

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS 636th TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
Office of the Battalion Commander

AFC 164, U. S. Army
9 February 1944

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Records

TO : Commanding General, 36th Infantry Division, AFC 20, U. S. Army

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in Letter, Allied Force Headquarters, dated 20 April 1943, file AG 314.7/339 3-3, Subject: Historical Records and Histories of Organizations, transmitted herewith Operations in Italy, January 1944 of this Battalion.

2. Conclusions:

a. A 3 inch self-propelled gun Tank Destroyer in support of a river crossing presents an interesting study in employment. First the thirty-two ton vehicle must wait for the armor d force bridge or Bailey to be constructed, so the pre-crossing employment of the T.D. will be considered. The high velocity, beautifully accurate 3 inch gun is ideally suited to smash pill boxes, enemy emplacements, and knock down houses near the crossing in which enemy snipers and machine gunners lurk. Contrary to popular belief the guns are most effective when sited in close-up indirect positions with flash defilade and with minimum elevation sufficient to engage close in targets. All thirty-six guns of the battalion must be carefully registered on a common base point and several check points in the target area. Forward observers placed well up with the Infantry outposts along the river in the zone of the supported unit bring the massed fire of the Battalion to bear on targets of opportunity and on located enemy strong points. These observers can also bring fire to bear on any enemy armor which may be used in the initial stages of the crossing.

Van W. Pyland

VAN W. PYLAND
Lt Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

1 Incl:

Narrative of Operations for the month
of January 1944, with attached annexes

SECRET

14-63.2
3612

20

~~SECRET~~

HEADQUARTERS 636th TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 464, U. S. Army

7 February 1944

OPERATIONS IN ITALY, JANUARY 1944

The first fourteen days of January 1944 were spent in a rear area, in the vicinity of Piedmonte D'Alife (289040), where the Battalion reorganized in accordance with the new Table of Organization, and underwent a short training period with the new organization. On January 14th, the Battalion Commander received a warning order to move the Battalion to an assemble area between Mount Lungo and Mount Forchia, from which it could support the 36th Division in an operation against the German line across the Rapido River, near S. Angelo.

The Battalion Commander took the staff forward on January 14th to reconnoiter an assembly area. Upon completion of the reconnaissance the Company Commanders were ordered to report to the Battalion CP the following morning prepared to go on an all day reconnaissance with the staff to select assembly areas.

The following two days, 15th and 16th January, were spent in the reconnaissance and preparation of the assembly area which had been selected. The 17th and 18th of January were spent in moving into the assembly area. The positions selected were as follows:

Battalion CP	(978145)
Reconnaissance Company	(973148)
Company "A"	(940157)
Company "B"	(935154)
Company "C"	(930154)

At 1400 hours on the 18th of January, the Battalion Commander held a meeting of the Staff and Company Commanders to orient them on the present situation. Information was exchanged which had been obtained from the various reconnaissances, which had been conducted during the day. At the conclusion of the meeting, Staff members guided Company Commanders to forward areas which they would most likely occupy to support the planned attack. After supper that night another Staff Conference was held to complete plans which the Battalion would follow. A message was sent to

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

the Company Commanders directing them to report to the Battalion CP the following morning.

At 0800 hours, 19 January, the Staff and Company Commanders assembled and the Battalion Commander issued orders which resulted in the movement of the Companies to their combat positions from their assembly areas. The Battalion Commander also directed that Reconnaissance Company supply two officers to maintain Liaison with the two assaulting Infantry Battalions of the 141st. The Company Commanders were also informed that the Battalion mission was to support the 141st Infantry in the assault on the Rapido River defenses.

