

The chief obstacle to a start on the new tank destroyer was due to previous failures in tests by Ordnance of individually sprung wheel suspension.¹³ The volute spring and bogie suspension then common to nearly all U.S. Army tracked vehicles would not permit the speed and maneuverability desired; as, with increased speed, vibration became destructive.¹⁴

Thus it was the middle of March before action was attained by General Bruce, conferring with Mr. Davidson of General Motors Corporation, on a vehicle design embodying Christie suspension. Subsequently a Christie suspension was devised and developed for a vehicle of track laying type, by Mr. Schilling, engineer for General Motors.¹⁵ This gun motor carriage was first designed to mount the 37mm gun, but before Ordnance could designate it as the T42, it was redesigned to mount a 57mm gun and designated 3 April 1942 by the Ordnance Department as the T49.¹⁶

With the development of a tank destroyer weapon on its way, other problems of the Board such as Tables of Organization and Equipment, and doctrine and training, were somewhat simplified because their solutions were inherently dependent on the type of primary weapon to be achieved.

To meet the need of the 28 light and 6 heavy battalions activated 15 December 1941,¹⁷ Colonel Bruce and members of the Board published, for battalion commanding officers, tentative tables of organization 13 December 1941.¹⁸ These tables of organization and charts were based on the experience gained in the fall maneuvers of 1941.¹⁹ The soundness of the original tentative tables of organization in providing a reconnaissance company, three gun companies and a headquarters company, is pointed to in all subsequent tables of organization and equipment. At this early date, the tables of organization and equipment were influenced by the concept of the visualized ideal tank destroyer with speed and mobility. Tanks, being too slow, were eliminated from the tables of organization and equipment.²⁰

The Board continued studies on tables of organization and equipment, and subsequent to a directive by the Commanding General, Tank Destroyer Center, submitted recommendations on 19 March 1942 that the heavy self-propelled battalion be adopted as standard.²¹ After approval by the War Department, for a single standard type tank destroyer battalion, tables of organization and equipment for this single type battalion were published on 8 June 1942.²²

Equipollent with the need for a new tank destroyer weapon and tables of organization and equipment was the need for textbooks prescribing the use and tactical employment of tank destroyer equipment and personnel.

Reference to the list of projects (appendices, Chapt. IX) discloses that Projects No's. 6 to 10 inclusive, and Projects 13, 14, 16 and 17, were adopted by the Board in December 1941, and January and February 1942, to make available the new theory, practice, tactical use and employment of tank destroyer units and their equipment.

Special emphasis and concentration were directed on Project No. 10, Organization and Tactics of Tank Destroyers, which was adopted as a project 20 December 1941.²³ The emphasis on this subject appeared of first importance because logistics, tables of organization, gunnery, and other training literature were incidental to and fabricated around the tactics and technique of tank destroyers.²⁴

Whereas early tank destroyer doctrine and tactical employment were created from data of provisional antitank battalions in the maneuvers in 1941, and from reports of observers and from studies of the British and German antitank tactics, the new concept of tank destroyers called for offensive and aggressive tactics as opposed

to the old static and passive defense doctrine.²⁵

The principal characteristics desired of tank destroyer units were a high degree of armor piercing firepower, a high battlefield mobility, and facilities for rapid communication. Lightly armored to afford protection against small arms fire, they retained maneuverability. They were intended to operate in close coordination with other combat units but were capable of independent action.

It was recognized by the Tank Destroyer Board that the tank destroyer units would be most effective when employed to canalize and destroy enemy armored forces, to block encirclement or envelopment by hostile armored attack, and to provide security against hostile armored action in all types of operations. These functions were regarded as primary tank destroyer missions.²⁶

Preparation of Field Manual 18-5, Organization and Tactics of Tank Destroyer Units, was begun by the Board in January 1942. The doctrine formulated by the Tank Destroyer Board and included in this manual was based on the new concept of tank destroyers and the lessons learned in: the experiences of provisional antitank units in the 1941 maneuvers, the training notes compiled by the 93d Antitank Battalion, and reports and studies of British and German tank and antitank operations. The manual was completed in May 1942, and was published by the War Department on 16 June 1942.²⁷

In the light of battle experience in the Tunisian campaign, the Tank Destroyer Board began a revision of Field Manual 18-5 in May 1943. Cooperation with other combat elements and more elastic methods of employment were emphasized.²⁸ The tactical section of the Board was transferred to the Tank Destroyer School in August 1943, and the revision of the manual was completed by the School.²⁹ The relationship of the tank destroyer weapon, doctrine and training and tables of organization was well illustrated in the Board's effort to solve all three problems concurrently.

On 8 June 1942, the proposed tables of organization for the single type tank destroyer battalion were approved by the War Department. The authorization of self-propelled anti-aircraft weapons, adequate security sections, and strong reconnaissance platoons indicated a trend toward flexibility and self-sufficiency of tank destroyer battalions.³⁰

Observations in maneuvers and extensive tests at Camp Hood proved the 8 June 1942 tank destroyer battalion tables of organization inefficient in many respects. It was found that the battalion headquarters company lacked a sufficient number of cargo vehicles to insure constant supply of the battalion with ammunition. There was also a shortage of supply, administrative, and maintenance personnel. It was evident that additional armored vehicles were needed to provide protection against small arms fire. It was also apparent that an armored wrecker was needed for battlefield recovery of disabled vehicles. An increase of armored cars in the reconnaissance company was also desired. In accordance with these requirements, recommendations were made for changes that would increase the equipment and personnel of the tank destroyer battalion.³¹

On 22 July 1942, Army Ground Forces informed the Tank Destroyer Command that a decision had been reached to eliminate the 37mm guns from the tank destroyer companies. It was decided to make the 3 inch gun the standard weapon for tank destroyer units. These changes did not affect the reconnaissance company which retained the 37mm gun mounted in the Light Armored Car, M-8. New tables of organization were developed to provide personnel for the heavier weapons and to improve on the current tables.³²

On 9 November 1942, new tables of organization for the tank destroyer battalion were submitted which eliminated the light platoons and provided for the necessary increases in personnel and equipment.³³ However, a directive from Army Ground

Forces on 12 November 1942 ordered that all organizations be reduced fifteen per cent in personnel and twenty per cent in motor transportation.³⁴ This decision again necessitated the modification of the tables of organization. Administrative and supply personnel were reduced and many supply and tactical vehicles eliminated, the most important of these being the self-propelled antiaircraft vehicles. The tables were revised and new tables of organization submitted on 1 December 1942. These were approved and officially published on 27 January 1943.³⁵

Army Ground Forces directed on 1 January 1943 that tests be made of a tank destroyer battalion equipped with towed guns. The Tank Destroyer Board conducted a series of tests to determine the suitability of the 3 inch antiaircraft gun M-5 mounted on the 105mm howitzer carriage M-2 as a weapon for the proposed towed battalion. The tests proved successful, and the tables of organization for this unit were submitted. The organization recommended was essentially the same as the self-propelled battalion. The main difference were the elimination of the reconnaissance company, the inclusion of two reconnaissance platoons in the headquarters company, increased personnel in the gun crews, and enlarged security sections.³⁶

This new unit was approved as recommended by the Tank Destroyer Center, with minor modifications. The tables of organization were published on 7 May 1943. They provided for a headquarters and headquarters company which included two reconnaissance platoons. The three gun companies consisted of a company headquarters and three platoons of four 3-inch guns each, towed by half-track prime movers.³⁷

Concurrent with the development and improvement of tank destroyer battalion organization of the Board was developing tables of organization for higher headquarters to provide tactical and administrative control of battalions.

As early as the 1941 maneuvers, the need for such a headquarters was evident. Provisional antitank groups were employed by the Third Army in the Louisiana maneuvers of August and September, 1941, and a similar organization was tested by the First Army in the October and November Carolina maneuvers. Operating with the 93d Antitank Battalion, the first provisional General Headquarters tank destroyer battalion, in the Carolina maneuvers, were engineers, field artillery, cavalry, reconnaissance, and chemical warfare troops. These units were grouped together under a single headquarters termed a "Tank Attacker" headquarters. This was the nucleus of the group headquarters idea.³⁸

It was desired by the War Department, however, that only tank destroyer elements should be included in the groups. In view of these tests verbal instructions were issued by the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, that a study be made to provide tank destroyer units with a headquarters higher than battalion. This would provide closer cooperation between units and would permit the group or any part of it to be available for attachment to other organizations. On 5 January 1942, the first official tables of organization for a tank destroyer group headquarters and headquarters company were published by the War Department.³⁹

The group headquarters company was made up of a company headquarters with sections for command and operations and for mess and maintenance. War Department policy at this time prescribed that a group headquarters be organized tactically; thus a number of administrative personnel and items of equipment were eliminated.⁴⁰ The revised tables were published on 26 May 1943.⁴¹

To facilitate further control of tank destroyer organizations, it was evident that a headquarters higher than the group would be necessary. This headquarters could be attached to army and corps headquarters to provide: supervision and coordination of training, a focal center for the collection of antitank information, tactical control

of tank destroyer units in battle, an officer with the necessary assistants to act as a staff officer for the corps or army commander, and facile control of task forces formed with tank destroyer units as a nucleus.⁴²

To fill these requirements, the Tank Destroyer Board developed a table of organization for a tank destroyer brigade headquarters. These tables were submitted to headquarters, Army Ground Forces, 11 August 1942, and were approved. The brigade headquarters organization was similar to that of group headquarters.⁴³

The intrarelationship of the three major problems confronting the Board during the early months of 1942 was met by a "modus operandi" by the Board imposing coordination not only throughout the Board personnel but with all sections of Tank Destroyer Center. While under Colonel Fay Ross and later Colonel Hazen L. Hoyt, as acting president, the three sections of the Board were comprised of specialists in research. The solution of problems (projects) of Board origin or those initiated by formal directive of higher headquarters, required a long range policy in order to obviate repetition of tests on corollaries.⁴⁴ Each problem was assigned to the best qualified person or group of persons on the Board. Exhaustive research and tests were required of them, round table discussions by all Board personnel held, and their findings submitted to other sections of the Center for comment and suggestions.⁴⁵

The Board, in an effort to make reports on projects short, accurate and clear beyond the power of descriptive words, established a photographic laboratory during March 1942. Thereafter all reports on tests and equipment included photographs illustrating the why and wherefor of conclusions reached and recommendations made.⁴⁶

With the opening of Camp Hood in September 1942, better facilities for testing were available and the Board was reorganized along more definite functional lines.

Colonel Ray C. Montgomery, who had continued to serve as liaison officer at Aberdeen Proving Ground⁴⁷ became president of the Board, 30 August 1942.⁴⁸ In his reorganization of the Board of September 1942, the administrative section was expanded to include a supply and shop sub-section and a mail and records sub-section. The tactical section was increased to include sub-sections on tactical employment, tables of organization, training literature and visual aids. The automotive section was redesigned to include a weapons section, a communications section, and a pioneer section.⁴⁹ Further minor changes in the organization of the Board were made from time to time as a matter of more closely following missions, and are recorded by charts in Appendices, Chapter IX.

Liaison with War Department and manufacturing agencies was maintained and direct expeditious action achieved by the Board.

With substantial progress on the three major pressing problems and with a proper organization, the scope of activities of the Tank Destroyer Center as analyzed through the list of projects contained in Appendices, Chapter IX, reveals that under the supervision and jurisdiction of the Tank Destroyer Center, the Board had assumed and been allowed to interpret its mission as permitting great latitude in initiating and developing tank destroyer materiel. Analysis of the list of projects shows many skips in numerical sequence. This was caused by the Board adopting a project which was later found to be either capable of incorporation in another project, or a solution which had been evolved by some other service board, or obsolete in the view of later developments.⁵⁰

During the early part of the year 1942, the majority of projects adopted by the Tank Destroyer Board were of Board origin; but after establishment of proper liaison with other War Department agencies, the list of projects shows that the majority were

initiated and authorized by Army Ground Forces or higher headquarters.

The list of projects undertaken and reported on reflected the many contingent problems arising from a proper solution of the major problems previously mentioned. The Records on each project reveal the thoroughness of research establishing positive conclusions offered by the Board. In studying the list of projects and the recommendations made, there was but one report, namely, Project No. 264, which carried a proviso which might have been eliminated through further research.⁵¹

Among the outstanding contingent problems confronting the Tank Destroyer Board in the early part of 1942 were those of sighting equipment, training films and communications.

When the 75mm GMC M-3 was developed, the panoramic sight was removed and replaced by the straight telescopic sight developed for the 37mm gun. This sight was modified by the use of a gridded reticle ballistically calibrated for the 75mm gun and was standardized as the M-33. This was found to be unsatisfactory because of its low power, limited field of vision and the type of reticle.

The most important change desired by the Tank Destroyer Board was the elimination of the many lines in the grid type reticle which obstructed the view of the target, and an increase of magnification in order to facilitate sighting on targets at distances greater than 1000 yards.⁵²

Since the desired characteristics of sights to be used by both the Armored Force and tank destroyers were the same, close cooperation was maintained between the two Boards.

Projects on the proper sighting equipment reflected continuous action and intermittent concentrations on the subject during 1942 and it was not until January 1943 that a reticle designed by the Armored Force Board was tested by both that Board and the Tank Destroyer Board and a single type reticle for all armored force and tank destroyer weapons was recommended. The sight adopted was a three power sight with sight lines spaced at 400 yards instead of 500 yards and was known as the antitank reticle.⁵³

The advent of the towed tank destroyer gun necessitated efficient sighting equipment for it. After extensive work, the T-108 sight, with three power magnification and seven degree field of vision, utilizing plastic lenses, was approved and adopted for use with the 3 inch gun carriage M-1.⁵⁴

Indirect laying by tank destroyers in the execution of their secondary mission further involved the sight problem. The panoramic sight was suitable for indirect laying but was unobtainable because of limited production.⁵⁵ The azimuth indicator, a development of the Armored Force Board, was tested by the Tank Destroyer Board and found satisfactory for measuring horizontal angles.⁵⁶

The Board met considerable difficulty in production of training films and film strips. Eighteen training films and eleven film strips had been authorized by the Army Ground Forces for Tank Destroyer Board action. The Army Ground Forces directed that all scenarios be completed by 30 June 1943.

The preparation of these scenarios was hampered by lack of skilled personnel. Writers were secured on a loan basis from the signal corps, but proved generally unsatisfactory as most of them were unqualified. During the seven months period from December 1942 to June 1943, there were eleven different scenario writers on duty with the Tank Destroyer Board visual aids section.⁵⁷

In spite of the lack of adequate and experienced personnel, eight film strips were produced and released by the Tank Destroyer Board. Six of these strips covered different phases of the 3 inch GMC M-10 and the others dealt with the care and cleaning of the 75mm GMC M-3 and bore-sighting. Film bulletins entitled "Seek, Strike and Destroy," "Training Under Fire," "Close Combat Firing," "The 3-inch Gun Motor Carriage, M-10," and "The T-70 Tank Destroyer - 'Hell Cat'" were also produced by the Tank Destroyer Board.⁵⁸

The communications section of the Tank Destroyer Board was charged with the responsibility of testing all signal and communication equipment. Particular emphasis was placed on the testing of radio facilities and electrical and visual signaling devices. Tests were performed by this section, for the purpose of determining the need and suitability of equipment for tank destroyer use. The performance, structural ruggedness, compactness, serviceability, and portability of equipment were also considered.⁵⁹

The responsibility of the communications section did not end with the testing of equipment. It was the function of this section to anticipate future communication requirements. Based on tests by this section, recommendations were made for the development of new equipment and accessories.⁶⁰ Among these developments was the Case, JS 137, a double tray crystal holder which fitted into the Power Unit PE 117 of the SCR 610 radio, permitting the entire complement of 120 crystals to be transported with the set at all times.⁶¹

This section was vitally interested in the development and test of tank destroyer vehicles as they pertained to stowage, operation, and maintenance of inter-phone and other signal equipment. Vehicle suppression, including track static, the position of control boxes, switches, extension cords, and the position of operators were all subjects of study. The communication equipment worn and carried by the individual crew members was tested to determine whether it could be easily operated and worn without discomfort.⁶²

From studies along these lines, recommendations were made for the standardization of Head Set HE 30, Lip Microphone T-45, and retractable cord assembly CD 801 for tank destroyer use.⁶³

Also included in the activities of the communications section were studies of signal maintenance problems, such as the training of maintenance personnel and tools and equipment for the proper care of signal equipment. A report on the study of radio maintenance plans for tank destroyer units conducted in July 1943, brought out the need for more adequate maintenance facilities.⁶⁴ Operational procedure and the organization of tank destroyer radio nets were also important features for development by this section.⁶⁵

An important achievement of the Tank Destroyer Board was that of the test of the antitank rocket launcher in July 1942. This rocket launcher, commonly called the "bazooka", utilized the rocket principle of propulsion by attaching a new tail assembly to the M-10 grenade. The special launching device was known as the rocket launcher M-1. After exhaustive tests, the Board recommended that the launcher be adopted at once and that issue be made to tank destroyer units immediately.⁶⁶

Because of the exhaustive tests made by the Tank Destroyer Board and the merit accorded the weapon, the Board was requested to prepare a tentative training circular for technical use of the rocket launcher.⁶⁷ Major John C. Hooker, Tank Destroyer Board, performed the tests on the launcher and prepared data for a training circular. The subject matter as presented by the Board was subsequently incorporated in a War Department Training Circular published on 15 December 1942.⁶⁸



Incidental to the major objective of the Board, but of real importance, was the development of supplemental vehicles for the tank destroyer units. During March 1942, the 37mm GMC T22, built by the Ford Motor Company, was recommended for issue to tank destroyer units for use in reconnaissance companies. This vehicle was standardized as the light armored car M8. A further modification of this vehicle - the removal of the gun turret and top plate - made it adaptable as a light armored personnel carrier.⁶⁹ This vehicle was standardized as the car, armored, utility, M20 for use in tank destroyer units.⁷⁰

The development of the tank destroyer primary weapon was a difficult problem. It was a story of enthusiastic tank destroyer men in action and of their refusing to pay obeisance to maxims and negatives seemingly supported by past failure. Other difficulties appeared in manufacturing conditions.

