to join 11th Cav Gp in
NEUFERCHAU. Bn opened Cp in NEUFERCHAU at 1030 hrs.

Co. C CP established in vic KUSEY. 1st Plat. in vic 312538;
2nd Plat. 276529 and 317537. One plat (3rd) remained in KUSEY.

Road blocks were established in vic of all above locations.

Co. B had one (1) plat in vic TRITTIGLEBEN (sheet N5) and
two in vic NEUFERCHAU.

At 1230 following shifts in position took place—1st plat Co. B to cover area from TRITTIGLEBEN to JEGGAG; one plat Co. C
to cover area from WENZE (exclusive) to TRITTIGLEBEN. Six M-36s
of Co. C remained in vic KLITZE (sheet N5). Two Co. B platoons
were to remain in NEUFERCHAU.

Co. A attached 202 FA Gr. set up road blocks in following
locations: A-1

1st Sect. 314750
Sec Sect. 295750

A-2

1st Sect. 345770
Sec Sect. 318770

A-3

1st Sect. 292780
Sec Sect. 280750

CT location 345765 (sheet M-5)

As of 1800 the wooded area surrounding KLITZE (to N, NE, E, SE,
and S) were cleared of all enemy resistance. Companies B and C
recalled all platoons to assemble in vic of their respective CFs.

Co. B established road blocks in and about vic NEUFERCHAU for
GF protection of 11th Cav Gp and En. Hq.

Co. C assembled platoons in vic 267528 (sheet N5).

On 22 April Co. B and C positions remained the same.

Co. A closed in vic SALZWEDELL at 1500 and escorted Fa Bn. of
202d FA 3p to vic LUCHOW (sheet N-5). CP located at 297910.

1st Plat in vic REH30CH (294950); sec plat—one section at
285918, second section at 273939; 3rd plat in vic 310921.

On 23 April Co. B sent one (1) plat. to act as protection for
the 11th Cav Gp Hq. which moved to vic KUNRAU and was placed in
vic 225460 (sheet N5).

Co. C was moved to town of NEUFERCHAU.

On 24 April there was no change in positions or mission of
Co. B and C. As of 0745 Co. A was released from operational
control of 5th Arm Div. and joined Bn. Moved entire Co. to vic
WENZE (sheet N-5)

Co's B and C were performing road patrols in assigned areas as
per instructions. (See overlay #3 and attached instruction sheet)

All Companies continued to perform maintenance and hold
supply checks throught 25-26 April.

Orders were received verbally from XIII Corps ATO on 26 April
that Bn. was again to revert to control of CG 102d Inf Div.
Bn, Co and S-3 visited Div. Hq. and received area for occupation, screening, searching, and policing. Plans were made to move to assigned area by 1400 on 27 April 1945.

On 27 April Bn. S-3 visited XIII Corps Hq. and received final verification on planned move and occupation of new area.

Bn. complete moved from vic NEUFCHÂTEAU to assigned area (see overlay #4). CP located in LINNSTEDT (574504); Co. A in KASSICK (543498); Co. E in RINSFELD (504474); Co. C CP at KENSTEDT (506474) and two plat. in TRUSTEDT (551467); 3rd plat. was located at airport (513507) performing guard duty; Ron Co. in ALKENSTEDT (513507). All units had closed in assigned area by 1700 on 27 April.

On 28th April, all companies began search, police, and screen of assigned areas (see overlay #4). Ron Co. placed guards on two (2) hospitals and one (1) pharmacy in vic GARDELEGEN. Co. A and 3 patrolled area as designated on overlay #4.

GARDELEGEN was subdivided so that all units would receive an equal portion to screen, police and search. (See overlay #5).

Ron Co. was relieved of guard on installations in GARDELEGEN by units of 701st Tank Bn. on 0800 on 29 April.

On 29th and 30th April the Bn continued to establish military gov't in assigned area. Preliminary search, police, and screen of the area had been completed and a more systematic and thorough search had been initiated at the close of the period.