The Destroyer Companies moved to indirect firing positions in the vicinity of (901164) during the night 19-20 January beginning the movement at 1700 hours and completing the movement prior to daylight. The following day the Battalion Commander selected direct fire positions for Company B and the light tanks of Reconnaissance Company on La Pieta Hill in order to give direct support to the 141st Regimental Combat Team in its Rapido River crossing operation. Lt Colonel Pyland then ordered the Pioneer Platoon to clear a mine field located on the right side of the hill on which Company B was to place part of its guns. Four men of the Pioneer Platoon were wounded in clearing this mine field by anti-personnel mines.

During the morning of this same day the Battalion Commander selected a forward CP at a house just in the rear of La Pieta Hill and located an OP on this hill. Another CP was located on Mount Trocchio and manned by observers from Companies A and C. Company B manned and operated an OP on a small hill near the boundary between the assaulting Regimental Combat Teams and near the Rapido River.

Liaison Officers were sent to the Regimental Headquarters and to each of the assaulting Battalions of the 141st Infantry. Visibility was poor all day, but the Companies in indirect fire positions succeeded in registering on a base point on the north edge of S. Angelo. The Division Field Order was received at 1109, and it was found that one Destroyer Company was to follow the Infantry across the River at a point north of S. Angelo as soon as a Bailey bridge was completed. Reconnaissance was immediately made to check the route and ground to see if it would be possible for the Destroyers to use it. This reconnaissance was made by Captain Kinnison, the Battalion S-2. Company A was ordered to be prepared to make the crossing as soon as the bridge was completed, preceded by the six light tanks of Reconnaissance Company. Captain Pearson of Company A, with Lt Walker of Reconnaissance Company, who was to lead the light

SECRET

tanks, went forward to make a reconnaissance of the route to be used.

At 1930 hours, the Battalion began its preparatory fire with the Companies that were in indirect fire positions and 2030 hours, the preparatory fires were completed. As the assault progressed, our Liaison Officers kept the Battalion Commander posted on the situation and called for fire on suitable targets.

On the morning of Jan 21st, it was found that the Bailey bridge had not been constructed, so Company A remained in its indirect fire positions. At 0715 hours, Company C reported a direct hit on one of its destroyers, killing one man and disabling the destroyer.

Constant contact was maintained with the assaulting Regiment through our Liaison Officers in order that close support might be given. As soon as it was learned that our troops had gained only a small foothold across the River, Companies A and C fired missions on S. Angelo and areas beyond S. Angelo.

At 1100 hours, 1st Lt John C. Campbell, O-1168196, our Liaison Officer to the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry called and stated that the 2nd Battalion was going to attack, and as there was no Liaison Officer from our Battalion with it, requested that he be permitted to report to the 2nd Battalion. The Battalion Commander gave his consent and Lt Campbell reported to the Battalion Commander, 2nd Battalion, 141st Infantry.

At 1130 hours, a message was received stating that the attack was to be resumed at 1400 hours. The Company Commanders were called in and given the new situation by the Battalion Commander. The Battalion Commander directed that Companies A and C continue to lay harassing fire on the enemy positions beyond the area held by our troops at the bridge site. Due to the smoke and haze it was impossible to observe the fires.

During the conference word was received that an allied force had landed south of Rome. At 1306 hours word was received that the attack would not be launched until 1500 hours and the Companies were immediately notified of the change. At 1730 hours, word was received that the hour of the attack had been changed to 2200 hours and the Companies were notified.

During the early part of the evening it appeared that the crossing was proceeding according to plan and one Platoon of Company A moved into position in the vicinity of (893168), prepared to follow the Infantry as soon as the bridge was constructed. A considerable amount of enemy

SECRET

23

SECRET

artillery fell in the Destroyer Companies' positions during the night, but no damage was done, and counter-battery fire was placed on Nebelwerfer positions by Company C.