Much credit should be given to the Ordnance Department, when, in an effort to decentralize during the early part of 1942, it created the Tank Automotive Center with headquarters at Detroit. This Center was autonomous and through it the Tank Destroyer Board was able to obtain expeditious action in the design of the ideal tank destroyer. The problem of the tank destroyers in achieving their primary weapon was also simplified through direct approach to the manufacturing agencies in Detroit. Lt. Colonel W. E. Sherwood acted as liaison officer for the Tank Destroyer Board with the Tank Automotive Center at Detroit during the period of development of the tank destroyer primary weapon.⁷¹ He was in constant contact with ordnance, manufacturing agencies and the Tank Destroyer Board, and the day by day progress on the development of the tank destroyer primary weapon is reflected in three volumes of notes and

memoranda directed by him to the Tank Destroyer Center.⁷²



On 2 May 1942, an important conference was held at Aberdeen Proving Ground between General Bruce, the president of the Tank Destroyer Board, and representatives of Ordnance and of the Requirements Division of the War Department. During this meeting a 3 inch GMC T35 developed by General Motors Corporation and the Ford Motor Company was exhibited and tested with a view to standardizing it as a primary tank destroyer. General Bruce did not approve the standardization of this self-propelled mount, deeming it another expedient. The speed of the vehicle was 30mph and the weight was approximately 30 tons. In spite of these handicaps, this vehicle was standardized in two forms - the 3 inch GMC M10, a General Motors product with twin diesel engines, and the 3 inch GMC M10A1, a Ford Motor product with a V-8 tank engine. Both types were issued to the tank destroyer battalions.⁷³

Notwithstanding the substitutes and expedients offered the Tank Destroyer Center and the Board, work continued on the development of the T49 which possessed the characteristics necessary for mobility and maneuverability. The creation of the T49 offered definite indications of the basic characteristics desired; but, in line with the need for a heavier weapon, the Commanding General on 2 July 1942 recommended to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, a redesignation of the T49 and requested definitely that the 75mm gun M2A3 be used in lieu of the 57mm.⁷⁴

The development of this 3 inch gun motor carriage with Christie suspension was well under way by General Motors Corporation and a pilot model was available for tests on the 3rd of September 1942, at Aberdeen Proving Ground. During this test, General Barnes of the Ordnance Department called the attention of General Bruce and of

Colonel Montgomery to a new 76mm gun.⁷⁵ This gun embodied the same physical characteristics of the 75mm, and had the same breechblock, recoil and similar design of tube. Through a longer tube and the use of a larger cartridge case, a much higher muzzle velocity and a greater striking power were attained than with the 75mm gun, and that without an appreciable increase in weight. The 76mm gun was in reality a 76.2mm caliber weapon, equivalent to the 3 inch but much lighter in weight than the 3 inch. It had the additional advantage over the 75mm of using the same projective as the 3 inch.⁷⁶ General Bruce and Colonel Montgomery quickly perceived the superiority of this weapon.

The 75mm gun motor carriage with Christie suspension was designated 19 November 1942 as the T67.⁷⁷ Representatives of the Board met with the Ordnance Department and manufacturing representatives in Detroit on 22 and 23 December 1942 and the decision was made by General Bruce covering additional important characteristics which were to be incorporated in the GMC 76mm.⁷⁸ One of the most important of these decisions was the use of the torsion bar in lieu of springs in the suspension system. On 7 January 1943, the T67 75mm gun motor carriage project was brought to a close and the Ordnance Department designated the 76.2mm gun motor carriage the T70.⁷⁹

The Tank Destroyer Board had adopted as a project the T70 on 31 December 1942 and from that time on until the middle of 1944, continued tests to achieve the perfection desired. Between 31 December 1942 and 23 November 1943, the Board made sixteen complete reports on tests of the T70 and the recommendations covered in these reports were to effect 157 modifications and changes in the design of the vehicle.⁸⁰ Subsequent to the preliminary reports, twelve production models of the T70 were received by the Board during the latter part of 1943 and after the Board had submitted the vehicles and the weapons to every reasonable test, only fifteen modifications and changes were requested.⁸¹

The Buick Division of General Motors Corporation had been making its own tests on the experimental models of the T67 and T70. The performance of the vehicle was such as to inspire the nickname "Hellcat", and it was thus named by them.⁸² The 76mm gun motor carriage T70 was standardized by OCM Item 23202, as the M-18, 16 March 1944. During maneuvers, it was clearly discernable that the M-18 showed a tendency to over-run its own security section, and other tank destroyer vehicles. Upon a study by the Board of this problem it was found that by removing the gun and turret from the M-18, a utility vehicle was quickly achieved with the necessary speed characteristics to stay up with the M-18. This adaptation of the M-18 was known as the T41 and recommended by the Board as an auxiliary vehicle for the tank destroyers. This adaptation of the M-18 was designated by OCM Item 26106 on 1 February 1945.

During the latter part of 1944 and 1945, the Board efforts were directed toward improvement of the many items of equipment used by tank destroyers. The tank dozer was tested and found superior for excavating positions for emplaced destroyers, thereby effecting defilade, concealment and security. The tank dozer was a blade attached to the M10 or M10A1 destroyer and upon recommendation by the Board, two each tank dozers were added to the tables of organization and equipment for each M10 company in February 1943. One of the biggest problems confronting the Board in 1945 was the problem of muzzle blast. The subject was given over-all and concentrated attention by the Board and many conferences were held with scientists of the leading technical schools and with Ordnance Department and the Research Council. The project reports on this subject reveal some progress in improvement of ammunition and primer which would minimize smoke without increasing flash. Muzzle brakes first adopted by the Germans were tested and they too effected some relief from muzzle blast through the diverting of the gasses to the rear and upwards at an angle of 45 degrees.⁸³ The problem of dust and blast obscuration, which vitally affected the gunner's ability to observe and repeat fire, is still unsolved. This problem, along with that of stabilization of the gun

carriage, radar, and armored turret covers for both the 90mm and the 76mm gun motor carriages, were the objects of intense effort on the part of the Board during the final months up to V-J Day, 2 September 1945.

SUMMARY: The Tank Destroyer Board was initiated 1 December 1941 and in forty-five months reported on more than 300 projects and tests.

The Tank Destroyer Board compiled Tables of Organization and Equipment and the original Field Manual 18-5 - Organization and Tactics - which formed the basis for the tactical use and employment of tank destroyer weapons and personnel.

The Board contributed in a major way in the development and refinement of motor carriages, M-8, M-10, M-10A1, M-20 and M-36.

It first tested and recommended subsequent improvements in the rocket launcher M1 (bazooka), and then at the request of the War Department, compiled the text for the tactical use and employment thereof. This resulted in the War Department Training Circular No. 104, 16 December 1942.

The greatest single accomplishment of the Tank Destroyer Board was the development of the M-18, 76mm GMC Tank Destroyer and the M-39, an all-purpose vehicle. More than 157 modifications were effected on the original design of the M-18. In the development of the M-18, Mr. C. L. McCuen, Mr. W. J. Davidson, Mr. W. K. Haig, Mr. E. T. Ragsdale and other officials of General Motor Corporation deserve special mention for their cooperation and work with Ordnance and the Tank Destroyer Board. Major (later Lieutenant Colonel) W. A. Wood, Jr., of the Tank Destroyer Board effected many changes and modifications which resulted in superior performance by the vehicle. For his work in the development of the M-18, Colonel Wood was later awarded the Legion of Merit by the War Department.⁸⁴

WEAPONS AND VEHICLES:

M-18: The M-18 was designed specifically as a highly mobile, self-propelled gun for action against enemy armor. Its development for this requirement was "from the ground up," - it is completely new. In its design, the 3" (76mm) was selected, with a 15 lb. projectile at 2760 f/s muzzle velocity and a penetration of 4.5" of armor at 1000 yards. Since maximum gun power and high mobility were incompatible with armor of tank thickness, protection against small arms only was contemplated.

Results:

Gun: A 76mm (3"), utilizing a compact 75mm recoil mechanism; in open turret for maximum vision; direct sight of advanced design; azimuth indicator and quadrant for indirect laying; maximum range, 14,500 yards - highly accurate; projectile fits both 76mm and 3" guns and is fixed in cartridge case, complete round being 5 lbs. lighter for 76 than the 3", - since the cases differ, complete rounds are not interchangeable.


Chassis and Engine: 1/2" armor basis; improved radial engine of 480 hp; newly designed track, steel, rubber-bushed, with slack compensation, capable of high speed and with life double that of tanks; ground pressure approximately 11 bs; slope-climbing ability 60% or 50% with towed load of 8000 lbs. Forging depth, 48". Speed, 55 mph.

Summary: A highly mobile gun motor carriage with new suspension, having individually mounted wheels on trailing arms, torsion bar springing, new track, torquatic transmission, engine and transmission differential removable on rails through doors in

one hour, horse-power weight ratio of 25 to 1. Weight 17 tons.

Gun - power, turret-mounted, of armor-penetrating caliber and velocity, flat trajectory with a good direct laying sight (telescope), means for indirect laying.





Capable of widely varied tactical application as a self-propelled gun.



Armored Utility Vehicles M-39: The M-39 is a prime mover modification of M-18, with the gun and turret removed, affording space in hull for a crew of ten and 47 rounds of ammunition; as ammunition carrier transports 263 rounds 3" and crew of two; mobility characteristics same as the M-18 but weight of 16 tons. The M-39 was approved as the prime mover for the 3" guns M1 and M6, and use as a reconnaissance vehicle.

3" Gun Motor Carriage M-10 and M-10A1: 3" Gun Motor Carriage M-10 is a modification of the standard M4A2 Medium Tank chassis, mounting the 3" Gun M7 in an open top, hand-operated, 360° traversable turret. Vehicle weight is 32 tons, carrying a crew of five and 54 rounds of 3" ammunition. Vehicle is powered by a 375 horsepower, twin 6 diesel engine, providing a top speed of 30 miles per hour, with a maximum gradeability of 50%. Fording depth is 36". 3" Gun Motor Carriage M10A1 differs from the M10 only in power plant, which is a 500 horsepower Ford V-8 engine providing approximately the same performance characteristics as the M10.

90mm GMC M36: The M36 is a modification of the 3" Gun Motor Carriage M10A1, mounting a 90mm gun in a conical 360° turret, traversed by hand and power. Turret is balanced in design, requiring no counterweights as in M10, and is therefore approximately



TANK DESTROYER BOARD


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CAMP HOOD, TEXAS

LIGHT ARMORED CAR, M8

1000 lbs. lighter. Crew of five; 47 rounds of ready ammunition. Armor penetration, 6" at 1000 yards; reinforced concrete penetration, 5 ft at 1000 yards with 2 rounds (compares with 10 rounds for same penetration with the 3" gun). Rate of fire slower than other GMC's due to bulk and weight of round and space limitations in turret. Gun recoil mechanism same as the 3".



Car, Armored, Light, M8 (6x6): Vehicle was designed to provide high speed mobility, defensive fire power, and crew protection for reconnaissance personnel. Armament consists of one gun 37mm, one machine gun caliber .50 mounted coaxially, and one machine gun caliber .50 on rear mounted pedestal mount for antiaircraft protection. Crew consists of four men and space is provided for stowage of ammunition, 506 and 602 radios. Basic armor of vehicles is 7/8" on front and 3/8" on side.



Car, Armored, Utility, M20 (6x6): Vehicle utilizing Light Armored Car M8 chassis was designed to provide a highly mobile armored personnel, cargo carrier, and field commander's car. Space is provided to accommodate crews of six, in addition to 506 and 608 radios. Armament consists of one machine gun caliber .50 mounted on a ring mount for anti-aircraft protection, a rocket launcher AT, and individual weapons. Basic armor is same as that of the Light Armored Car M8.

3" Towed Gun M1 - M6:

Description: The 3" Gun Carriage M6 is the standard 3" Gun Carriage M1 with following modification: Handbrakes 12" longer and rotated 45° muzzleward; the Gun, M5, is repositioned one inch rearward; carriage has: (1) firing segments with



locking devices for firing and traveling positions; (2) gunner's shoulder guard with hinged portion for breechblock removal; (3) one additional standard handspike (total two); (4) handspike socket added to each spade at right angles to trail; (5) new cradle yoke for telescopic mounts and range quadrant; (6) a sloping shield; (7) a sight box; (8) trail caster; (9) two wheel ratchet wrenches; (10) two ropes; and (11) special hubs. The traveling position of muzzle has been raised 12 inches. Shield apron is hinged to axle with 5-inch ground clearance in firing position. Axle stops limit the equalizer cant correction to 5°.

Rocket Launcher M1 (Bazooka): The Bazooka originally was an open tube approximately 54 inches long, 2.365 inches in internal diameter, equipped with hand grip, stock, firing mechanism and sights. It was designed to launch the rocket, AT, 2.36 inches, M6, which was a high explosive projectile for use against tanks and armored vehicles. The weapon was to be fired from the shoulder and there was no recoil since the propulsion of the rocket was by jet action of the propelling power. The rocket weighed approximately 3½ lbs and was 21½ inches long. It was capable of penetrating heavy armor at angle of impact up to 30 degrees and could be used up to distances of 400 yards with an optimum range between 200 and 300 yards. The muzzle velocity was about 300 feet per second. The Rocket Launcher has been constantly improved and is a most formidable antitank weapon and superior weapon against fortification.

THE TANK DESTROYER SCHOOL

A Tank Destroyer School was a part of the original organization of the Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center. It was to teach the tactics and technique of tank destroyer employment, emphasizing practical instruction applicable to training and leading tank destroyer organizations; to give key tank destroyer personnel a working familiarity with the tactics and technique of associated arms; to train selected officers and enlisted men for special technical duties in tank destroyer units; and to furnish qualified officers and enlisted men for the cadres of new tank destroyer organizations.¹ The capacity of the School was to be sufficient to allow sixty percent of the officers and ten percent of the enlisted men assigned to tank destroyer units to attend courses there in any given year. The school was to develop and perfect tank destroyer tactics and technique as well as conduct courses.

The commanding officer of the Center was designated as Commandant of the School. He delegated the task of organizing and operating the School to Lt. Col. (later Brig. Gen.) Hugh T. Mayberry, who reported for duty 3 December 1941, and was detailed as Assistant Commandant.²

Colonel Mayberry's experience as a member of the staff and faculty of The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, provided him with an excellent understanding of the problems connected with organizations and operation of the Tank Destroyer School. He continued as Assistant Commandant until 27 May 1942, when he was named Commandant of the School, and directed the School's activities from its pre-activation planning period to its establishment at Camp Hood, Texas, as one of the largest and finest Army special service schools.³

CHAPTER X

THE TANK DESTROYER SCHOOL

The organization of the Tank Destroyer School as an element of the Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center was directed by the War Department letter of 27 November 1941, under the provisions of which the Center was activated at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, on 1 December 1941.

The commanding officer of the Center, Lieutenant Colonel (later Major General) Andrew D. Bruce, was designated as Commandant of the School, and the following action was directed by the War Department:¹

The organization and operation of the Tank Destroyer School was directed as a War Department agency to develop and perfect tank destroyer tactics and technique and to conduct courses for the training of key officers and enlisted men. The capacity of the School was to be sufficient to allow sixty per cent of the officers and ten per cent of the enlisted men assigned to tank destroyer units to attend courses there in any given year.

The School was directed to submit to the War Department an outline of courses to be conducted and to make recommendations to the War Department for the training in existing schools of officers and enlisted men required to start the School and other elements of the Center.

Accordingly, the Tank Destroyer School was organized: to teach the tactics and technique of tank destroyer employment, emphasizing practical instruction applicable to training and leading tank destroyer organizations; to furnish key tank destroyer personnel with a working familiarity with the tactics and techniques of associated arms; to train selected officers and enlisted men for special technical duties in tank destroyer units; and to furnish qualified officers and enlisted men for the cadres of new tank destroyer organizations.²

The task of organization and operating the Tank Destroyer School was delegated by the commanding officer of the Center to Lieutenant Colonel (later Brigadier General) Hugh T. Mayberry, who reported to the Center on 3 December 1941 and was detailed as Assistant Commandant to the School.³

Colonel Mayberry's experience as a member of the staff and faculty of The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia, provided him with an excellent understanding of the problems connected with the organization and operation of the Tank Destroyer School. He continued as Assistant Commandant until 27 May 1942, when he was named Commandant of the School, and directed the School's activities from its pre-activation planning period to its establishment at Camp Hood, Texas, as one of the largest and finest Army special service schools.⁴

Upon reporting to Fort Meade, the Assistant Commandant was faced with a number of problems, the immediate solution of which was essential to the early activation and operation of the Tank Destroyer School. The most important problems were those connected with the administrative organization, the planning of courses of instruction and the formulation of master training schedules, the selection and training of a staff and faculty, and the development of a table of organization and equipment for the School,⁵ and the submission of recommendations for the construction of the School's buildings.⁵

It was initially planned to organize the School into five academic departments for instructional purposes, and the first seven officers detailed to the School by the Center in December 1941 were assigned to the tactics, weapons, pioneer, and communications departments.

The initial efforts of the Assistant Commandant and his staff were concentrated on the planning of courses of instruction. Initial plans were submitted to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, War Department, on 15 January 1942,⁶ and on 3 February 1942 the War Department announced its official approval of the following courses:⁷

Officer Courses

<u>Course</u>	<u>Number of Students</u>	<u>Length</u>
Automotive Maintenance	40	12 weeks
Basic Tactical	80	12 weeks
Pioneer	40	4 weeks

Enlisted Courses

Communications	74	6 weeks
Pioneer	74	4 weeks
Weapons and Gunnery	370	8 weeks
Motor Mechanics	74	12 weeks

To carry out the instruction planned, the School was then confronted with the problem of instructors. Available officers were not qualified so the School, through the Center, effected the sending of officers and enlisted men to various established schools for training, from which they returned as instructors to the Tank Destroyer School.⁸ By 20 March 1942, 29 officers and 209 enlisted men were attending the Armored and other special schools.⁹

The problems of the great number of instructors required from the beginning of the School was thus only partly solved. In addition, the School obtained from any and all branches available officers. Very few of them had any teaching background and fewer still knew anything about training in antitank or tank destroyer technique.¹⁰ To prepare them as instructors, the School established a thorough "Methods of Instruction" course, which was a continuing project. This course designed and instituted by the Tactics Department was of 14 hours length and was given in two-hour evening sessions to each group of newly arrived instructors.¹¹

Each instructor was required to demonstrate proficiency in form and material before he was classed as qualified. At that time there was no field manual covering tactics and doctrine, but the School officers evolved their tactics and doctrine from the description of the ideal tank destroyer,¹² and its characteristics in action. To improve officers in lecture technique, current events were discussed in conferences beginning in March 1942.¹³

The instructor problem was being met, but the Army Ground Forces policy of relieving officers of troop age after one year's duty with any special service school, which was announced on 7 April 1942, presented a new personnel problem.¹⁴ In order to procure officers not subject to this rotation plan, steps were taken to secure the commissioning of men who had served as officers overseas during World War I. These officers were assigned to positions in the School commensurate with their civilian experience and skills.¹⁵ Later, as the instructor staff expanded, officers were assigned to understudy key personnel, so that the School was not deprived of qualified officers by transfers incident to the rotation plan.¹⁶

One of the principal reasons for the Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center's moving to Temple, Texas, before the completion of facilities on the Camp Hood reservation was to allow the Center's training elements--the School and the Unit Training Center--to begin instructing tank destroyer personnel as soon as possible.