Total Ammunition Expenditure during period:

128 HE - - - - 46 30C

Remarks:

During the pursuit phase of the attack from the RHINE to the ELBE, in which this Bn. played a part, some points were made very clear and certain definite conclusions drawn:

1. A Tank Destroyer Bn. is exceedingly versatile in use.

2. Supply problem in the pursuit phase is one of prime importance. The greatest difficulty encountered was in keeping sufficient fuel and lubricants on hand. The amount of gas necessary to refill a TD Bn. is approximately 12,000 gals, and present transportation permits only half a refill to be carried. When great distances are covered regularly (as they were during the past operations) and a great many column marches used; the mileage per gallon on the M-36 is greatly reduced. The T/O and E of the TD Bn. is entirely inadequate as far as fuel transport vehicles are concerned.

3. It was also found advisable (when possible to secure) to carry at least one (1) or more spare boggie wheels on each M-36. Twice during the past period boggies were not available in sufficient quantities and M-36s were unoperational because of this lack. In the pursuit phase of an attack, a unit should carry as much of all the necessary items that it possibly can. Supply lines were always stretched to the breaking point.

4. Administrative difficulties increased considerably in the pursuit phase. They are too often forgotten, when actually they are more essential.

5. ADMINISTRATIVE

a. Status of Strength of Command and reinforcements needed.

(1) Officers and Warrant officers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Shortage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq. Co.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ron. Co.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Co.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Co.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Co.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med. Det.</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18
(2) Enlisted Men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorized</th>
<th>Assigned</th>
<th>Shortage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rcn Co.</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Co.</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Co.</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Co.</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med. Det.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
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</table>

b. Casualties

(1) Officers and Warrant officers:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Evac</th>
<th>Non-evac</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rcn Co.</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Co.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Co.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Co.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(2) Enlisted Men

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Evac</th>
<th>Non-evac</th>
<th>Captured</th>
<th>Missing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Co.</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Co.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Co.</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Med. Det.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Enlisted Men captured: 565 (estimated)

d. Evacuation casualties divided approximately as follows:

- Twenty-five percent through Battalion Medical Detachment, and
- Seventy-five percent through Medical installations of units
to which the Battalion was attached; 102d Inf. Div., 11th
Cav. Gr., and 5th Armored Division.

e. (1) The following officers were assigned to the Battalion
during the month of April 1945:

- Rcn. Co. 2nd Lt. Charles H. Hall Platoon Commander
- B Co. 1st Lt. Stanley C. Wakild
- C Co. 2nd Lt. Wilbur E. Jacoby
- Med. Det. 1st Lt. Corley W. Odom Bn. Medical Officer

(2) The following officers were lost to the Battalion
during the month of April 1945:

- Rcn. Co. 1st Lt. Herbert F. Hallet Platoon Commander
- C Co. 1st Lt. John H. Petersen Co. Exec. Officer
- C Co. Capt. Walter S. Beaver Company Commander
- C Co. 1st Lt. John F. Konahan Platoon Commander

f. Decorations awarded during month of April 1945.

(1) Purple Heart

- Officers 2
- Enlisted Men 19

(2) Bronze Star

- Officers 9
- Enlisted Men 3

(3) Silver Star

- Officers 1
- Enlisted Men 0

- Status of Supply

The supply situation was made exceedingly trying at times
during the period because the unit was engaged in a pursuit
phase of battle.

The pressing need was for more fuel and lubricants.

Replacements on vehicles came through very rapidly. At
the close of the period the Bn. was lacking only one (1)
M-36 destroyer.

At times it was impossible because of distance involved
for immediate evacuation. However, it was carried on continually with the equipment on hand.

Captured property and equipment which has been found during the screen, search, and police of the area has been evacuated in accordance with Annex #1 to Letter of Instruction #82 from Hq. 102d Inf. Div., dated 1100E, 26 April 1945.

Certain items of supply such as following were listed as critical at end of the period:

1. Stoves, cooking, 1-burner
2. Heaters, water, immersion type
3. C.O. pants and shirts and cleaning and preserving material.

DAVID DeG SMITH,
Lt. Col., FA,
Commanding.