By 0640 hours, 22 January, most of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 141st had crossed the Rapido, but the Engineers were having difficulty in constructing the bridge due to mines and heavy artillery and mortar fire, but reported they expected to have the bridge constructed by noon. At 0735 hours, it was learned that the 141st Infantry was being held up by very heavy enemy mortar and machine gun fire. Heavy enemy artillery and Nebelwerfer fire was falling at the site where the bridge was under construction. Company C, which was still in indirect fire positions delivered fire on Nebelwerfer positions. Later in the morning, fire was also delivered on S. Angelo and other targets in that vicinity. The 141st Infantry requested that we continue to fire on the Nebelwerfer positions to keep them silent. Prior to daylight heavy artillery (170 mm) had fallen in the Battalion Service Echelon area and the Battalion Commander directed the Executive Officer and the Adjutant to select a new area for it.

At 1027 hours, a report was received that 1st Lt John C. Campbell, O-1168196, Liaison to the 2nd Battalion, 141st Infantry, was killed at 1000 hours by an enemy mortar shell. The Sergeant assisting Lt Campbell on his mission reported that Lt Campbell had left his foxhole to telephone a report to Lt Colonel Fyland, the Battalion Commander, and that the shell exploded just to the front of Lt Campbell, as he telephoned.

At 1055 hours, Division Artillery requested that we keep two guns firing on the Nebelwerfer which we had located, as it remained inactive as long as we placed fire on it.

Enemy artillery fire on the entire area was quite heavy making it very difficult for wire communications to be maintained. It was necessary for wire crews to work on the lines almost constantly.

Since it was found that the bridge would not be completed during the day Company A was moved back into indirect fire positions in order to support the operation with its fire.

The Commanding Officer, 141st Infantry called during the afternoon of 22 January and reported that the Battalion's fire was very helpful and seemed to be highly effective. The Battalion Commander assured the Commanding Officer, 141st Infantry, that we would continue to fire on every target that appeared and on those reported to us by the Infantry.

Late in the afternoon the Service Echelon was moved to a new location closing in the new area (933156) at 1615 hours.

5
SECRET

24

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

At 1655 hours, Company B reported that another man had been injured by shell fragments from a concentration that had just fallen in its area.

Throughout the morning of 23 Jan, Companies A and C fired on targets opposite the sector of the 141st Infantry and also fired several counter-battery missions on enemy Nebelwerfers and artillery positions. At 1146 hours, we received information from the 141st Infantry that a demonstration would be staged during the night and that our destroyers would participate.

At 1500 hours, our Liaison Officer, with the 36th Division visited the CP with information concerning the demonstration which was planned. The Battalion Commander received permission to move the Company B destroyers, which were in direct fire position to indirect fire positions in the vicinity of Companies A and C, in order that their fire might be better used to support the Infantry. At 2200 hours, the Battalion participated in a Division demonstration, firing 288 rounds of 3-inch HE on targets assigned by the Division Artillery. At 2340 hours, information was received from the 36th Division that there would be no smoking of the valley the following day. Smoke had been so heavy during the last few days that it was impossible for the Artillery observers to adjust fire on the enemy.

Orders were received on 24 January to participate in another demonstration that was planned for that evening. The Battalion Commander ordered Reconnaissance Company to move forward to take part in the demonstration and plans were made to use .30 cal. and .50 cal. machine guns, and light tanks in the demonstration. One platoon of Company B was also ordered to move back into direct fire positions to assist in the demonstration.

The Battalion continued to fire harassing missions and also observed fire on selected targets across the Rapido all during the day.

The Division Artillery gave the rate and time of fire to be used during the demonstration. Just at dusk, the light tanks and machine gun crews of the Reconnaissance Company moved to the forward slope of La Pieta to take up positions for the demonstration that night. The .30 cal. and .50 cal. machine guns were emplaced about 100 yards in front of the light tanks. One Platoon of Company B with its .50 cal. machine guns also took position on La Pieta, prepared to fire during the demonstration. The remainder of the Battalion fired indirect fire missions.