The need for some degree of standardization in the training of existing tank destroyer battalions was acute. Accordingly, the School on 24 March 1942 requested authority from Army Ground Forces to conduct an officers' orientation course designed to train inspector-instructors for tank destroyer organizations and for the higher headquarters to which they were attached.¹⁷ Approval was granted on 8 April for a four weeks' course to begin on 4 May 1942.¹⁸

Two hundred and sixty officers attended this course, which was the first training to be conducted by any element of the Tank Destroyer Command.¹⁹ (The Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center was redesignated as the Tank Destroyer Command on 14 March 1942.)²⁰ Since no housing was available in the cantonment area, the students were quartered in private homes in Gatesville, Texas, near the northwestern boundary of the reservation. Classes were conducted on the reservation, except in inclement weather, when the auditorium of the Gatesville municipal building was used.²¹ Firing was conducted on three temporary ranges operated by a detail from the School Training Regiment. Demonstration units and assistant instructors were furnished by the 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 753d Tank Battalion (Medium) both bivouacked on the reservation for duty as school troops.²²

The course included instruction in the use of tank destroyer weapons and equipment, operation and employment of tank destroyer units, tank destroyer tactical doctrine, tables of organization and allowances, proper training programs for tank destroyer organizations, and methods of training inspection. Officers received this instruction from the School's five academic departments and from the Unit Training Center, which presented demonstrations of tactical employment and of tank hunting.

The school conducted a second officers' orientation course from 4 to 30 June 1942. This class was attended by 236 officers, of which number 32 were assigned to the Tank Destroyer Command.²³ During this period, the School's demonstration troop requirements were coordinated by Headquarters, School Troops which began operating 1 June 1942 when the 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 753d Tank Battalion, and the Tank Destroyer School Band was assigned to it.²⁴

During April and May a book shop, a reproduction department and a library were established for the School.²⁵

Although the operation of an Officer Candidate School was not included in the initial plans for the Tank Destroyer School, Colonel Mayberry foresaw its need. He detailed a member of his staff to study existing officer candidate schools and to plan a program of instruction for such a school. This program was completed on 27 April 1942.²⁶ Thus when the War Department directed on 23 June 1942 the immediate establishment of a Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate School, with a capacity of 2100 to be reached by 15 October 1942, plans were ready.²⁷

The expansion and reorganization of the Tank Destroyer School required by its increasing activities, began on 15 July 1942, when the School Service Regiment was redesignated the Student Regiment and the activation of the School on 9 March 1942, was confirmed and made of record.²⁸ The Tank Destroyer Command activated the Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate School on 16 July 1942, and assigned it to the Tank Destroyer School.²⁹

On the same day, the Tank Destroyer School activated the following organizations:³⁰

School Headquarters.

Academic Division, consisting of a headquarters and eight departments--automotive, communications, officer candidate school department, pioneer, publications, reproduction, tactics, and weapons.

Academic Regiment, consisting of Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, and four lettered companies.

Officer Candidate School Regiment, consisting of Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, and two battalions of seven numbered companies each (the two battalions of seven numbered companies each were never organized in lieu thereof the Regiment was organized with twelve lettered companies).³¹

Student Regiment, consisting of Headquarters, Headquarters and Service Company, the Student Officers' Battalion of four lettered companies, and the Student Enlisted Battalion of eight lettered companies.

The scope and delineation of functions of the entire organization was excellently portrayed by their organizational charts.³²

The School's internal organization appeared at all times to be patterned according to the fabric of its instructional missions and caused little difficulty of itself. The Academic Division was later inactivated³³ but this was to effect full compliance with Army Regulation 345-400, and resulted in all Academic Division personnel being assigned to the Academic Regiment.³⁴

One of the initial problems of the School was in getting orthodox textbooks published which were to be used as a basis for its instruction. The time lag between the composition of the subject matter and its submittal to a higher headquarters, until final approval, tended to muzzle and throttle action. This problem was accentuated by the placement of the School under the jurisdiction of the Replacement and School Command, 30 July 1942,³⁵ which further involved continuity and celerity of action over the assigning and reassigning of personnel.

Due to the efforts of the School and Tank Destroyer Center, the School was again made the responsibility of Tank Destroyer Center but not until 15 March 1943.³⁶ The Tank Destroyer Center's jurisdiction was again withdrawn on 11 November 1943.³⁷ Jurisdiction was again re-established over the School by Tank Destroyer Center on 28 December 1944.³⁸

The officers of Tank Destroyer Center and of the School felt that jurisdiction exercised by Tank Destroyer Center, recommended by an over-all inspection by Replacement and School Command, materially aided the expeditious action required by higher headquarters.

A further problem confronting the School was that of obtaining equipment. Many items of equipment were not standardized at that time and had to be purchased in the open market where priorities were allocated to the School for approximately its first three months of existence and after funds were allocated, the School had to secure \$26,000 worth of tools for the automotive department. Motors which were highly essential were almost impossible to secure. They were finally obtained through the cooperation of the 8th Corps Area Headquarters which made available a number of old Civilian Conservation Corps vehicles which had been inventoried and condemned and were stored at Lufkin, Texas.

Instruction in the Tank Destroyer School, which had ceased with the completion of the second officers' orientation course on 30 June 1942, was resumed on 20 July 1942, when the first officer candidate class of 150 students began classes at Gatesville, Texas. These candidates were selected from tank destroyer battalions bivouacked on the Camp Hood reservation.³⁹ In accordance with War Department direction, a new class was begun each week, the first four reporting at Gatesville, and the source from which candidates were drawn was broadened to include the entire Army. Classes at Gatesville were conducted on the reservation and in municipal buildings. Students were quartered in public schools, tents, and in an abandoned Civilian Conservation Corps camp.

The School moved its headquarters from Temple to Camp Hood on 14 August 1942, the first element of the Center to occupy permanent quarters in the cantonment area.⁴⁰ The fifth officer candidate class reported at Camp Hood, and the four classes at Gatesville moved into the cantonment on successive week-ends so as not to interrupt their training.

The largest number of candidates ever present was 2,005 on 28 December 1942, when the twenty-third class began training.⁴¹ This enrollment was only slightly less than the 2,100 maximum authorized by the War Department's directive of 26 June 1942, which ordered the establishment of the Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate School.⁴²

The graduation requirements of the school stressed leadership. The leadership rating of a candidate was determined chiefly by his company commander and platoon leader, based upon their observation of his conduct of command and physical training exercises, his weekly assignments as a student officer or non-commissioned officer, and his execution of practical work in classes. Two ratings were submitted by the members of each platoon on their classmates. Demerits given candidates by their officers for miscellaneous delinquencies were also considered in determining a candidate's leadership capability.⁴³

The faculty board which considered doubtful candidates during the eleventh week of the thirteen-week course adopted a policy of allowing students weak in academic subjects but not adjudged lacking in leadership to repeat parts of the course failed. Successful completion of academic work on the second attempt by these candidates resulted in their graduation. Students whose leadership was not satisfactory were relieved at the end of the eleventh week. All doubtful candidates appeared before the board and were given an opportunity to make any statements they desired.⁴⁴ The system of leadership rating was modified in December 1942 to include semi-weekly rather than weekly assignments of students to command positions.⁴⁵ In June 1943, a new efficiency report for the use of company commanders and platoon leaders was introduced to make their ratings of candidates more accurate by basing them upon the candidates' demonstration of specific traits of leadership.⁴⁶ The new system reduced the emphasis on student conduct of command and physical training exercises as a means of judging leadership and gave greater weight to the other component parts of the rating scale. At the same time, company commanders were permitted to recommend the release of weak candidates at the end of the fifth week of training.

The reduction in the size of classes from 175 to ninety men in February 1943, facilitated close observation of candidates by their officers,⁴⁷ and the introduction of a week's field training in April 1943 gave an additional opportunity for students to demonstrate their capabilities.⁴⁸

The problem of rating candidates in leadership was complicated by the varied experience of the students prior to their attending the Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate School. This complication was alleviated somewhat in July 1943. The quota for volunteer officer candidates was greatly reduced as a result of the Army's accepting no more such candidates after February 1943. In July 1943, it became the policy to place all

students from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in the same classes, whenever possible. The situation was further improved as the military experience of other candidates became more uniform, all having completed at least a basic training program.⁴⁹

As originally organized, the instruction in the Officer Candidate School was divided as follows:⁵⁰

Weapons department--227 hours devoted to antiaircraft fire, pistol and revolver, carbine, grenades, light machine gun, .50 caliber machine gun, Thompson sub-machine gun, 37mm antitank gun, 75mm gun, aircraft identification, and close combat methods.

Tactics department--170 hours devoted to air-ground liaison, armored force tactics, combat orders, current events, defensive employment, general subjects, offensive employment, reconnaissance, security and command, staff, and logistics.

Pioneer department--29 hours devoted to map reading and aerial photograph interpretation, antitank mines, bridges and roads, camouflage, demolitions, engineer reconnaissance, engineer tools and equipment, and obstacles.

Automotive department--26 hours devoted to the army system of maintenance, inspection of motor vehicles, nomenclature and functioning of major assemblies, principle parts and installations, preventive maintenance, formal and informal inspections, field maintenance and operation, and tank identification.

Communications department--15 hours devoted to antitank warning nets, characteristics of tank destroyer radio sets, communications in the tank destroyer battalion, voice procedure, and operations of various radio sets.

General subjects committee--113 1/3 hours devoted to command training, company administration and mess management, defense against chemicals, efficiency reports, medical service in the tank destroyer battalion, military law, physical training, sanitation, hygiene and first aid, military discipline, and social customs and courtesies.

By March 1943, the original curriculum had been modified by reducing the hours devoted to general subjects and communications and by increasing the time devoted to automotive, tactics, weapons, and pioneer instruction, the greatest increase being in pioneer training.⁵¹

On 10 July 1943, the length of the officer candidate course was increased to seventeen weeks.⁵² Instruction was increased in all courses, but principally in tactics, weapons, and automotive training. Much of the increased time was devoted to practical work, the students receiving a total of 471 hours of such instruction.⁵³ In addition, the time devoted to command and physical training exercises and school of the soldier, under the supervision of Officer Candidate School Regiment company officers, was increased.

With the lengthening of the course to seventeen weeks, the number of classes reporting was cut from one each week to one every two weeks. In August 1943, this was further cut to one new class per month, and the number of companies in the regiment was reduced from twelve to eight. By 30 October 1943, a total of 4,929 candidates had been graduated from the Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate School.⁵⁴ On 15 November 1943, six officer candidate companies, totaling 275 students, were in training. Of these, 175 were candidates from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps.⁵⁵

Late in 1943 the Officer Candidate School Department at the Tank Destroyer School experimented with a Combat Adaptability Test developed by Dr. Ernest M. Ligon, Expert Consultant to the Secretary of War, with the object of discovering a reliable method of selecting successful combat officers. The approach involved an analysis of the "job elements" of the combat leader's work; among these were ability to instruct his men in their mission, to reach his objective, to get his men to cooperate, to keep his head when things went wrong, to foresee what the enemy would likely to do, etc. A rating scale was developed to record the judges' estimate of the candidate's possession of these traits, and the candidate was placed in several test situations in which, presumably, the traits or their absence would be revealed. While a group of four or five judges observed and rated the candidate, he was first interviewed for ten or fifteen minutes. On the basis of his answers to a list of questions--all questions were the same for all candidates--the judges were to rate some of the desired "job elements"; thus, ability to get men to cooperate was inferred from the subject's response to such a question as "How would you deal with stubborn subordinates?" After the interview, the candidate was given a short time in which to prepare and deliver a two-minute talk to an imaginary platoon about to go into battle for the first time. This test revealed to the judges something of the candidate's performance under stress, his power of expression, and his ability to command attention. To get more direct evidence on the subject's ability to work under pressure, the judges placed him in two "stress situations." Against time, he was required to solve a map problem and to translate two different codes sent alternately by two senders. As he worked he heard a battle noise recording through an earphone, felt periodic shocks applied through a shock device strapped to one wrist, had his chair violently shaken by a vibrator, and breathed with difficulty through the partially closed intake of the gas mask he wore.

The combat adaptability test was used on the last three officer candidate classes at the Tank Destroyer School. No relationship was discovered between the test ratings and the regular Officer Candidate School rating scale, or between the test and the AGCT scores, age, height, weight or education. There was a slight correlation with scores on the Officer Candidate Test (OCT). Since the Tank Destroyer School closed soon after the experiment was undertaken, no complete findings or revisions were possible.⁵⁶

Of the three principal ratings made on each man--academic rating, tactical officer's rating, and fellow candidate's rating--the last two carried the greatest weight because they revealed the candidate's leadership ability. A man whose leadership ability was high but whose academic average was low would probably be commissioned; a man whose grades were high but whose leadership was thought mediocre or poor would probably not be commissioned.

The Officer Candidate School Regiment was disbanded 16 May 1944 with the completion of its 54th class.⁵⁷

The Tank Destroyer School's first courses for officer and enlisted specialists began on 17 August 1942, with instruction starting in officers' automotive, pioneer, and basic tactical courses and in the enlisted pioneer course.⁵⁸ These courses ranged in length from 4 to 12 weeks and the length of the courses and the number of officers attending were modified from time to time to achieve the most thorough instruction possible.⁵⁹ Instruction was given by all academic departments of the School.

On 7 November 1942, a basic orientation course was inaugurated. It was attended by sixty officers, principally recent graduates of schools other than the Tank Destroyer School, and was designed to familiarize them with subjects peculiar to tank destroyers. As in the advanced orientation course, instruction was given by all School's academic departments. Unlike the advanced course, however, the emphasis was on subjects applicable to the work of company grade officers of tank destroyer organizations. The course lasted four weeks and was discontinued after two courses

had been conducted.⁶⁰ A third officers orientation course with a duration of four weeks, began on 12 October 1942. This course was for commanders and staff officers with prior tank destroyer training.

The officers' advanced orientation course was initiated by the School on 7 December 1942,⁶¹ to indoctrinate the students with correct tank destroyer doctrine, tactics and technique of employment.⁶² This course was discontinued 6 February 1943 and replaced by a six weeks officers advanced tactical course which began 8 February 1943 with an enrollment of 100 officers.⁶³ The major portion of this course was conducted by the tactics department, and the emphasis was placed on problems likely to be encountered by commanders and staff officers in combat.⁶⁴ The first classes received their field training under the supervision of the Advanced Unit Training Center. Coordination of the School and Center schedules being difficult and often unsatisfactory, on 26 June 1943, the School recommended to the Replacement and School Command that the course be modified to include field exercises under School supervision.⁶⁵ This request was approved by Army Ground Forces on 12 August 1943.⁶⁶ Its revision was recommended on 4 August and approved on 11 September 1943, to include more practical work and less classroom instruction.⁶⁷

The School inaugurated an officers communications course on 27 March 1943 to meet the urgent need for qualified communications officers in newly activated tank destroyer organizations.⁶⁸ A rising need for qualified company grade officers in newly activated organizations resulted in the starting of a new unit officers course on 1 May 1943. This instruction was similar to the basic tactical courses which had been discontinued.

A four weeks' officers' advanced course in the maintenance and operation of motor vehicles, with emphasis on the 76mm gun motor carriage T-70, was begun by the automotive department on 14 September 1943. Forty students were enrolled, all of whom were required to have completed satisfactorily a basic motor course at an Army service school, and a new class reported every four weeks.⁶⁹ The name of the course was changed to the officers' full-track vehicle course on 16 September 1943.⁷⁰

Enlisted courses for tank destroyer personnel in the pioneer, weapons, communications, automotive and other classes, were initiated in August 1942 and the training in each subject was designed to produce specialists who, in turn, could conduct thorough instruction with their units.

The School reached its largest enrollment on 1 January 1943, when there were 4,810 students in the following courses:⁷¹

NAME OF COURSE	NUMBER OF COURSES IN SESSION	TOTAL NUMBER OF STUDENTS
Officers automotive	3	142
Officers advances orientation	1	40
Officers basic orientation	1	63
Officers pioneer Officers basic	1	68
tactical	3	260
Enlisted motor	9	584
Enlisted communi- cation	6	515
Enlisted pioneer	1	107
Enlisted weapons	8	1,039
Officer candidate	12	1,992
Total		4,810

During its organization and through 1942 and 1943, the Tank Destroyer School had initiated schools and instruction to cover the needs that were arising throughout the units of the tank destroyers.

In 1944, with the demand for trained personnel decreasing, the School necessarily curtailed activity. Student capacities were reduced in January 1944 and the School overhead, both enlisted men and officers, in excess of requirements, was made available to the Replacement and School Command for reassignment. On the basis of a survey of training needs of field units, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces directed on 14 February 1944 the following changes in the capacities of classes at the Tank Destroyer School:⁷² The officers' advanced class was to be increased approximately 60% in capacity and all other classes were to be reduced approximately 30 - 40 %.

With the discontinuance of the Unit Training Center and the Training Brigade, the 22d Tank Destroyer Group of three tank destroyer battalions, one tank battalion and other special troops, were transferred to the School for administration and for use as school troops. For the greater part, the administration of the troops was delegated to the commanding officers of the several units but was supervised and coordinated through the School Assistant Executive Officer.⁷³

Brigadier General E. J. Dawley, F.A., a veteran of the Mediterranean theatre, assumed command of the Tank Destroyer School on 26 February 1944 upon the departure of Brigadier General Hugh T. Mayberry. General Dawley enlivened the tempo of activities at the Tank Destroyer School by accentuating realism, accuracy, perfection and teamwork in all School activities. He emphasized accuracy, followed by speed developed to the acme of perfection.

During the period from 1 March 1944 to 31 October 1944, there were drastic reductions in the overhead personnel of the Tank Destroyer School. The overhead decreased 1492 as opposed to a reduction of 1613 students.⁷⁴ This drastic reduction in overhead was met by instructors' assuming additional duty.

Brigadier General Dawley was succeeded as Commandant of Tank Destroyer School by Brigadier General Miles A. Cowles on 30 June 1944. General Cowles was also a veteran of the Mediterranean theatre of operations. While continuing the policies of his predecessors, General Cowles was particularly interested in the tactics and employment of tank destroyers because of adverse criticism in theatres of operation with respect to their boldness and their over-all employment. Through successive demonstrations, he, with his School faculty, attempted to find and exploit the proper use of tank destroyers in integrated action.⁷⁵

A new organization of the School was effected on 17 November 1944, whereby the Tank Destroyer School Regiment was redesignated Tank Destroyer Battalion and Headquarters and Service Company, and Companies A and B of the Regiment were redesignated Headquarters and Service Companies A and B of the School Battalion.⁷⁶ The WAC Detachment on duty at the School was disbanded during November, their duties being assumed by civilian personnel and Class "D" personnel. School troops were cut to one battalion.⁷⁷

The personnel problem was the major problem during the last few months of Tank Destroyer School activities at Camp Hood. The War Department policy was that of release of able-bodied and troop age personnel for combat duty. The problem presented was the utilization of limited service personnel and personnel returned from foreign service, most of whom knew little or nothing of tank destroyer procedure. There appeared to be but one manner of solving this problem and that was the doubling up of duties by those capable of instruction and the installation of classes for the training of new school instructors.⁷⁸

Brigadier General Kenneth G. Althaus became acting Commandant of the Tank Destroyer School on 25 May 1945. As a veteran combat commander of the 10th Armored Division under General Patton in Europe, he brought to the School the viewpoint of an armored force commander. Frankly stated, this viewpoint was that despite the physical similarity of tanks and tank destroyers, the primary missions of the two were widely divergent. General Althaus appreciated the capabilities of tank destroyers and was of the opinion that they should be specialists or a separate arm so long as their primary mission was different from that of any other arm or group of specialists.⁷⁹

A valuable lesson indicated during this period was the necessity for liaison between the School and Redistribution Stations. Without such liaison, the School did not know which of the officers or personnel returned to the United States were capable of conducting proficient tank destroyer instruction.⁸⁰

SUMMARY: Unlike the majority of service schools, the Tank Destroyer School was started from naught and in the beginning, there was no basic structure upon which to build or to enlarge, no established doctrine, no standardized plan of instruction, and no equipment with which to operate. With the war raging and the need for trained tank destroyer personnel very acute, the School had to assume the proportions and develop the efficiency of an old, well-established and tremendously large teaching institution.

The initial problems of the Tank Destroyer School were concerned mainly with organization, personnel and equipment.

With respect to organization, tables of over-head allotment and distribution were evolved concurrently with the acquisition of students and the main difficulty experienced in organizing the School and setting up a table of organization was the fact that capacities for students varied every few weeks, thereby causing uncertainty as to what the School required. This problem was met by the School by pre-planning and then recasting the organization as dictated by the trial and error method.

With respect to personnel, the problem was most salient. Officers and enlisted men had to be quickly obtained as instructors and there were no men in the entire Army who were qualified in the basic tank destroyer subjects, or the new doctrine and new weapon which, at that time, was more or less spectral. The School solved this problem by first having the officers and enlisted men train in basic military subjects at other schools; then further training officers and enlisted men through orientation, unit and advanced unit courses. To meet the problem of rotation of officers and other personnel, officers and enlisted men over-age in grade and on limited service were sought as instructors. This resulted in standardized teaching methods and tended to stabilize organizational effort.

The problem of equipment for the Tank Destroyer School in the beginning was most acute. What was not issued, they sought and bought on open market and, in addition, they proved most adept at borrowing equipment from the Unit Training Center and the other tank destroyer organizations.

In all of the instructional activities of the School, it was evident that aggressive and competent combat leadership was the goal desired. The effort to develop strong combat leaders was especially manifested throughout the activities of the Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate School.

The later problems of the School were minor compared to those in the beginning. They were personnel problems. Trained officers and enlisted men needed as instructors

were lost to the School by reason of the over-all War Department needs. These difficulties were met by doubling up of time and effort on the part of those who knew the standards of tank destroyer training, and by teaching the doctrine and technique of tank destroyers to new men during over-time periods.

CHAPTER XI

THE TANK DESTROYER UNIT TRAINING CENTER

The Unit Training Center was activated as an element of the Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center on 9 March 1942, with Major Noble J. Wiley, Jr. as Executive Officer and Colonel (later Brigadier General) Richard G. Tindall commanding.¹ Colonel Tindall and Major Wiley, because of zealous antitank work with the 93d Antitank Battalion during the October-November 1941 maneuvers of the 1st Army in North and South Carolina, were well qualified to meet the challenging problems of the Unit Training Center.²

The mission of the Unit Training Center was that of training tank destroyer units to the point of blotting out and erasing any fear of armored forces; establishing superiority in maneuver and gunfire; and fitting the unit to receive profitably combined training with other forces in maneuvers conducted by higher headquarters. In conducting this training, the Unit Training Center operated essentially as a Tactical and Firing Center, without slighting in any respect the specialist instruction necessitated by tank destroyer requirements.

Without a uniform training schedule for tank destroyer organization, the Unit Training Center's first concern was the preparation of a Mobilization Training Program to coordinate the basic training of all tank destroyer units in order to secure an appropriate uniform stage of their training upon their arrival at the Center. A schedule prepared by the Unit Training Center was published by the War Department on 1 April 1942, as Mobilization Training Program 18-1.³

This program provided for 19 weeks of training - 6 weeks basic and 13 weeks technical and tactical training. The basic instruction was comparable to that given at a replacement training center but the technical instruction was designed to make all personnel expert with their principal weapons or in their specialist duties. In the tactical phase, the coordinated action of the squad, section, platoon, company and battalion, was taught.

The original plan called for a Unit Training Center with a capacity of six battalions, three to be attached to each of two training groups to be organized by the Center.⁴ Accordingly, the First and Second Tank Destroyer Training Groups were activated by the Center early in June 1942.⁵ Meanwhile, the need for the unit training of tank destroyer battalions became so acute that nine battalions were ordered to report to the Center in June, 1942, and preparations to receive them were hurried during May.⁶

Bivouac areas for the battalions were located on the Camp Hood reservation, and a former farm house was selected for Center headquarters in the field. On 29 May 1942, only ten days before the first battalions were expected to arrive, 156 privates reported from the Infantry Replacement Training Center, Camp Wolters, Texas for duty as assistant instructors.⁷ Eighteen qualified non-commissioned officers were transferred from the 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion, which had arrived at Camp Hood in April, to augment the assistant instructor staff, and an intensive program of training for this personnel was inaugurated.⁸

An exceptional innovation in training was added at this time. Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Gordon T. Kimbrell of the Unit Training Center staff, who was at that time the only American graduate of the English courses in commando tactics, initiated a Battle Conditioning Course at the Center which later became a model for similar courses throughout the Army.⁹

With the advance echelon of the Center headquarters moving into a farmhouse on the reservation, the nine Tank Destroyer Battalions were met as they detrained at Copperas Cove, Texas, and placed in bivouac areas. Five battalions were attached to the First Training Group and four to the Second Training Group.¹⁰ These battalions were at a sufficiently advanced stage of training to permit the omission of the 6 weeks basic training course and to allow the reduction of technical and tactical training from 13 weeks to 2 months in some cases. The length of time each organization remained at the Unit Training Center was determined by its proficiency one month after commencing instruction there and by the status of its equipment and personnel.¹¹

While at the Unit Training Center, battalion officers exercised normal command functions and retained responsibility for the training of their units. Training Groups exercised general supervision and control over the training of battalions attached to them and were responsible to the Center for the training of such organizations.¹² Most of the instruction in the battalions was given by its assigned officers and non-commissioned officers. The training groups furnished officer and non-commissioned officer inspector-instructors to train the battalion's own teaching personnel and to supervise instruction. The inspector-instructors also conducted some specialist training themselves.¹³

The difficulties which confronted the Unit Training Center in beginning its program of training were colossal. Housing facilities were non-existent and equipment was scarce. Simulated tank destroyers maneuvered against simulated tanks over terrain almost devoid of roads. Firing was conducted on improvised ranges. There were no training aids. So few radios were available that practically no communications training could be given.¹⁴ The harassing problem of equipment shortage was met in part by pooling available equipment and by borrowing from Tank Destroyer units.

The scarcity and poor condition of roads from railheads to field camps made supply difficult. Drinking water had to be hauled from water points on creeks in the reservation, and very little water was available for bathing or for washing vehicles. As the summer progressed, creeks dried up; and new water points on larger streams had to be located. New battalions, arriving before the first battalions departed, made the location of even more new bivouac areas and water points necessary.¹⁵

Health conditions presented a serious problem. Black widow spiders, mosquitoes, chiggers, and poisonous snakes were hazards as well as sunstroke and heat exhaustion. The nearest hospital facilities were at Camp Bowie, Texas, approximately 100 miles away and, in case of an emergency, the Waco Army Flying School Hospital, approximately 50 miles away. These difficulties were dealt with in turn, established military doctrine pointing to a feasible solution in each case.

While not uncommon to other military installations, the multiplicity of these minor problems compounded the major problem of expediting training. Despite the handicaps incident to the location of field camps, the training of the first battalions by the Unit Training Center progressed rapidly in accordance with the detailed schedules in Mobilization Training Program 18-1.

As a result of the efficient training under these carefully prepared schedules, six battalions were shipped out in July with less than eight weeks instruction.¹⁶ This celerity of training was to meet the demand of Army Ground Forces for units ready for combined training. It was, however, expedient in nature and with the need for tank destroyer battalions temporarily alleviated, on 1 August 1942 it was decided that units arriving at Unit Training Center thereafter would remain for a full course of technical and tactical training.¹⁷

Tank destroyer battalions coming to the Center after August 1st showed a general deficiency in basic training. While this was normal for newly activated battalions, it presented a major problem to the Unit Training Center and resulted in the activation of the Basic Unit Training Center on 27 November 1942.¹⁸ In anticipation of this element's establishment, the Unit Training Center was redesignated as the Advanced Unit Training Center on 17 August 1942.¹⁹

During August and September 1942, the Advanced Unit Training Center and its units occupied housing facilities available at Camp Hood for 18 battalions. Facilities were also available for 4 additional training groups but these were never activated. This left the Center with only two training groups and in the meantime, the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th Tank Destroyer Tactical Groups had been formed with the last 4 tactical groups activated at Camp Hood and assigned to the Center.²⁰

With five tactical groups in the Center and only two training groups authorized, a reorganization of the Center was effected 21 September 1942 to relieve the administrative burden then borne by the two training groups. All tank destroyer battalions attached to the Center were attached to the tactical groups for administrative purposes. Relieved of administrative problems, the First Training Group conducted instruction in tactics, communications and pioneer work, and the Second Training Group taught weapons, gunnery and automotive work. The tactical group headquarters were responsible for their own training and the supervision of administration and training of the battalions attached to them.²¹

The status of tactical groups was clarified by Training Memorandum 18 March 1943 which specified that group commanders were responsible for the training of their own group headquarters and headquarters company and for assisting in the training of battalions under their control. The training program for the group headquarters company paralleled in general that prescribed for battalion headquarters company. Much of the technical instruction was accomplished by attaching group personnel to battalions in training. Group staffs were trained by direct instruction from the group commander, by command posts and tactical exercises, and by practical work in receiving and clearing battalions and by supervising and inspecting battalion training and administration. The group commander was responsible for the correction of deficiencies noted in the training of battalions under his supervision.²² On 13 October 1942, the 8th and 9th Tank Destroyer Groups were activated at Camp Hood and assigned to the Advanced Unit Training Center.²³ and two days later, the 3d Tank Destroyer Group arrived from Camp Bowie, Texas.²⁴

Renewed demands by Army Ground Forces for tank destroyer battalions again necessitated shortening the training period, for some organizations, to two months, but by 29 October 1942, the program of the Advanced Unit Training Center assumed a definite form which continued thereafter without any important modification.²⁵ Three months training was scheduled and this period was divided into five weeks of firing under the Second Training Group and six weeks of tactical instruction under the First Training Group with one week on the Battle Conditioning Course.

An analysis of the activities of the Second Training Group, the Battle Conditioning Department and the First Training Group revealed parallelism of training effort of the Unit Training Center, the Basic Unit Training Center and the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center.²⁶ Such duplication of effort was due to: large number of units and personnel to be trained in shortest time possible; lack of uniformity in stage of training of many units; and the delay in establishing the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center.²⁷

The purpose and mission of the Second Training Group of the Unit Training Center was identical with that of the basic training outlined in Mobilization Training

Program 18-2, 11 July 1945, for Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center, except that new personnel were trained in newly activated units rather than as replacements for an experienced unit. The purpose and mission of the First Training Group was the same as that given the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center in paragraph 8 of Mobilization Training Program 18-2, covering tactical training, except that the Unit Training Center through its groups and brigades, carried teamwork into the company, battalion, group and brigade.

From analysis of the training conducted by both the Second Training Group, the Battle Conditioning Department and the First Training Group, it appears that Mobilization Training Program 18-5, 11 July 1945, was a refinement of the principles of tank destroyer training initiated by the Unit Training Center in 1942.^{XX}

Preparatory, technical, and range firing training were all outlined in the Second Training Group's master training plan. To aid battalions in preparing for range firing, the group published training guides on: preparatory marksmanship for the 75mm and 3 inch guns, placing the 75mm destroyer in action, range cards and data charts, target designation and range estimation, and standing operating procedures for the various ranges. The group also provided such training aids as drill and dummy cartridges, transparent sight reticles, sighting and aiming bars, rifle rests, and instruction charts.²⁸ Small arms courses included field firing with the rifle, night and anti-aircraft firing with the light machine gun, and field and anti-aircraft firing with the .50 caliber air-cooled machine gun.

An outstanding innovation in training by the Second Training Group was sub-caliber firing at buttressed-up moving tanks equipped with periscopes. Introduced in March 1943, this proved to be one of the most valuable features of the entire weapons training program, affording gun crews marksmanship training more nearly approaching actual combat than could have been devised in any other manner. The targets were light tanks which were reinforced with 1/4 inch armor at points vulnerable to small arms fire. Drivers were protected from bullet splash by special shields.²⁹

In June 1943, a new method of night target designation was developed by the Second Training Group. Range was determined by machine gun tracer fire and announced to a tank destroyer section. One gun was laid at the announced range and the other gun in the section at a range 100 yards short. A delayed fuse setting was used. Both gunners observed the tracers and fired at will. In a test of this method, three targets were destroyed with the expenditure of only three rounds per gun for each target.³⁰

In accord with Unit Training Center policy, the forms used by the Second Training Group were held to a minimum. Only three were used consistently--a report on the conduct of range firing, a training inspection report, and an all-purpose inspection report. The group issued periodical directives covering such subjects as pre-firing orientation, range policy, instructions for long range firing at stationary targets, sequence of fire orders and sensings, care and cleaning of tank destroyer weapons, and critiques.

After six weeks of basic instruction, units were introduced to the Battle Conditioning Course. Captain (later Lieutenant Colonel) Gordon T. Kimball, as acting S-3 of the Unit Training Center, was detailed by the Commanding Officer to develop a course in commando tactics as applied to the destruction of tanks.³¹ With the assistance of Captain (later Major) Ralph W. Sleator, formerly of the United States Border Patrol, he completed plans for such a course in May 1942. At that time, the first demonstration of "tank hunting" tactics was staged for the Tank Destroyer School's first officers' Orientation Course.³² At first the "tank hunting" course consisted of: an obstacle course and instruction in crawling across an open field; "wild west" hip shooting with pistol, submachine gun, and rifle; street fighting, manufacture and use

improvised grenades; and "tank hunting" raids and ambushes. Because of the wide scope of instruction, the name "tank hunting" was dropped in favor of "Battle Conditioning" course in April 1943.³³

Early in the same month, permission was received from the Tank Destroyer Center to experiment with the use of live ammunition in training. For the first time in the history of the United States Army, troops were subjected to grazing machine gun fire twelve to eighteen inches above their heads while they crawled across an open field in which explosives were detonated in their midst. This was the origin of the infiltration course, now standard throughout the Army as preparation for combat. The methods of street fighting, woods fighting, and close combat firing -- taught by the battle conditioning department of the Unit Training Center -- were copied extensively by other training installations.³⁴

Instruction was improved and expanded in accordance with information secured through military intelligence sources and reports of overseas observers. New classes added, included night firing in which small arms were fired at the flickering gleam of a flashlight bulb, the rattle of a tin can behind a target, and at other unseen marks.³⁵

In conjunction with this training, the tank destroyer battle firing position was developed--a crouch with the pistol held directly in front of the belt buckle or with the butt of shoulder weapons resting in the pit of the stomach. Aimed by ear rather than by eye, fire from this position was phenomenally accurate in daylight as well as in darkness. Units firing in the darkened tunnels of the battle conditioning course consistently averaged eighty-five per cent hits as compared to an average of fifty per cent hits on similar targets with aimed fire in daylight.³⁶ Two additional Battle Conditioning courses were constructed during the latter part of 1942 and January 1943 to provide facilities for all tank destroyer organizations.

The objectives of the course, as finally constituted, were the instruction of all personnel in close combat fighting and the destruction of tanks by the use of small arms and hand-placed demolitions. The infiltration course conditioned personnel to the din of combat and taught them the proper methods of advancing over rough terrain covered by machine gun fire and torn by exploding land mines and bursting grenades. Barbed wire entanglements, trenches, and foxholes added realism to this baptism of fire.