The machine guns participating were ordered to carefully dig in their positions as it was anticipated that heavy mortar and artillery fire would fall on these forward positions as soon as they began firing. The

SECRET

25

SECRET

demonstration was staged at three different hours during the night and the light tanks, machine guns, and destroyers on La Pieta received considerable counter-battery fire. After firing the last demonstration, about 20 minutes was allowed for the machine gun barrels to cool and the counter-battery fire to lift. The tanks, destroyers and machine guns were then withdrawn to their regular positions just prior to daylight.

At 0842 hours, Division Artillery alerted the Battalion to be prepared to meet any counter-attack which might be launched against our positions down Highway #6 or up from the Junction of the Papido and Carigliano Rivers.

The Battalion Commander received word that the Division was going on the defensive and that the Battalion was to support the 143rd Infantry. A direct telephone line was laid to the 143rd Infantry and defensive fires were planned for this work. It was not necessary to move any of the Companies as the entire 143rd Infantry sector could be easily covered from the positions the Companies occupied. Our Liaison Officer to the 141st Infantry was instructed to report to the 143rd Infantry.

For the first time in several days the weather was clear, and the visibility was good on the morning of 26 January. Our forward observers were alerted to be especially watchful for any targets that might appear opposite our sector. All organizations were cautioned to be particularly careful about camouflage discipline.

The 141st Infantry located a cave in the vicinity of (858141) where enemy activity was noticed and requested fire to be placed on it. The target was adjusted on by our forward observer and no further activity was seen near it.

About noon, the Company C area was heavily shelled by the enemy with 150mm and larger shells, and some extra ammunition was set on fire. It was necessary to move some of the Destroyers to save them from burning. As counter-battery continued to fall in the Battalion area, the Battalion Commander requested that smoke be laid to obscure the enemy observation.

During one of the enemy counter-batteries in the Company B area, a shell fragment knocked the sight mount from one of the Destroyers.

The Battalion continued to fire on Nebelwerfer positions and other enemy targets throughout the day. Several Nebelwerfers were silenced by this fire.

The Battalion was directed to participate in the Division demonstration

7
SECRET

26

SECRET

that was to be staged during the night. Enemy dispositions were taken under fire during the demonstration. Due to the restriction on ammunition, it was not possible to fire as many rounds on harassing and other missions as requested by Division Artillery.

At 1900 hours, enemy track vehicles were reported in S. Angelo by Division Artillery and harassing fires were placed in this area. The 143rd Infantry reported this fire was effective. At 2005 hours, the 143rd Infantry reported vehicles on the road south of S. Angelo and harassing fire was placed in that area.

At 0050 hours, 27 January, word was received from Division Headquarters that the remaining demonstration fires had been postponed until 0600 hours and our destroyer companies were notified accordingly. The 143rd Infantry called at 0815 hours and reported that no enemy activity was observed opposite that sector during the night and the Division Artillery requested that our CP's check the area around S. Angelo carefully for evidence of damage caused by the firing on the previous night. Throughout the day the enemy installations opposite our sector of the River were systematically shelled and all suspicious buildings were fired on. An enemy machine gun and mortar position was located by a 143rd Infantry observer and Company C took it under fire. The Infantry observers reported the enemy installation destroyed. One of our observers located an enemy pillbox at (859148) and Company C layed on it. Several HE shells with delay fuse made direct hits but apparently had no effect, so APC shells were used and excellent effect was observed. The pillbox was penetrated and ammunition or other explosives inside the pillbox were ignited causing a large explosion completely demolishing the installation. The S-2 of the 143rd Infantry requested information regarding the type of ammunition used in destroying the pillbox and this information was supplied.

The Division planned another demonstration during the night and requested that our Battalion participate in it. The hours and rate of fire were given to the Destroyer Companies as well as targets to be fired on. On 28 January, the Battalion was requested to support the 34th Division with fire and this was co-ordinated with the 36th Division Artillery. All guns were checked to determine what fire could be placed in the 34th Division sector.

During the morning, enemy Nebelwerfer fire fell in the Battalion area

SECRET

27

SECRET

and shell reports were turned in on it. The Battalion did some firing in the 34th Division area and continued to cover known and observed targets opposite our sector. By noon the visibility became poor and it was difficult to determine the results of our fire. Another enemy pillbox was located and Company B fired on it until smoke began pouring from the door indicating that ammunition or equipment inside had been set on fire. The enemy evidently began smoking the valley to obscure our observation.

At 1430 hours, the enemy fire on our destroyer positions became very heavy and it was estimated that around 300 rounds fell in the three company positions during the afternoon. A direct hit on the house in which the Company A CP was located destroyed it and slightly injured the Company Commander, Captain Alec F. Pearson and his Executive Officer, 1st Lt Robert E. Graham. An enlisted man of the Company CP, Tec 5 Henry E. Behr, was slightly injured. In the Company C area, a white phosphorous shell ignited the camouflage nets. Shell reports were turned in on this shelling and it was noted that the largest shells that had been used on our positions fell in this concentration, as there were about 4 shells in the Company A area which made craters six feet deep and twenty-four feet in diameter. The hole made by one unexploded shell measured thirty inches in diameter. All of this information was given to G-2 of the 34th Division. Lt Colonel Island, the Battalion Commander had these measurements verified.

At a conference with the Staff during the evening, the Battalion Commander directed that alternate positions be located the following morning so that the Destroyer Companies could be moved as it was evident that their positions had been located by the enemy and that they were well registered on them.

The Battalion Command Post received some shell fire during the afternoon and the Headquarters Company Mess Sergeant and one cook were lightly wounded.

On the morning of 29 January, the Battalion Commander, with the Company Commanders of the Destroyer Companies and members of the Staff made a reconnaissance for alternate positions for the destroyer Companies. After checking the area, the Battalion Commander directed that Company A move to a new location at (923140) and that Companies B and C shift their positions one or two hundred yards and disperse more, but remain in the same general area that they had occupied previously. All these changes were made during the day and all Platoons re-registered on the base point. Only a few destroyers were moved at a time and the Battalion continued to fire on targets which appeared opposite the Division sector and those

SECRET

28

SECRET

called in by the Infantry and Artillery. All the areas received some enemy shelling during the day and night but no heavy concentrations fell in the new areas such as those which were received during the previous day.

From about 0100 to 0130 hours and from 0501 to 0530 hours, heavy artillery shells estimated to be 170mm or larger fell near the Battalion CP. The craters indicated that the fire was coming from two different positions, one opposite the 34th Division sector and one opposite the 36th Division sector. There were no casualties from this fire. The Executive Officer made a shelling report giving all the facts that could be obtained to assist in locating the long range guns, which were doing this shelling.

Visibility was poor during the day but it was possible to engage several targets. No harassing missions were assigned by the Division Artillery.

The Battalion Commander attended a conference with the Division Commander. Upon returning, held a meeting with the Staff and Company Commanders. The Battalion Commander explained the situation and gave the plan of a proposed attack on S. Angelo. The attack was only to be made if the 34th Division was successful in making a break through.

All Companies were alerted to take part in the attack if it materialized and were assigned missions to fire on the town and the vicinity just back of the town to cover the advance of the Infantry.

The Battalion Commander attended a conference at the Division Artillery to learn just what fires were expected from this Battalion and found that the firing would take place as a demonstration whether an attack was actually launched or not. Upon returning to the Battalion CP, the Company Commanders were given complete information about the firing for the night and the missions were carried out as scheduled. As the break through was not effected, the Infantry did not make the proposed attack that night.

On 31 January, the Battalion continued to search the enemy positions across the Rapido River selecting known targets and thoroughly covering them with fire. Late aerial photographs were found to be very helpful in selecting targets and the positions located by the Division Photographic Interpreter were pointed out to our forward observers to assist in selecting targets to be fired on.

Wherever possible, enemy movement was noted by our observers was fired on and in a number of instances, excellent effect was observed.