In a trip through the Nazi village--a complete small town filled with surprise targets, booby traps, and anti-personnel mines--instruction was given in street fighting with machine guns, submachine guns, rifles, and grenades. The close combat use of all small arms available to tank destroyer organizations was taught, and instruction was given in firing the light machine gun from the hip in assault and against enemy aircraft. Other subjects included woods fighting, dirty fighting, scouting and patrolling, use of maps and compasses, fieldcraft, assault on minor field fortifications, and fire recognition. This last course taught men to recognize, distinguish, and locate overhead fire of small arms, automatic weapons, and artillery coming front and flanks. Further additions to the battle conditioning course included night infiltration, training for medical personnel in removing wounded under fire, a combined woods-and-street fighting course involving the use of eye-and-toggle ropes in surmounting difficult obstacles, and the use of live grenades by personnel in training.

Unit commanders were urged to initiate an intensive physical conditioning course at least one month before their organizations underwent battle conditioning, since the battle conditioning schedule included the running of an obstacle course four times daily and a five-mile forced march. In preparing for the course, exercises were stressed which would harden the hands and strengthen the arms and legs, teach the proper methods of falling, and give practice in crawling, running, and in jumping from

heights of at least four feet.³⁸ Personnel not fit for battle conditioning training were assigned fatigue or guard duties for the week or, if able to undergo part of the instruction, were excused from the more hazardous and strenuous portions. Class "X" uniforms were worn on the course, and one evening meal during the course was prepared individually without the use of mess kits or kitchen utensils.³⁹ In addition to conducting instruction, the battle conditioning department developed the so-called "sticky" grenade and tested for the Tank Destroyer Board such weapons as knives, the rocket grenade launcher, the M-3 Inland machine pistol, various types of antitank mines and incendiary grenades, and steel-case .45 caliber ammunition.⁴⁰

In accordance with Unit Training Center policy, the battle conditioning department made only a minimum use of forms. They included a monthly schedule, a time record for the obstacle course and the forced march, a bivouac raid report, and a final report on each organization's work under the department.

Although the training of battalions in the Unit Training Center did not come under the control of the First Training Group until the seventh week, the First Training Group supervised and conducted specialist instruction during the first five weeks of the training period in order that organizations could begin tactical training with efficient specialist personnel. Pioneer platoons were trained directly by the First Training Group, and battalions or groups conducted schools for communications, reconnaissance, staff section, bugler, and armorer-artificer personnel under the supervision of the First Training Group.

Detailed subject schedules covered 100 hours of instruction for radio sections of communications platoons, 110 hours for message center sections of communications platoons, 40 hours for administrative sections of staff platoons and company clerks, 104 hours for intelligence and operations sections of staff platoons, 58 hours for supply sections of staff platoons and company supply sergeants, and eight days of training for reconnaissance platoons.⁴¹

The tactical training conducted by the First Training Group began with the seventh week of the training period and was divided into small unit, company, and battalion instruction.⁴²

The small unit period consisted of six eight-hour field exercises and four five-hour sand table previews. Each exercise included a conference, demonstration, and critique. One exercise was devoted to squad and section tactics, platoon organization and equipment, and organization of positions during daylight, darkness, and in desert terrain; deliberate occupation of positions; hasty occupation of positions; and use of road nets and combined platoon battle plays.⁴³ For the company and battalion, similar instruction was given with emphasis on the unit functioning as part of a combat team. Pioneer, reconnaissance, intelligence, and communications personnel underwent special instruction during the small unit and company periods and rejoined their organizations for the battalion exercises. The First Training Group scheduled training film programs and administrative inspections. It also handled the assignment of training areas.⁴⁴

In accordance with Army Ground Forces training directives, the Army Ground Forces physical fitness, combat firing, and tactical proficiency tests for Tank Destroyer Battalions were added to the Unit Training Center training schedule.⁴⁵ While the tactical groups were given the responsibility of conducting the physical fitness tests, the Center, through the First Training Group, prepared these tests, scheduled and supervised them.⁴⁶

The use of forms by the First Training Group was held to a minimum and included only rating sheets for unit and organization exercises, a daily strength report on personnel participating in problems, an air observer's report, reports of camouflage

and chemical warfare training, a confidential final report, and a standard cover-indorsement for forwarding reports to groups and battalions through Unit Training Center Headquarters.

The activation of the Basic Unit Training Center materially simplified the Advanced Unit Training Center's instructional problems. One group and six battalions were transferred to the Basic Unit Training Center,⁴⁷ and thereafter all battalions scheduled to come to the Advanced Unit Training Center were first sent through the Basic Unit Training Center and received uniform basic training prior to beginning advanced instruction.

Brigade training was added to the Center's program following the activation of the First and Second Tank Destroyer Brigades at Camp Hood on 24 November 1942, and their assignment to the Advanced Unit Training Center on 7 December 1942.⁴⁸ A training directive defining brigade organization and the functions of the brigade commander was prepared by the Advanced Unit Training Center and published on 5 January 1943 with the approval of the Tank Destroyer Center.⁴⁹

The adoption of the revised tank destroyer battalion table of organization 18-25 on 27 January 1943, which reduced materially both the personnel and the vehicles of self-propelled tank destroyer organizations, and the conversion of ten battalions in the Advanced Unit Training Center from self-propelled to towed units on 31 March 1943, both presented new problems.⁵⁰ In both cases it was necessary: to conduct experiments to determine such matters as the time length for road marches of the new battalions; to study the need for revising some parts of Field Manual 18-5, Organization and Tactics of Tank Destroyer Units, and to determine the ammunition allowances and the modifications in firing schedules needed.

The conversion of the self-propelled battalions to towed units was far more disruptive from a training standpoint than the adoption of the new table of organization in January 1943, since it necessitated a complete revision of technical and tactical instruction. The towed organizations began subcaliber firing immediately after their conversion, however, and by 1 May 1943, complete details on the training of towed Tank Destroyer Battalions were published by the Advanced Unit Training Center.⁵¹

By 13 April 1943, thirteen months after the Advanced Unit Training Center had been activated and ten months after the first units had arrived for training, forty-two battalions with an average strength of 750 officers and men--approximately 31,500 troops in all--had been trained and shipped out by the Center.

On 5 May 1943, General Tindall, who had commanded the Advanced Unit Training Center since its activation, was succeeded by Colonel Thomas J. Heavey.⁵² Colonel Heavey had commanded the Second Training Group of the Center, gone to England and to North Africa as an observer, and returned to the Tank Destroyer Center as commander of the Training Brigade. The training policies of General Tindall were continued by Colonel Heavey.

Shortly after this change of command, on 25 May 1943, the number of groups and battalions in the Advanced Unit Training Center reached its peak with a total of eight groups and twenty-eight battalions--1,312 officers and 24,159 enlisted men--approximately equivalent to two infantry divisions.⁵³

On 13 August 1943, the Advanced Unit Training Center was redesignated as the Unit Training Center, the Basic Unit Training Center being redesignated as the Individual Training Center.⁵⁴ The staff sections of the Unit Training Center established schools for correction of deficiencies in personnel, in military intelligence, and operations and supply. Internal battalion administration was greatly improved through

an inspector-instructor team operating during 1943.⁵⁵ Schools for illiteracy, non-English speaking and mentally retarded personnel were established 19 July 1943.⁵⁶ Extra-curricular programs of training films for both officers and enlisted men were used by both the S-2 and S-3 staff sections. In cooperation with the Training Brigade, special courses in battalion artillery and small arms, internal combustion engines, automotive, electricity, welding and other subjects, were established in August 1943 for the purpose of effecting proficient unit maintenance.⁵⁷

The Unit Training Center S-4 cooperated with the G-4 of Tank Destroyer Center to alleviate a serious shortage of vehicles, radios and weapons common to most tank destroyer units. Some improvement was effected in this situation but a wholly satisfactory solution was never reached.

By 15 December 1943, all battalions under the Unit Training Center had completed their normal training cycle; thereafter time was allotted to correcting deficiencies, conducting firing required by POM and to refresher firing under the direction of the Second Training Group.

On 1 January 1944, Colonel Heavey was succeeded by Colonel Earl W. Bacon, a veteran of World War I and a seasoned artilleryman.⁵⁸ Colonel Bacon had formerly commanded the Second Training Group and continued the policies of his predecessors, with emphasis on accuracy and teamwork. All battalions of the Unit Training Center during the months of January and February 1944 were given the Army Ground Forces combat intelligence training test.⁵⁹

On 18 February 1944, the Unit Training Center, with its mission accomplished, was officially discontinued.⁶⁰

SUMMARY: Battle realism was the key note of the Unit Training Center's program from its inception. Training was constantly modified to increase its effectiveness and correlate it with combat conditions. Frequent modifications in the training program were effected through the close supervision of instruction by General Tindall, Colonel Heavey and Colonel Bacon. General Tindall was awarded the Legion of Merit on 18 August 1943 in recognition of his contributions to the development of Unit Training Center and to the progress of tank destroyers.⁶¹

Faced with innumerable difficulties, the Unit Training Center had, within less than two years, trained two brigades, 21 groups, 100 battalions and one separate company. Between 85,000 and 87,000 troops had passed through the Center in less than a year and a half. They had been trained on a mass production basis by decentralizing the training responsibility from the Center through the training groups to the tactical groups. Despite this decentralization, their training had been efficient and thorough. Always overcrowded with organizations in training, the Center took ill-equipped and undermanned units and shipped them out as well-trained combat teams by securing as much equipment for them as possible and lending them what could not be otherwise supplied.

The tank destroyer organizations trained by the Center were ready to participate in maneuvers and combined training. At the Center, they perfected their own teamwork; but, because elements of the ground force team other than tanks and mechanized cavalry were not available at Camp Hood until 12 July 1943 when a battalion of armored infantry was attached to the Training Brigade,⁶² the Unit Training Center was initially hampered in its efforts to teach tank destroyer battalions and groups to coordinate their operations with those of other ground elements.

By its efficient training of tank destroyer organizations in tactics and gunnery, the steady improvement of which was evidenced by the increasing difficulty of the firing tests conducted by the Center, the Unit Training Center contributed materially

to the advancement of tank destroyer forces. Special contributions were made by the battle conditioning department through its development of improved technique of close combat and its testing of weapons in cooperation with the Tank Destroyer Board.

Further, the Unit Training Center made a substantial contribution to training throughout the Army by its inauguration of instruction in infiltration under fire and its realistic battle conditioning program.

CHAPTER XII

THE TANK DESTROYER TRAINING BRIGADE

The plans for training at the Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center included the use of school troops to serve the elements of the Center. The tactical organizations assigned as school troops were to be utilized in demonstrations for the Tank Destroyer School, Unit Training Center, and the Tank Destroyer Board. The remaining school troops were to be used in transportation details and maintenance of vehicles and weapons.

Supervision of these organizations was provided by the activation of Headquarters and Headquarters Company, School Troops, on 9 March 1942.¹ The original plan called for two tank destroyer battalions, one squadron of cavalry (mechanized), one infantry battalion (motorized), two quartermaster companies, and two ordnance companies.² The addition of armored force elements was indicated on 4 April 1942, by correspondence between the Tank Destroyer Command and the Armored Force regarding the assignment of a tank group consisting of a headquarters and headquarters detachment and two tank battalions, one medium and one light.³

Although its date of activation was 9 March 1942, the organization existed without personnel until 30 April 1942, at which time three officers were assigned.⁴ Colonel (later Brigadier General) Harry F. Thompson was assigned to and assumed command on 2 May 1942⁵ with temporary headquarters in Temple, Texas. On 20 May 1942, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, School Troops, moved from its location in Temple, Texas, to a field camp on the reservation, to facilitate demonstration requirements of the Tank Destroyer Schools' second officers' orientation course, using the 893d Tank Battalion (Medium). These two units were slated for assignment to School Troops and were located in field camps on the reservation. The first problem of the School Troops was the total absence of experienced personnel. Three key non-commissioned officers were obtained from the 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion⁶ and on 1 June 1942, a cadre of eighteen enlisted men reported for duty from Camp Bowie, Texas.⁷

An early problem was planning to coordinate troop requirements with the units of Tank Destroyer Center. It was indicated that the School Troops would have to know in advance the nature of demonstrations, the equipment to be carried, the equipment needed and the troops required. A plan was initiated whereby the headquarters would receive the troop requirements one week in advance so that a schedule could be prepared and distributed to all units concerned. However, with the rapid expansion of Tank Destroyer Center, troop requirements were such that it was necessary to establish notice of requirements at least one month in advance. This was necessary to permit scheduling of training for the School Troops themselves. The plans used for filling troop requirements at different service schools were studied and a file card system was instituted. These file cards contained all the necessary data for each demonstration and were kept complete for a month in advance.

With the increase in demand for tactical units, priority was established by the Tank Destroyer Center for the Tank Destroyer School and the Unit Training Center. The Tank Destroyer Board, because of the nature of its activities, was extended the privilege of requesting troops when they were needed without advance notice. The 893d Tank Destroyer Battalion and the 753d Tank Battalion, together with the Tank Destroyer School Band, were assigned to School Troops on 1 June 1942.⁹ The 893d had been the first provisional General Headquarters tank destroyer battalion and at this time had some experimental equipment but was short other essential items. This was all of the tank destroyer equipment available at Camp Hood. In order to stage demonstrations required by the Tank Destroyer School, it was necessary to call on the 753d Tank Battalion for vehicles and personnel. In addition, assistant instructors were needed by the

Tank Destroyer School, since it had not received any enlisted personnel. This was solved to a certain extent by calling upon the 753d Tank Battalion to furnish assistant instructors.¹⁰

The different units of the School Troops experienced the same difficulties in the field as were recounted in the early operation of the Unit Training Center, but these units, more experienced in bivouac and maneuvers, readily solved the problems of health, hygiene, communications, etc.

Additional demonstrations were required upon activation of the Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate School. These requirements could not be met by the 897d Tank Destroyer Battalion, and it was therefore necessary to assign another unit to School Troops. The 809th Tank Destroyer Battalion was added on 29 June 1942,¹¹ but this organization was poorly equipped, under strength, and not fully trained. The additional mission of training this battalion increased the responsibility of school troops.

Facilities for the school troops' training program were provided by the construction of temporary ranges near the field camps. Ranges were provided for firing at moving targets, vehicular firing, firing from ground mounts, and antiaircraft firing. Training aids such as obstacle courses and driving courses were constructed, and other areas were designated for different types of training.¹²

On 15 July 1942, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, School Troops, was redesignated Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Training Brigade.¹³

To supervise the demonstrations and training of tank battalions, the Seventh Tank Group was assigned to School Troops on 1 July 1942.¹⁴ The number of tanks available for troop requirements was increased by the assignment of the 744th Tank Battalion (Light) to the Training Brigade on 21 August 1942.¹⁵ This organization was considerably understrength and had only recently been activated. Due to its training program, it did not participate in troop requirements until 1 December 1942. The demand for tactical units became so great that an additional organization, the 605th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was assigned to the Training Brigade on 1 October 1942.¹⁶

Tank requirements for the Advanced Unit Training Center soon increased to such an extent that it was impossible to furnish tanks from the two available battalions. A plan was suggested to use the tanks of the cavalry regiment that had been requested but as yet had not arrived at Camp Hood. The addition of this organization would allow the two tank battalions to be used for Advanced Unit Training Center free maneuver exercises. It was also apparent that tank destroyers should have some experience in maneuvering against the mounted reconnaissance that cavalry could furnish.¹⁷ On 15 December 1942, the 113th Cavalry Regiment (Mechanized) was attached (later assigned--20 February 1943) to the Training Brigade.¹⁸ This organization was well organized, completely equipped, and thoroughly trained.

The tank destroyer group problems that were given by Advanced Unit Training Center required an enemy force that was furnished by the Training Brigade. The coordinator of this force was the commanding officer of the Seventh Tank Group. It was usually composed of the Tank Group Headquarters, two tank battalions, one squadron of reconnaissance cavalry, and one company of tank destroyers. Experience gained from these problems was used as a basis for future training of both the demonstration troops and units of the Advanced Unit Training Center.¹⁹

To provide for demonstrations by all types of tank destroyer battalions, the Training Brigade was assigned one towed battalion and two self-propelled battalions, one equipped with M-3 destroyers and the other with M-10 destroyers.²⁰ Due to the lack of other ground elements, principally infantry and artillery, the Training Brigade was

unable to present a picture of tank destroyer operations as a part of the larger ground force team.²¹ This situation was not alleviated until the First Battalion, 51st Armored Infantry Regiment, 4th Armored Division was attached to the Training Brigade on 12 July 1943.²² This was a well trained and well equipped organization, and its participation in demonstrations and problems proved valuable. To afford additional training of tank destroyer battalions with ground elements, plans were made to include field artillery and combat engineers in the demonstrations. Artillery was added on 4 November 1943, by the assignment of the 264th Field Artillery Battalion,²³ but combat engineers were not available.

The tactical elements of the Training Brigade had the dual task of furnishing troop requirements and of increasing their own combat efficiency. In order to accomplish this, it was essential that all available time for training be applied with sedulity. Accordingly, a master schedule was devised which coordinated the time devoted to troop requirements and the hours in which training could be conducted by each unit of the Training Brigade. In addition, demonstration troops were given instruction while on assignments. Officers' schools, non-commissioned officers' schools, marches, and specialist training were conducted at night in order that units leaving the Training Brigade be prepared for combat duty.²⁴

Troops were rotated through the Training Brigade so that many organizations were able to attain a higher standard of efficiency by serving as demonstration units. To facilitate the rotation of troops, the Training Brigade established a system of instructing new organizations in demonstration duties which minimized the training required.²⁵ This plan was divided into three phases. The first phase called for the observing of parts played by key personnel in demonstrations. That was followed by substituting key personnel of the new unit to act as enlisted men under the direction of non-commissioned officers of the old organization. In the final phase, the new unit furnished vehicles and non-commissioned officers while the old organization furnished one key non-commissioned officer with each vehicle. If the new unit was unable to perform satisfactorily, additional rehearsals were scheduled before the new organization was used for demonstrations.²⁶

To check the performance of units on troop assignments, each instructor was required to fill out a troop performance record. All records showing a rating of "satisfactory" had to be endorsed by the instructor and state what was lacking to make this performance excellent. Headquarters of the unit reported upon would then correct the deficiencies. In case the rating was "unsatisfactory" then the commanding officer of the Training Brigade was notified.²⁷

A large part of the Training Brigade was made up of ordnance units stationed at Camp Hood for maintenance and training purposes. Maintenance of vehicles and weapons at Camp Hood was of major importance due to the large amount of material that was utilized at this station. The main problem that confronted the ordnance units was the necessity of completing their training before undertaking their primary mission of maintenance.

Certain of the ordnance units were activated at Camp Hood where they received all their training, while others were activated at other stations. Some were organized from "affiliated units" (organizations from which civilian automotive experts, both officers and enlisted men, were appointed in grade). Others were activated in the usual manner with cadres furnished by existing organizations and fillers reporting directly from induction centers.²⁸

The primary mission of ordnance troops activated elsewhere and sent to Camp Hood was somewhat obscure. Apparently many units were sent to Camp Hood for training, yet the changing policies of the Army Ground Forces conferred new responsibilities as

time went on. The principal problems arose from the conflicting missions of training and maintenance, since maintenance presented a full time job for fully trained troops.²⁹ The first ordnance units were Medium Maintenance and Medium Automotive Maintenance, and the number rapidly grew to include ammunition, evacuation, depot, heavy maintenance, and heavy maintenance tank companies. The 13th Ordnance Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, which had been assigned to the Training Brigade on 26 October 1942³⁰ conducted an intensive course of basic technical training from 26 October 1942 to 15 January 1943. Up to that time, Post Ordnance units had been attempting to perform maintenance and supply functions, but on 15 January 1943, the 13th Ordnance Battalion assumed the responsibility of servicing Tank Destroyer and Training Brigade units.³¹

To insure training supervision of the many ordnance companies activated at Camp Hood, the 310th Ordnance Battalion was activated on 1 April 1943, and the 320th Ordnance Battalion on 24 June 1943. These units were assigned to the Training Brigade on the date of their activation.³²

Newly activated companies were assigned to the 310th Ordnance Battalion for basic training, the Thirteenth Ordnance Battalion for technical training and the 320th Ordnance Battalion for field training.³³ A Battalion basic technical school was established by the 310th Ordnance Battalion in which the maintenance of artillery, small arms, fire control instruments, and wheeled and track laying vehicles, were taught to recruits. Instruction was given to about 400 individuals during the first five or six months of its operation. This school supplemented the instruction given in regular service schools.³⁴ Systematic tests and examinations permitted the selection of personnel to attend service schools based on demonstrated aptitude rather than on reference to the soldier's individual qualification card.³⁵

A great variety of instruction was required, as nearly every type of ordnance service was represented. At the outset a marked shortage of experienced personnel was a serious handicap, but as training progressed more than fifty percent of enlisted specialists and all officers attended one or more ordnance schools. This interrupted unit instruction, but no alternative was possible, since no technical ordnance school facilities were available at Camp Hood. By the time each company entered its final phase of training, practically all personnel was present for duty and the organization was able to function as a team.³⁶

All ordnance companies activated at Camp Hood were instructed on the basis of of thirteen weeks basic military and technical training. As much advanced training was given as time permitted.

On 27 April 1943, the Army Ground Forces ordnance units were assigned the responsibility of maintenance and supply for all elements of the Tank Destroyer Center.³⁸ As a measure of the extent of this responsibility, it is noted that the material inventory of Camp Hood in July 1943, included:³⁹

General Purpose Vehicles	7,000
Combat Vehicles	2,200
Light Artillery	1,050
Hand and Shoulder Weapons	48,000

A shortage of replacement parts created a major maintenance problem. Individual requirements were continually on an emergency basis because post ordnance warehouses carried inadequate stocks. Parts requisitions were forwarded to distant base depots and the vehicle deadline figures were the highest of any Army Ground Forces installation in the country.⁴⁰ To remedy this situation each maintenance company was authorized to stock appropriate parts on a fifteen-day basis. A depot company was installed in North Camp and began to stock parts. The effect of these changes was felt at once, and the

vehicle deadline condition showed prompt improvement. From a high point of 8.46 percent in July 1943, it declined to a 2.55 percent in October 1943.⁴¹

The Training Brigade was not organized to coordinate properly training activities of the ordnance units. As a higher headquarters in the chain of command, it imposed an extra administrative channel which did not always expedite the accomplishment of the ordnance, maintenance, and training mission.⁴² To remedy this situation, plans were formulated for the organization of an ordnance group headquarters, which would be assigned to the Training Brigade. These plans were approved on 25 August 1943, and Ordnance Group Headquarters was organized on 1 September 1943.⁴³ This agency immediately undertook the task of coordinating the activities of the three ordnance battalions. By 1 November 1943, a total of twenty-one ordnance companies had received all or part of their training at Camp Hood. By their maintenance of materiel, these units rendered valuable service to the Tank Destroyer Center.⁴⁴

In addition to demonstration troops and ordnance units, there were assigned to the Training Brigade a number of organizations that performed a variety of services. The most important of these services was that of transportation and on 12 June 1942, Company C, 49th Quartermaster Regiment (Truck) arrived at Camp Hood.⁴⁵ This company had been recently activated, and the men had not been trained to function as truck drivers. In order to start training immediately, twenty-two class "Y" vehicles were utilized for the instruction of drivers and mechanics. As soon as training was completed, transportation details were furnished to the Post Engineer and to the Post Range Officer to haul materiel from the cantonment area to temporary training areas. By 25 July 1942, the company had received forty-one 2½-ton trucks, and additional training in these vehicles was given by instructors from the automotive department of the Tank Destroyer School.⁴⁶

The transportation required by the Tank Destroyer School reached such proportions that eventually 48 tractors and 40 semi-trailers were secured. Thirty-five of these vans were equipped to seat 70 students each. Transportation facilities were further augmented on 4 February 1943 by the activation of the Provisional Truck Battalion;⁴⁷ this unit was later renamed Truck Battalion, Tank Destroyer Center,⁴⁸ and served as a pool for all transportation of the Center.

To release tank destroyer units for other duties, the 374th Engineer General Service Battalion, less Company B, was assigned to the Training Brigade on 21 August 1942.⁴⁹ This organization constructed the airport, temporary landing fields, numerous ranges, battle conditioning courses, the other training facilities both at Camp Hood and North Camp Hood.⁵⁰ On 3 August 1943, this unit was redesignated the 374th Engineer Regiment and was assigned to the Eighth Service Command, with station at Camp Hood.⁵¹

To facilitate future scheduling of band activities, the Tank Destroyer School Band was assigned to School Troops on 1 June 1942.⁵² The band was used to play for parades and other functions of the Tank Destroyer School in Gatesville. It was also utilized to perform at ceremonies and concerts for organizations of the Unit Training Center located in field camps. On 15 August 1942, the Second Band, Tank Destroyer School was activated and assigned to the Training Brigade.⁵³ The following month, on 2 September 1942, the bands were redesignated the First and Second Bands, Tank Destroyer Center.⁵⁴

There were a number of other organizations present at one time in the Training Brigade, a complete list of which is recorded in the Appendices, Chapter XII.

The Training Brigade since its activation on 9 March 1942, was under the direction of six commanding officers:

1. Colonel (later Brigadier General) Harry F. Thompson,
2 May 1942--28 November 1942.⁵⁵
2. Colonel (later Brigadier General) Alexander O. Gorder,
28 November 1942--22 February 1943.⁵⁶
3. Colonel Thomas J. Heavey, 22 February 1943-- 4 May 1943.⁵⁷
4. Colonel William S. Biddle, 4 May 1943--20 July 1943.⁵⁸
5. Colonel Lansing McVicker, 20 July 1943--20 January 1944.⁵⁹
6. Colonel Edward A. Kinball--20 January 1944.

The Training Brigade was inactivated 17 February 1944.⁶⁰ The 22d Tank Destroyer Group was assigned to the Tank Destroyed School for administration and use as school troops. Other units were either disbanded or rejoined their arm or service.

SUMMARY: The Training Brigade, beginning from naught, in March 1943, grew to an organization of approximately 800 officers and 11,000 enlisted men, eventually comprising all arms except engineers and chemical warfare service.

Through troops furnished the Tank Destroyer School and demonstration troops furnished the Unit Training Center and other installations of the Tank Destroyer Center, it was a most constructive agency in helping other installations execute their primary missions. Due to lack of infantry and artillery units, the Training Brigade was not able to present a true picture of tank destroyer employment in integrated combined arms action until July and November 1943.

The Training Brigade accomplished its demonstration mission and at the same time maintained a high standard of training by continuous instruction. It also performed valuable services for elements of the Tank Destroyer Center through its supervision of maintenance and transportation, and its supervision of training ordnance troops who rendered a very necessary maintenance and supply service and emerged as well trained units themselves.

CHAPTER XIII

THE TANK DESTROYER REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTER

As reflected in Chapter II of the Tank Destroyer Center history,¹ the Commanding General of the Center visualized in December 1942 the necessity for a Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center. The Mobilization Branch, G-3, War Department, did not concur in the recommendation for the establishment of a Replacement Training Center as a part of the Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center.²

On 8 May 1942, General Bruce recommended to Army Ground Forces that a tank destroyer section be established in each of the Replacement Training Centers at Fort Riley, Kansas, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, and Camp Wolters, Texas. This recommendation was disapproved.³

Again on 2 June 1942, General Bruce definitely recommended the establishment of a Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center,⁴ based on the fact that existing replacement centers were not adequate in that their training did not include specialized instruction in tank destroyer subjects.

On 19 August 1942, the Replacement and School Command recommended to Army Ground Forces that a Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center be established expeditiously at Camp Hood, Texas.⁵ The Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center was finally activated 3 October 1942, with temporary station at Camp Hood, Texas.⁶

Colonel J. E. Gillfillan, Lieutenant Colonel (later Colonel) Christian Hildebrand, and Major William H. O'Brien had reported to Camp Hood on 1 September 1942 to prepare plans for the Replacement Training Center. Thus, when the Center was activated with Colonel Gillfillan in command, plans had been prepared for:

1. Selection of trainees to be sent to the Tank Destroyer School for training in motors, radio, weapons and pioneer, in order to furnish specialists for the Basic Unit Training Center as new Tank Destroyer battalions were activated in that installation
2. Preparation of trainees to act in crews or sections as battle loss replacements for tank destroyer battalions.
3. Outline of training in Mobilization Training Program 18-1 as applied to a replacement training center.
4. Organizational charts for Center headquarters and lower echelons.
5. Plans for housing, supply, training aids, motor parts and ranges.

The first phase of the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center, covering the period from activation to 1 January 1943, was the training of initial trainees and other personnel to qualify as cadre for an expansion of the Center after 1 January 1943. The initial cadre were provided by the Replacement and School Command and arrived on 3 October 1942.⁷ This cadre was composed of personnel from various replacement training centers -- Cavalry, Infantry, Field Artillery and Branch Immateral. It was therefore essential that the time available before the arrival of trainees be used for specialized training of the cadre in tank destroyer subjects. With no equipment available for the Replacement Training Center, the facilities of the Tank Destroyer School were used and the cadre was trained in battle conditioning, vehicle operation, weapons, orientation, instructional methods and voice radio procedure.

It was thus that the Center was prepared to receive and initiate the training of the 2640 trainees who began to arrive on 26 October 1942.

The initial organization of the Replacement Training Center consisted of 99 officers, 528 enlisted cadre and 2640 trainees.⁸ In addition to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center, three training battalions (126th, 127th and 128th), consisting of Headquarters and Headquarters Company and four lettered companies, were activated.

The trainees, divided between three battalions, were then given the same general basic and technical tank destroyer training as their instructors had received. On account of the shortage of equipment and training aids, the facilities of the Tank Destroyer School were again used. Upon the re-assignment and transfer of Colonel Gilfillan on 31 October 1942,⁹ Colonel Christian Hildebrand acted as Commanding Officer of the Replacement Training Center until 13 November 1942 when Colonel (later Brigadier General) Walter A. Dumas arrived to take command. One of the early difficulties confronting the Center was due to temporary housing facilities at Camp Hood where there were a great number of tank destroyer battalions, school troops and school students, all operating under congested housing, congested training areas and paucity of equipment.

At the time of the activation of the new Replacement Training Center, and for a time thereafter, there was a shortage of officers. This shortage was met in part by assigning officers of all grades from the Tank Destroyer School and the Replacement and Training Center. Junior officers were received directly from the Tank Destroyer Officer Candidate School,¹⁰ but due to their inexperience as newly commissioned officers, it was necessary for the Center to establish thorough courses of instruction for them.¹¹

With the weekly graduations of newly commissioned officers from the Tank Destroyer School and with newly assigned officers from other sources, the shortage of officers was overcome in a short time and resulted in a surplus. In order to facilitate the assignment and attachment of these officers to organizations, the Tank Destroyer Officer Replacement Pool was activated in November 1942. This pool furnished the initial needs of the Replacement Training Center for the bulk of the officers of company grade. The pool officers were attached to training units, placed on detached service or sent to the officer schools.¹²

Fortunately for the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center, not all of the 2640 trainees arrived during the months of October and November. There was a shortage of 331, and the Center requested of the Replacement and School Command that this number of men be transferred from the over head of the Tank Destroyer School which was, at that time, overstrength.¹³ This request was granted and the men from the School with previous tank destroyer training, provided a source of excellent non-commissioned officers who were sorely needed.

Since the Replacement Training Center planned to use the first men trained as cadre in the expansion of the Training Center, the training throughout the three battalions was uniform. The trainees were given basic subjects, together with technical and tactical subjects. The scope of the technical and tactical subjects had been indicated through the training inaugurated by the Unit Training Center and tank destroyer training manuals which, at this time, had assumed a definite form, policy and doctrine.¹⁴ The training was given, however, under adverse conditions due to the serious shortage of equipment, training aids, congested housing and training areas. Equipment was borrowed or simulated. Training aids were manufactured and borrowed from other units. Eventually the Replacement Training Center, without a reproduction plant, requested the aid of the 8th Service Command, San Antonio, Texas, in securing a large quantity of charts and other training aids. This resulted in the Replacement Training Center receiving 1500 pictorial training aids.¹⁵

By 1 January 1943, units of five training regiments had been activated to receive the weekly increments of 1050 trainees beginning the first week in January.¹⁶

Training was uniform for all battalions for the training. This basic training was substantially the same as that given in any other Replacement Training Center but included orientation lectures on the tank destroyer units. In addition to the basic and general subjects received, the trainees received 305 hours in technical and tactical training in their particular specialist field.¹⁷ The weekly system of increments presented a difficult problem for the Center in that it involved a large number of classes on different subjects in each battalion. With a limited number of officers and cadre for instruction, the instructors were not able to prepare thoroughly and specialize in the subjects to be presented. The Center required that each instructor prepare a written lesson plan at least 12 hours in advance of the instruction to be given. With the large number of classes in different subjects occasioned by the weekly increment system, instructors had to double up on different subjects. This tended to make the instructor "Jack of all trades" and in a large percent of the classes, defeated superior instruction developed through specialization. The only advantage of the increment system appeared to be in limiting to a small number the students in each class. In the opinion of the Center, this advantage was negligible when compared to the advantage of having specialized instructors in each subject.¹⁸

Since physical and mental aggressiveness were desired for tank destroyer personnel, trainees were given thorough individual training and close personal observation. Captain (later Major) Samuel H. Kraimes, psychiatrist, was assigned to the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center on 22 December 1942.¹⁹ A Mental Hygiene Clinic was opened and the Advisor System was established. Under this system the company commander was chief advisor. One non-commissioned officer was designated as advisor for each barracks. The trainees were encouraged to present their problems to the advisor. Extreme cases were referred to the Mental Hygiene Clinic for possible discharge under Section VIII of AR 615-360. Officers were instructed in the recognition and treatment of psychiatric difficulties likely to be found in any typical group of trainees.²⁰ On 4 July 1943, a Standard Operating Procedure for the disposition of mental and emotional problem cases was published. Cases to be referred to the Mental Hygiene Clinic were: retarded mental development; emotional instability; mentally sick; illiterate; non-English speaking; and personnel not performing satisfactorily. If action was indicated individual instruction in the company was given, or the subject was transferred to a Special Training Unit which had been activated 24 February 1943 with the mission of instructing low-grade men, illiterates, non-English speaking and mental and physical misfits, with a view to preparing them for regular training.²¹ Otherwise, personnel was transferred to the Station Hospital for necessary examination and treatment with a view to either discharge under AR 615-360 or reclassification as limited service personnel.

The training problem was complicated by epidemics of measles, meningitis, mumps and scarlet fever which occurred in the early spring of 1943. The situation became so bad that the Post Commander, on 13 March 1943, imposed an over-all working quarantine on the Replacement Training Center which continued in force until 22 April 1943.²²

In order to secure leaders and the best equipped instructors, the Center established numerous schools. Three of these schools were most effective.

An Officer Candidate Preparatory School was established on 22 February 1943.²³ Altruistically, this was designed to select the best officer candidate material possible. It consisted of a two weeks course of instruction for men with Reserve Officers Training Corps experience and for volunteer officer candidates and selected trainees. If able to pass the examination, selectees were sent before the Post Officer Candidate School Board where, if they failed entrance requirements, they continued instruction

in the Officer Candidate Preparatory School. This School served a worthy purpose in helping find officer material when officers were needed but was discontinued by directive of the Replacement and School Command on 8 May 1943.²⁴ The post-graduate school for officers of the Center and the Pool was inaugurated 10 March 1943.²⁵ The courses offered consisted of post-graduate work for newly appointed second lieutenants and cadre schools for other officers. The School was primarily a refresher course in the fundamental subjects, such as marksmanship and methods of instruction. Originally designed to cover a two weeks period, it was expanded on 27 August 1943 to include weapons and radio communication and was increased to six weeks duration. All assigned officers were scheduled for the course and by 15 October 1943, 2644 officers had received instruction in this school.²⁶

To standardize and improve the instruction of the cadremen, thereby better fitting them as instructors, an enlisted cadremen's class was organized 8 June 1943. This course extended over a two weeks period with emphasis placed on methods of instruction in basic training. Cadremen were rotated so that all assigned cadremen might receive this instruction. Efficiency ratings were forwarded to battalion commanders and in the case of ratings below excellent, the battalion commander either effected correction of deficiencies or obtained a new cadremen for instruction purposes.²⁷

In April 1943, the Replacement Training Center attained its full growth. Although 14,000 was the authorized trainee strength, the actual strength was much greater due to the presence of volunteer officer candidates awaiting transfer to Officer Candidate School and men held over to complete training. The cadre at this time consisted of 18 per company of 220 to 250 trainees.