SECRET

SECRET

When no actual targets could be observed, harassing fires were placed on suspected area and roads. Houses opposite our positions were systematically covered by fire as it was found in the S. Pietro operation that the enemy made a practice of occupying them in most instances.

Five houses were reported completely destroyed that were known to be occupied by the enemy and strong points which had been pointed out by the Aerial Photographic Interpreter, were well covered by fire several times during the day. The harassing fires for the night which had been assigned by the Division Artillery were planned by the Battalion Commander and the Staff assigned these missions to the various companies.

No replacements were received for the period for which this report is rendered.

Map Reference: 1:50,000.

Attached Annexes:

1. Copy of Unit Journal
2. Overlays of Positions
3. Personnel Casualties during period
4. Materiel destroyed or damaged by enemy action
5. Enemy Casualties caused by 636th TD Bn during period

For the Battalion Commander:

Regan L. Duxose
REGAN L. DUXOSE
Captain, Infantry
Unit Historian

OFFICIAL:

REGAN L. DUXOSE
Captain, Infantry
Adjutant

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

33

? ~~RESTRICTED~~



OPERATION OVERLAY #28A

HQ 636 TD BN APO #464


1400 23 JAN 44

MAP: ITALY 1:50,000

ORDERS:


1. COMPANY "B" WILL MOVE FROM PRESENT DIRECT FIRE POSITIONS TO INDIRECT FIRE POSITION SHOWN ON OVERLAY DURING DARKNESS 23 JAN 44.

2. BN AID STATION WILL MOVE FROM PRESENT LOCATION TO LOCATION SHOWN ON OVERLAY 23 JAN 44



TD 636

23 JAN 44



OFFICIAL

BODENMILLER

S-3

PYLAND

C.O

~~RESTRICTED~~ ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

RESTRICTED

OPERATION OVERLAY # 28 B

Hq 636 TD BN. APO 7464



1500. 29 JAN 44

MAP: ITALY 1:50,000

ORDERS:

1. COMPANY A WILL MOVE FROM PRESENT
INDIRECT FIRE POSITIONS TO INDIRECT
FIRE POSITIONS AS SHOWN ON OVERLAY
DURING DARKNESS 29 JAN 44

2. ROUTE OF MARCH, SEE OVERLAY



TD 636

A TD 636


PYLAND
CO

OFFICIAL:
BODENMILLER

S-3

RESTRICTED

~~SECRET~~



34

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 3

PERSONNEL BATTLE CASUALTY REPORT

OFFICERS

ENLISTED MEN

	<u>KILLED</u>	<u>WOUNDED</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>	<u>KILLED</u>	<u>WOUNDED</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>CAPTURED</u>
18 Jan 44	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
19 Jan 44	0	1	0	0	0	6	0	0
22 Jan 44	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0
23 Jan 44	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
28 Jan 44	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	1	5	0	0	1	13	0	0