Pursuant to authority by Replacement and School Command, which provided for the omission of one weekly increment, Replacement Training Center completed its movement to North Camp Hood on 2 May 1943. Training was resumed at 0700 on 3 May 1943.²⁸ The official opening of North Camp Hood took place on 29 May 1943. The outstanding feature of this occasion was a review of the Replacement Training Center troops by Major General Orlando Ward and Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces.²⁹ General McNair was greatly impressed with the progress made by the Center and rendered high commendation in his address.³⁰

During the latter part of May 1943, the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center was directed to conduct basic training for Army Specialized Training Program candidates for one cycle of thirteen weeks, using existing facilities. The inflow of tank destroyer trainees was stopped to provide space for 7,000 of these candidates. Eight thousand candidates were housed in battalion areas vacated by the Basic Unit Training Center.

Army Ground Forces allotted additional cadres to take care of this program on 24 May 1943. The inauguration of the Army Specialized Training Program resulted in the loss of many of the best men in the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center overhead who became cadremen for units of this new activity or were shipped to colleges as students.³¹ The 132d Army Specialized Training Battalion, the first to be formed, was activated on 29 May 1943.³² The inflow of Army Specialized Training Program candidates was 1000 weekly beginning early in June 1943, for the vacant Tank Destroyer Replacement Center battalion areas and 2,000 per week arriving in July 1943 for the vacant Basic Unit Training Center areas. Provision for additional commissioned and enlisted cadre for the Army Specialized Training Program was made by a letter from the Replacement and School Command on 24 May 1943, which authorized 262 additional officers and 1,301 additional enlisted men.³³ The Sixth and Seventh Army Specialized Training Regiments consisting of four battalions of four companies each were activated on 8 June 1943.³⁴ The training consisted of thirteen weeks' basic infantry training, after which the trainees were ready for assignment in advanced courses of study. The expected

inflow of Army Specialized Training Program candidates materialized only to the extent that two battalions received trainees. The flow then became sporadic and finally stopped with a total of approximately 4,000 present for training.

One of the duties of the pre-activation planning board had been to plan for the inclusion of eight per cent of colored trainees with appropriate cadres within the authorized strength of the Replacement Training Center. Two battalions, the 132d and the 133d, remained inactive, reserved for colored trainees.

On 22 May 1943, the Replacement and School Command sent a letter to the commanding general, Army Ground Forces, in which it was recommended that these two battalions be activated with white cadre in order to accommodate the Army Specialized Training Program and because the Replacement and School Command believed that the output of white tank destroyer replacements was more necessary than that of colored tank destroyer replacements. It was stated in this letter that upon completion of the Army Specialized Training Program in the Replacement Training Center, and at such time as was desired, these two white battalions, by reporting the cadres as available for assignment to the field forces and by securing colored cadre.

First enforcement to this letter by Army Ground Forces on 30 May 1943, approved the conversion of one Negro training battalion in the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center to a white battalion. One Negro battalion was activated in order to meet the estimated requirements of the War Department for approximately one battalion of tank destroyer Negro replacements in the calendar year 1943.³⁵ The first Negro unit, the 133d Tank Destroyer Training Battalion, was activated on 5 August 1943.³⁶ On 16 October 1943, there were 674 Negroes in the Replacement Training Center.³⁷

The installation of the Army Specialized Training Program with the resulting curtailment of tank destroyer activities at North Camp Hood caused a reorganization of the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center.

The Replacement and School Command directed the commanding general, Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center, on 1 October 1943, to reorganize the Center on a basis of 7,540 white trainees to begin instruction on 11 October 1943. A total of three regiments--eleven battalions, forty-five companies--was planned. Specialized training was given as follows:

Type of Training	Number of Trainees
Armored	120
Clerks	180
Cooks	168
Supply	180
Communication	416
Intelligence and Operations	80
Motor Mechanics	640
Reconnaissance	320
Pioneer	124
Motorcyclists--Scouts	160
Tank Destroyer	5152

Colored trainees were kept for the completion of instruction already in progress but they were in excess of the authorized capacity. Upon completion of training, no others were received and the colored training units were inactivated.³⁸

The remaining tank destroyer training units were the Second, Fourth and Fifth Regiments. The other four regiments at the Replacement Training Center were converted to the Army Specialized Training Program.³⁹

The inflow of tank destroyer trainees was at a standstill on 11 October 1943, but the reorganization was accomplished with the anticipation that the inflow would be resumed on 31 October 1943.⁴⁰ Under this new organization the number of specialists in the various training units was to have the same relationship to the total of 7,540 trainees as the number of like specialists in tank destroyer battalions. The length of the cycle was increased to nineteen weeks--seventeen weeks training and one week each for reception and shipment.

In the weapons regiment increments were of battalion size, since all the trainees were to receive identical training for the seventeen weeks. In the two specialists regiments the increments were of section, platoon, half-company, or company size. Under the system of inflow there were shipments of a balanced output of all specialists over a period of one month rather than weekly as had been the case before the reorganization on 1 October 1943. Training management was, therefore, simplified, since no organization received trainees every week.⁴¹ The increase in the training period from thirteen to seventeen weeks resulted in an increase in practical work. The training on the battle conditioning course was doubled, and other instruction involving practical work was lengthened.

Due to the heat wave in July and August 1943 which resulted in a number of cases of heat prostration and sunstroke, the Replacement Training Center effected a schedule greatly attenuating this hazard. In effect, an acclimatization week was added to the incoming week of trainees and work was avoided during the hottest hours of the day, with the men being toughened by gradually increasing activity.

The Replacement Training Center attempted to effect a combined staff for the Replacement Training Center and the Army Specialized Training combined program. This was never effected,⁴² and there were no indications as to when the flow of Army Specialized Training Program trainees would be resumed.⁴³ Hence, on 16 October 1943, there were in training 2,961 Army Specialized Training Program candidates in two battalions with both scheduled to complete training by 22 November 1943. There were in training 7,079 tank destroyer trainees in nine battalions, all scheduled to complete training by 15 January 1944.⁴⁴ The inflow of Army Specialized Training Program trainees was at a standstill, while the arrival of tank destroyer trainees was stabilized on a basis of from 1,400 to 1,700 men every four to five weeks beginning with the week of 1 November 1943.

The status of the Army Specialized Training Program was changed to that of a separate unit under the command and supervision of the Commanding General, Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center, on 16 November 1943.⁴⁵ The Center provided Standard Operating Procedures and trained officers and enlisted men for its new element. However, the Army Specialized Training Program Basic Training Center was inactivated on 21 December 1943.⁴⁶

The era of retrenchment in manpower again was felt on 23 November 1943 when revisions were effected. Under the new plans, the total trainee load remained unchanged. It resulted, however, in an increase in the size of the weapons companies, which necessitated inactivation of two regiments and nine training companies. There then remained in the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center three regiments consisting of 11 battalions which included 37 training companies.⁴⁷

This effort by the Replacement and School Command to standardize Replacement Training Centers resulted in a number of problems for the Center. Personnel was shifted, equipment re-allotted, training aids divided, and training areas reassigned. The proportionate decrease in cadre created a problem due to the many essential activities for which no overhead was provided. This situation was happily solved by the Center through the inactivation of the Army Specialized Training Program. Many valuable

non-commissioned officers and trainees with especially high intelligence ratings were received by the Center from the Army Specialized Training unit.

Another problem confronting the Center at this time was that of rotation of key officers. Replacement and School Command cooperated with the Center in making extensions as far as possible and by alerting the Center in advance so that suitable replacements could be found.⁴⁸

Brigadier General Walter A. Dumas departed on reassignment 2 December 1943 and was succeeded by Colonel Christian Hildebrand.⁴⁹ The Center was confronted with a most difficult problem on 14 January 1944 when a plan was put into effect rotating cademen who had served one year in the Replacement Training Center. Twenty percent of the physically qualified cademen were reported for shipment each month and were to be replaced with Zone of Interior personnel.⁵⁰ This problem was met by the Center in utilizing all qualified officer personnel with the battalion as the instructors both for trainees and for Zone of Interior men replacing experienced cademen.

On 15 February 1944, Brigadier General Alexander O. Gorder assumed command and Colonel Hildebrand resumed his duties as executive officer.⁵¹ General Gorder had had continuous service with tank destroyers since February 1942. He had commanded the Training Brigade at Camp Hood and a tactical brigade in the Second Army. He well understood the training requirements for tank destroyer personnel and emphasized accuracy, precision, and intelligent rhythmic action in all training.

On the same date that General Gorder assumed command, the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center was reduced to two regiments of tank destroyer crewmen and one regiment of specialists, comprising a total of 6600 trainees, and the storage of 400 trainees who had completed their training. A signal achievement of the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center during the early months of 1944 was that of solving the problem of maintenance, of motor vehicles, arms and equipment. The almost insuperable problem of motor vehicle maintenance was due to the fact that no regular drivers could be assigned to a vehicle. Vehicles were limited in number and were pooled for the use of different classes of instruction. Each day would bring a new driver for a vehicle and consequently no one driver could be made responsible for first echelon maintenance. The solution achieved was that of shortening the period of each class by five minutes and thus creating a forty-five minute period at the end of the day for over-all maintenance. All troops were rotated so that they would have experience in first echelon maintenance on vehicles, on arms and on other equipment. It followed the pattern of "stables" in the cavalry and artillery. All company officers and cademen participated in supervision and final inspection and first echelon maintenance was thoroughly performed.

In training the policy was inaugurated that all men know the how, why and wherefor of what they were doing and the Commanding General of the Center through constant personal inspection achieved superior instruction and superior training through the interest sustaining element of appreciation of the how, why and wherefor.

The Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center suffered further reductions on 21 September 1944 when trainees were reduced to 4000 and again on 2 December 1944 when the trainees were reduced to 2900. Under the latter reorganization, 2400 men were trained as tank destroyer crewmen and the remaining 500 specialists grouped as follows:

Cooks	50	Communications	150
Clerks	50	Pioneer	50
Reconnaissance crewmen	100	Motor mechanics	100

On 21 December 1944, the 144th Tank Destroyer Training Battalion was reorganized to give advanced training to trainee graduates immediately upon their return from a two weeks furlough. While made available to field requisition as loss replacements at any time, they were given training with emphasis on physical conditioning, development of leadership and potential non-commissioned officers, and as a tactical unit.⁵²

The advent of "Branch Immaterial" training for all personnel for the first six weeks interposed no special problem on the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center. This training was inaugurated on 30 December 1944. Being elemental, it simplified training procedure and was provocative of greater satisfaction among the trainees. The latter was due to the fact that the trainees felt that they had not had a branch of service imposed upon them and when the first six weeks of training was completed, they preferred to be tank destroyers.

The Tank Destroyer Officer Replacement Pool had declined in strength along with other training at the Center and on 8 May 1945, the total strength of the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center was 183 officers, 6 warrant officers, 750 enlisted men, 76 enlisted women, and 2818 trainees.

Training continued, using the same standards achieved earlier in the year and by the 1st of September, or V-J Day, the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center had been reduced to 2104 trainees. Notwithstanding the constant retrenchment and reorganization, the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center continued its high standards of training and wherever possible, obtained officers and men from overseas with battle experience, as instructors.

SUMMARY: Although requested as an adjunct for Tank Destroyer Center activities, the Replacement Training Center was not activated and did not commence functioning until one whole year after the activation of the Tank Destroyer Center. Unlike the Tank Destroyer School, the Replacement Training Center had something on which to build. The Unit Training Center had developed from use and experience Mobilization Training Program 18-1. Tank destroyer doctrines, gunnery and weapons standards had been evolved and the Center was concerned in a refinement of the methods delineated in Mobilization Training Program 18-1, 1 April 1942. The present Mobilization Training Program 18-2 is a refinement of the original Mobilization Training Program 18-1, omitting the tactical scope involving company, battalion and group employment. The Replacement Training Center contributed in a major way to achievements of the Tank Destroyer Center in training replacements perfected in basic and technical knowledge. The early problems of the Replacement Training Center were in securing officers and enlisted men capable of instruction. To do this, the Center inaugurated schools and trained personnel for the purpose. Lack of training aids and equipment were major problems and they were overcome by persistence and resourcefulness. The Replacement Training Center solved the problem of maintenance by devoting approximately one hour each day, with all personnel participating, in performance and supervision of maintenance.

The personnel problems of the Replacement Training Center were not uncommon to those of other Replacement Training Centers but through the system of advisors established in the Center, and the personal interest taken in each individual, the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center ranked high among all Replacement Training Centers as to number of effectives on duty.⁵³

From all reports received from units receiving replacements from the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center, the highest praise was given with respect to the replacements' ability to perform. One lesson pointed to in the experience of the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center was that after superior training as a tank destroyer replacement, an exceptionally large number of the graduate trainees of this

Center never found their way to tank destroyer units but were sent to other arms, and men trained in other arms were sent as replacements to tank destroyer units. The Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center had no way of correcting this but it appeared to all officers of the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center that when men were trained as specialists and technicians for tank destroyers, that they should first be made available to tank destroyer units.

A high degree of parallellism was reflected in the training of the three units -- Unit Training Center, Basic Unit Training Center and Replacement Center.* The present MTP 18-2, 11 July 1945, is a refinement of training original outlined and developed by the Unit Training Center under MTP 18-1, 1 April 1945. Due to the large number of troops which had to be trained expeditiously, this duplication of effort could not have been avoided as there was no basis for training tank destroyer replacements. With the training in the Replacement Training Center as now prescribed, it is believed that replacements can be trained to take their places in organization and further training could be accomplished by the tactical commander of the unit.

CHAPTER XIV

THE TANK DESTROYER BASIC UNIT TRAINING CENTER (INDIVIDUAL TRAINING CENTER)

The Tank Destroyer Basic Unit Training Center was organized to standardize the activating, equipping, and basic training of tank destroyer battalions by centralizing all such activity under the control of the Tank Destroyer Center.

Prior to the activation of the Tank Destroyer Basic Unit Training Center on 27 November 1942, tank destroyer organizations were activated at various stations throughout the United States. After a period of basic training under the supervision of the higher headquarters by which they were activated, these units were sent to the Unit Training Center, Camp Hood, Texas, for advanced instruction. Upon the arrival of the first tank destroyer battalions to undergo the Unit Training Center's course in June 1942, it became apparent that this system of activation and basic training was defective.

The experience of the Unit Training Center demonstrated that many tank destroyer units sent to Camp Hood lacked the necessary basic training to complete successfully advanced tactical and technical training. Many organizations arrived at only half strength or less, in both officers and enlisted men, and the majority of them had few or no major items of equipment. Personnel had done little or no firing with individual weapons. There had been little or no training in night operations, marches and bivouacs, use of antitank mines, map reading, and camouflage. Many of the deficiencies in these basic subjects resulted from units having received filler replacements in small increments, from emphasis on more advanced subjects, and from an apparent lack of close training supervision by higher headquarters. Some of the battalions had been hampered in their training by excessive details for guard and transportation required by divisions to which they were attached, lack of training areas, lack of ammunition and training aids, and by their use as replacement battalions.¹

It appeared that these defects could be corrected by centralizing activation, organization, and training of tank destroyer units under the Tank Destroyer Center. General Bruce, commander of the Tank Destroyer Center, planned not only to activate and train new tank destroyer battalions in the Basic Unit Training Center, but also to give battalions already activated such further instruction as was necessary to enable them to absorb advanced unit training. It was estimated that approximately twelve to seventeen battalions which had been activated during 1942 needed such additional training.² This plan was approved by Army Ground Forces on 22 October 1942. Training was to begin as soon as possible.³

The plans provided for the training of tank destroyer units in 1943, and called for the activating and simultaneous training of twenty-one battalions and seven group headquarters and headquarters companies at the Basic Unit Training Center.⁴ Housing and other facilities for the Basic Unit Training Center were incorporated in the plan of the new cantonment at North Camp Hood, Texas.⁵ Housing for twenty-four tank destroyer battalions, to include necessary overhead, was requested in a letter to the Commanding General, Army Ground Forces on 17 September 1942.⁶

Pending the completion of construction for the Basic Unit Training Center, authority was granted by the War Department for the temporary use of available facilities at Camp Bowie, Texas.⁷ The Basic Unit Training Center was officially activated there on 27 November 1942, with Colonel Harry F. Thompson commanding and Lieutenant Colonel Ira W. Black as Executive Officer. The 780th Tank Destroyer Company at Camp Hood had been redesignated Headquarters Company, Tank Destroyer Basic Unit Training Center, by War Department authority as a nucleus for the new headquarters.⁸

As with other installations of the Tank Destroyer Center, it was necessary for the Basic Unit Training Center to organize with speed and start training almost immediately. Six tank destroyer battalions were moved to Camp Bowie for training under the new Center on 5 December 1942. Other units with from five to twelve months of training were also ordered to Camp Bowie from all parts of the country and by the end of December, twelve battalions had arrived and eight additional units arrived in January 1943.

The Basic Unit Training Center had a three-fold objective, namely, to train the individual soldier in basic fundamentals; to train individuals to take proper places in tank destroyer organization and work as members of the unit team; and to prepare organizations for advanced unit and specialized training.

The units had to be brought to full strength, as only four colored battalions and one white battalion arrived with complete personnel. The intelligence level of the battalions had been lowered by losses to officer candidate schools and to aviation training. Seven white battalions had from forty-seven to sixty-three per cent of their personnel in Army General Classification Test grades IV and V, the normal percentages being 23.5 and 9.7, respectively in these grades.⁹ The fillers for these battalions began arriving in the latter part of December. Each battalion upon arrival was given a special inspection to determine the state of its training and a program of instruction was prescribed.¹⁰

The control and supervision of training of the twenty-three battalions was handled by the Eighth and Ninth Groups which had been transferred to Camp Bowie on 4 December 1942 and 13 January 1943.¹¹ From six to eight battalions were attached to each group and the balance were trained directly by the S-3 Section of the Basic Unit Training Center. This arrangement was temporary as, on 13 February 1943, the Tenth Group was activated and assumed responsibility for training.¹² As new groups were activated, the number of units attached to each group was equalized.