ANNEX NO. 3

SECRET

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 3

BATTLE CASUALTY REPORT

GRADE	NAME	DATE OF CASUALTY	STATUS OF CASUALTY	PLACE OF BIRTH
<u>HEADQUARTERS</u>				
<u>Officers</u>				
KINNISON, PAUL (M.D.)	Capt	0-344051	18 Jan 44	LWA 427 Fulton Ave. San Antonio, Texas
BRUECKNER, MORITZ F.	1st Lt	0-1168190	19 Jan 44	LWA 2905 Fletcher Rd. Chelsea, Mich.
<u>HEADQUARTERS COMPANY</u>				
<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
BLOYD, DELBERT F.	Sgt	37147019	28 Jan 44	LWA 836 S. 23rd St. Lincoln, Neb.
STOFER, BERNARD E.	Rec 5	37163338	28 Jan 44	LWA 107 Front Ave. St Paul, Minn.
<u>RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY</u>				
<u>Officers</u>				
CAMPBELL, JOHN C.	1st Lt	0-1168196	22 Jan 44	KIA 2406 Chestnut St. Columbia, S. C.
RODGERS, REYNOLDS D.	1st Lt	0-1288125	22 Jan 44	LWA 126 E. 22nd St. Erie, Pa.
<u>Unlisted Men</u>				
STOVER, HERSCHEL C.	Sgt	35219466	19 Jan 44	SWA 607 Harrison St. Newell, W. Va.
LALLMAN, ALVIN H.	Cpl	37146940	19 Jan 44	SWA Gen. Delivery Arlington, Va.
OLIVER, CHARLES H.	Cpl	37145107	19 Jan 44	LWA RFD 1, Guilford, Co.
HARRIS, JAMES C.	Pvt 1 cl	35213572	19 Jan 44	LWA Route 23 Taverly, Ohio
PENNINGTON, COYNE D.	Pvt 1 cl	37146982	19 Jan 44	SWA Gen Delivery Humboldt, Neb.
SALDIVAR, BENITO M.	Pvt	38027521	19 Jan 44	LWA 619 Grant St. Laredo, Texas
<u>COMPANY "A"</u>				
<u>Officers</u>				
PEARSON, ALEC P.	Capt	0-394225	28 Jan 44	LWA Route 15, Box 20 Waco, Texas
GRAHAM, ROBERT E.	1st Lt	0-1168254	28 Jan 44	LWA 11 Broad St. Sumter, S. C.
<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
SCHWAKE, ELTON L.	1st Sgt	38050898	28 Jan 44	LWA 420 W. 32nd St. Houston, Texas
PRICE, WILLIAM H., JR.	Cpl	38052856	28 Jan 44	LWA 1235 Columbia St. Houston, Texas
BEHR, HENRY E.	Rec 5	38081369	28 Jan 44	LWA 4242 Travis St. Dallas, Texas

ANNEX NO. 3

SECRET

36

ANNEX NO. 3 (Cont'd)

REF ID: A66000

COMPANY "B"

	<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
SHAW, FERMAN O.	Sgt	38038666	22 Jan 44	LWA	Route #2 Garland, Texas
SHAW, DAVID E.	Tec 5	31206545	23 Jan 44	LWA	17 Mechanic St. Boston, Mass.

COMPANY "C"

	<u>Enlisted Men</u>				
O'BRYANT, JOHN W.	Pvt 1 cl	35358422	22 Jan 44	DOW	Gen Delivery Daleville, Ind.

ANNEX NO. 3

~~SECRET~~

37

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX NO. 4.

MATERIEL DESTROYED OR DAMAGED
By ENEMY ACTION

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>DISPOSITION</u>
Mine Detector, SCR 625	12 January 1944	Requisitioned
M-10 Tank Destroyer	21 January 1944	Replaced
Circle, Aiming M1	22 January 1944	Replaced
3 - Carbines, Cal .30 M1	28 January 1944	Requisitioned
3 - Gun, Thompson submachine Cal .45	28 January 1944	Requisitioned
Board, drawing	28 January 1944	Requisitioned

ANNEX NO. 4.

SECRET

37

SECRET

ANNEX NO. 5.

ENEMY CASUALTY REPORT

- Par. 1. Total expenditure of 3" ammunition during period was 17,900 rounds of H.E. and 43 rounds of A.P.C., and 27 rounds of 3" smoke. Total expenditure of 37 mm ammunition during period was 340 rounds of H.E.. Total expenditure of .50 caliber ammunition during period was 30,000 rounds. Total expenditure of .30 caliber ammunition was 15,000 rounds.
- Par. 2. Estimated enemy personnel killed: Due to the nature of operation of this unit during this period no accurate estimate of enemy killed can be made.
- Par. 3. Damage to enemy material: Due to the nature of operation of this unit during this period no accurate estimate of enemy materiel damaged or destroyed can be made.

ANNEX NO. 5.

SECRET

39