For the most of the battalions, the program of training was of eight weeks' duration. Their stay at Camp Bowie was extended in a few cases due to the slow arrival of fillers, the shortage of housing facilities at the Advanced Unit Training Center in Camp Hood, and the repeated instruction necessary to enable the four colored battalions to attain a reasonable standard of proficiency in basic training.¹³ Beginning on 1 March 1943, the battalions completing their training at Camp Bowie were shipped to the Advanced Unit Training Center, Camp Hood. These battalions left at the rate of three per week, and by 20 April 1943, all of the original twenty-three battalions had cleared Camp Bowie.¹⁴

To the end of standardization procedure, both in pre-activation activities and in actual activation, the Basic Unit Training Center established a separate staff composed principally of officers awaiting assignment. This staff functioned as a planning board and developed policy and procedure for pre-activation and activation.¹⁵

The first three weeks preceding activation were utilized in continuing a program of officer conferences which covered the training program objectives, policy, procedure, administration, and instruction in tank destroyer battalion duties.

In the pre-activation period, training teams were organized which provided the newly activated units with qualified instructors. The objective of the training team idea was to provide each company of the battalion with a competent instructor in each subject. The principle of the training team was not considered wholly desirable and was adopted as an expedient due to the limitations of the eight weeks' training program.¹⁶

It was initially planned that basic training would commence one week after the date of activation with the first week utilized in receiving and processing fillers. However, in some instances fillers were slow in arriving, and the start of basic training was delayed. Later instructions were received that basic training in a newly activated battalion would commence when the unit had attained seventy-five per cent of its table of organization strength.¹⁷

The direct responsibility for training was decentralized. The tank destroyer groups became responsible for the conduct of instruction in their respective battalions. The training inspectors of the Tank Destroyer Basic Training Center were concerned primarily with the progress, methods of instruction, and training procedures in the units. Reports of deficiencies in training were made by the tank destroyer group headquarters, which was given the primary responsibility for instituting measures to correct such deficiencies.¹⁸

The deficiencies in training in Basic Unit Training Center battalions were found to be in direct proportion to the experience of their officers and key non-commissioned officers. Inexperienced young officers, many of whom were recent officer candidate school graduates, were necessarily placed in positions of command and on battalion staffs. The eagerness of men and officers to commence unit and advanced training caused an acceptance of low standards through efforts to digress from the basic individual training program. In some instances a lack of close supervision of training by responsible unit officers further contributed to a low degree of proficiency.¹⁹

The construction of facilities at North Camp Hood permitted beneficial occupancy by the Basic Unit Training Center beginning 1 May 1943. Because of the scarcity of vehicles, nine battalions and three groups made the 100 mile march from Camp Bowie, Texas, to Camp Hood in one week.²⁰ The march was tactical and afforded an excellent opportunity to observe and correct deficiencies in such basic subjects as military courtesy, discipline, marches, bivouac, sanitation, personal hygiene and security. The movement of the Basic Unit Training Center from Camp Bowie was completed 23 May 1943.²¹

By the end of June 1943, twenty-two battalions were in training at North Camp Hood. Eight of these battalions were put in field camps for lack of completed facilities in the new cantonment. These camps were from twelve to twenty miles distant from the Basic Unit Training Center Headquarters and complicated the training problem by extra requirements of transportation of training aids, training films and other facilities. This problem of transportation and training continued by reason of the advent of the Army Specialized Training Program which began in June 1943 under the Tank Destroyer Replacement Training Center. The battalions in the field, after completing their training, were shipped to the Advanced Unit Training Center and other Basic Unit Training Center battalions were moved out of North Camp Hood to make room for the Army Specialized Training Program. This process continued until the latter part of July 1943 when only seven Basic Unit Training Center battalions were in the cantonment area.²²

After the first six white battalions had been activated, a directive was received from the War Department to reduce tank destroyer battalions from a table of organization strength of 860 enlisted men to a new strength of 636. This meant that there was, in the six battalions, an overstrength large enough to fill two more battalions, and this personnel was used to fill the next two battalions activated.²³

As other tank destroyer battalions in the United States reduced their enlisted strength to the new table of organization, many of the fillers for the battalions later activated came from them. Problems arose because many of these fillers were the

cast-offs and undesirables of the parent organizations. These men were spread as thinly as possible among all units, but added administrative burdens to the organizations.²⁴

The limited time provided by the eight weeks' training program contributed to many minor deficiencies in the first battalions to be activated. The shortcomings of the eight weeks' program became evident at the Advanced Unit Training Center, where deficiencies in basic training, especially in weapons and motors, handicapped advanced instruction. A thirteen weeks' training program was prepared and recommended to the Tank Destroyer Center. This program was authorized in June 1943, and the training period of all units under the Tank Destroyer Basic Unit Training Center was extended to thirteen weeks. Due to their varied stages of training, separate programs had to be prepared for each of the eighteen battalions in the Basic Unit Training Center, taking into consideration the training already accomplished.²⁵

This extended program was approved and expanded to a fourteen weeks' program by Army Ground Forces on 5 June 1943, and was put into effect only in battalions that had not commenced basic training.²⁶ As a designation more in keeping with its functions, the Basic Unit Training Center was redesignated the Individual Training Center, upon the suggestion of Major General Orlando C. Ward, commanding general of the Tank Destroyer Center. Redesignation was accomplished on 13 August 1943, with the approval of Army Ground Forces.²⁷

The activation of battalions for training at the Individual Training Center ceased with the activation of the 679th Tank Destroyer Battalion (colored) on 21 June 1943, which was delayed six weeks in commencing training because of insufficient strength. The last white unit to be organized was the 672d Tank Destroyer Battalion, which was activated on 19 June 1943.²⁸

On 8 October 1943, the War Department ordered that the Individual Training Center, North Camp Hood, be discontinued effective 15 October 1943. Concurrent with this, the Headquarters and Headquarters Company of the Individual Training Center was disbanded.²⁹

SUMMARY: During the existence of the Tank Destroyer Individual Training Center, there was afforded an opportunity to compare the progress of the twenty-three tank destroyer battalions activated elsewhere, and shipped to the Individual Training Center after completion of five to twelve months of training, with that of the twenty-six battalions activated and trained within the Tank Destroyer Individual Training Center.³⁰

Considering other factors such as the availability of trained key commissioned and enlisted personnel and the increase in the program of training, it was believed that the plan for the activation and training of all tank destroyer units under the direct control of the Tank Destroyer Center was entirely sound and possessed many advantages over the decentralized procedures of activation and training which existed prior to the establishment of the Individual Training Center. The advantages of the Center's activation and training program were:³¹

1. Standardization of training of all battalions.
2. Training of all units at full strength.
3. Training in and firing of individual weapons by all men.
4. Increased instruction in night operations, marches, bivouacs, antitank mines, map reading motors and camouflage.
5. Closer supervision of training by higher headquarters.
6. Availability of training areas, training aids and ammunition.
7. Issuance of major items of equipment to battalions.
8. Reduction of guard and transportation details.

As a result of training under the advantageous conditions existing in the Individual Training Center, battalions arrived at the Unit Training Center in a uniformly high state of training which permitted them to readily absorb advanced instruction.

NOTES

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1. FSR 6 Sep 1940 - Security -- 10 Sep - The Defensive.
2. Memo for Col Ward fr Gen McNair, 5 Sep 1940, subj: Studies by Gen. Staff Div. copy in 353/36.
3. Memo for C/S GHQ fr Sec'y GHQ, 10 Apr 1941, subj: Tank Hunting, original in 353/34 antitank.
4. Ltr to Lt Col R T Heard, fr Gen McNair, 12 Apr 1941, copy in 470.71/2.
5. OC/S 21103-6 14 Apr 1941.
6. G-3/43107 - G-3 JTD, 19 Apr 1941.
7. Tab D. G-3/43107 - G-3 JTD, 19 Apr 1941.
8. Memo to C/S GHQ fr Lt Col A F Kingman, 10 May 1941, subj: Report of Meeting called by Gen Braden on Branch Responsibility for Antitank Defense, original in 333/17 GAG AWC.
9. Memo to AC/S G-3 fr C/S OCS 22103-6, 14 May 1941, subj: Defense against Armored Forces. Copy in 353/15 antitank, Tab A, GAG AWC.
10. Memo fr AC/S G-3, WD - G-3/311, 15 May 1941, subj: Planning Branch, Copy in 337/17 GAG, AWC.
11. Memo to C/S GHQ fr Lt Col A F Kingman, 26 May 1941, subj: G-3 Planning Branch Conference on AT Defense, 26 May. Original in 337/17 GAG, AWC.
12. WD ltr to CG's all armies, AG 320.2(19 Jun 1941) MR-M-C, 24 Jun 1941, subj: Organization of Provisional Division and GHQ AT Battalions for use in current maneuvers. Copy in 353/15 Antitank.
13. (1) Inclosure to notes on G-3, AT conference 14-20 July 1941, War College, Washington, D.C. Copy in 353/98 Antitank.
(2) Memo to C/S GHQ fr ltr, Lt Col A F Kingman, 15, 17, 18, 22 July 1941, subj: War Department Antitank Conference. Originals in 334/89 GAG, AWC.
14. Ltr to CG's, all armies, and Chief of AF, from C/S GHQ, 6 Oct 1941, subj: Use of Dummy Antitank Mines in Maneuvers. Copy in 479.1/10, GAG, AWC.
15. Ltr to CG, 3d Army, fr C/S, GHQ, 8 Aug 1941, subj: GHQ antitank units in GHQ directed maneuvers. Copy in 353/30, Training Directives.
16. (1) Ltr to CG, 3d Army fr Gen McNair, 10 Oct 1941, subj: Comments on 2d vs 3d Army maneuvers. Copy in 353/595, 3d Army.
(2) Ltr to CG, 3d Army fr GHQ, 25 Sep 1941, subj: GHQ Provisional Antitank Groups. Copy in 353/15 Antitank.
(3) WD ltr to CG's, all armies. AG 320.2 (9-29-41) MR-M-C 2 Oct 1941, subj: Organization of Provisional Division and GHQ Antitank Battalions for use in Current Maneuvers. Copy in 353/15 Antitank.
17. Memo to C/S, WD, fr G-3, WD, G-3/43107. 18 Aug 1941, subj: Organization of Antitank Units in the Army. Copy in 353/15 Antitank.
18. Memo to AC/S, G-3, WD, fr C/S, WD, OCS 21103-20, 8 Oct 1941, copy in 353/15 Antitank.
19. WD ltr to CO, TDRTC, AG 320.2 (11-5-41) MR-M-C, 27 Nov 1941, subj: Organization of Tank Destroyer Tactical and Firing Center. Copy in 320.2/736. Supporting documents in 680.1/31.
20. (1) WD ltr to CG's, all armies and CA's, and C of AF, AG 320.2 (11-17-41) MR-M-C, 3 Dec 1941, subj: Organization of Tank Destroyer Battalions. Copy in 320.2/736.
(2) WD ltr to CG's all armies, and CA's, and C of AF, AG 320.2 (1-24-42) MR-M-C, 30 Jan 1942, subj: Organization of TD Bus. Copy in 320.2/736.

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1. Par. 18, SO #258, WD, Wash., DC, 4 Nov 1941. Copy in AG 201-Bruce (0).
2. Outlined Biography, Maj Gen Andrew D. Bruce. Copy in Historical Officer's file.
3. Ltr to CO, TDIFC, fr WD AGO, AG 320.2(11-5-41)NR-M-C. 27 Nov 1941, subj: Organization of TDIFC. Copy in AG file 320.
4. Ibid.
5. CO #1, TDIFC, 1 Dec 1941. Copy in AG file 201-Bruce (0).
6. SO #2, 3 & 5, TDIFC. Copy in TDC SO file, TD School.
7. Verbal statement by Capt Cecil Stegner, Asst G-4 TDC. Type Copy in Historical Officer's file.
8. (1) SO #1, TDIFC, 2 Dec 41. Copy in TDC SO file, TD School.
(2) Ltr to Lt Col Ray C Montgomery, TDIFC, fr Lt Col Frank R Williams, 30 Dec 41. Copy in TD Board file 470.8/2-7.
(3) Verbal statement of Lt Col Thomas G Shaffer, G-4 TDC, Typed copy in Historical Officer's statement file.
9. (1) Memo for TAG fr AC/S G-3 WD, 17 Nov 41; subj: Organization of TD Bn. Copy in G-3 file 322.
(2) Ltr to CG, all armies and Corp areas, C/AF fr WD AGO, AG 320.2(11-17-41) M-R-MC, 3 Dec 41, subj: Organization of TD Bn. Copy in AG file 320.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Memo for AC/S, G-3, WD, fr CO, TDIFC, 11 Dec 41, subj: Activation of Group Hq for the TDIFC. Copy in AG file 320.
13. Memo for CO, TDIFC, fr AC/S, G-3, WD, G-3/46411, 11 Feb 42, subj: Activation of Group Hq for TDIFC. Copy in AG file 320.
14. Memo for the C/S, WD, fr AC/S, G-3, WD, G-3/43107, 18 Aug 41, subj: Organization of AT Units in the Army. Copy in Gen Bruce's memo notebook in Historical Officer's file.
15. Memo for AC/S, G-3, WD fr Chief of Mobilization Branch, G-3, WD, G-3/46995 12 Dec 41, subj: Permanent Location of the TDIFC. Copy in AG file 320.
16. Memo for TAG fr CO, TDIFC, 19 Jan 42, subj: Officers and EM to start the TDIFC. Copy in AG file 320.
17. Ltr TAG to CO, TDIFC, 20 Jan 42, subj: Request for Officer Personnel TDS. Copy in AG file 320.21.
18. Memo for AC/S, G-3, and AC/S, G-1, WD, fr CO, TDIFC, 31 Jan 42, subj: Tables of Organization, WD Overhead, TDIFC. Copy in AG file 320.21.
19. Memo for Historical Officer TDC, fr Maj Carl G Koeliner, Tactics Dept, TDS. Copy in Historical Officer's memo file.
20. Cf 9 (3).
21. Speech of Col Bruce to WDGS G-3 Antitank Conference, 14 Jul-20 Jul 41, War College, Wash., D.C. Copy in Notes on Conference.
22. Radiogram to Gen G C Marshall fr Gen Douglas MacArthur, 20 Feb 42 (C). Copy in TD Board file 311.2.
23. Verbal statement by Col Hazen L Hoyt, TD Board, typed copy in Historical Officer's statement file.
24. Verbal statement by Maj Henry C Kerlin, S-3, 893rd TD Bn.
25. (1) Ltr to CG, 3d Army, fr C/S, GHQ, 8 Aug 41, subj: GHQ Antitank Units in GHQ Directed Maneuvers. Copy in 353/30 Training Directives.
(2) Memo for the Historical Officer, TDC, fr Lt Col Russell T Jones, Publications Dept. TD Sch. Copy in Historical Officer's file.
26. Ibid.
27. T/O 18-10-1, TD Hq & Hq Co Group GP, 5 Jun 42.
28. Ltr to CG, AGF fr CG, TDC, 19 Mar 42, subj: Revision of 18 Series of T/O's.
29. Cf. 10.

CHAPTER II (Cont'd)

30. Ltr to CG, all armies and Corps Areas and C/AF fr WD AGO, AG 320.2 (1-24-42)MR-M-C, 30 Jan 42, subj: Organization of TD Bn. Copy in AG file 321.
31. Plan II (Tab E), incl to memo for C/S, WD, fr AC/S, G-3, WD, G-3/43107, 11 Aug 41, subj: Organization of Antitank Units in the Army. Copy in Gen Bruce's memo notebook, in Historical Officer's file.
32. (1) Memo for Historical Officer, TDC, fr Lt Col George N Tilson, Range Officer, TDC. Copy in Historical O's file.
(2) Plan II (Tab E). Cf. 32.
33. Memo for AC/S, G-3 WD fr Col Bruce, G-3/46411, 7 Oct 41, subj: Temp Trng Scheme for TD Units. Copy in Gen Bruce's notebook. Hist. O's file.
34. Memo written by Col Bruce, 3 Jan 42, subj: Selection of Camp Site. Copy in G-3, file 685.
35. Memo for C/AAF fr Co, TDTFC, 6 Jan 42, subj: Establishment of Air Unit at Killeen, Tex. Copy in notebook of Mrs. Ruth Richmond, Sec'y to Gen Bruce, in Historical Officer's file.
36. Memo for AC/S, G-1, WD fr CO TDTFC, TD/354.16, 7 Jan 42, subj: Command of Cantonment of Killeen, Tex for TDTFC. Copy in AG file 320.
37. (1) Memo for TAG, Fr AC/S, G-1 WD, G-1/16249-61, 9 Jan 42, subj: Command of Cantonment at Killeen, Tex for TDTFC.
(2) Ltr orders, WD AGO, AG 210.30 (1-7-42) OD, 17 Jan 42. Copy in AG file 320.
38. Ltr to TAG, fr CO TDTFC, 30 Jan 42, subj: Designation of Army Camps. Copy in AG file 320.
39. Ltr to CO, TDTFC, fr WD AGO, AG 680.1(1-9-42)MSC-C-M, 11 Jan 42, subj: Change of Location of TDTFC to Killeen, Tex. Copy in AG file 320.
40. Verbal statement of Lt Col Shaffer. Cf. 9 (3).
41. Ibid.
42. SO #14, TDTFC, 28 Jan 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
43. Memo for Col Bruce fr Col Fay Ross, pres., TD Bd. 3 Feb 42, subj: Tank Destroyer Developments. Original in notebook of Mrs. Ruth Richmond, sec'y to Gen Bruce, in Historical Officer's file.
44. Memo for TAG fr CO, TDTFC, 30 Jan 42, subj: Change of Location of TDTFC to Killeen, Texas, Copy in AG file 320.

CHAPTER III

1. Ltr to CO, TDTFC, fr WD AGO, AG 320.2(11-5-41) MR-M-C, 27 Nov 41, subj: Organization of TDTFC. Copy in AG file 320.
2. Ltr to CO, TDTFC fr Lt Col H T Stewart, 31 Jan 42, subj: Visit to 8th CA. Copy in notebook of Mrs. Ruth Richmond, sec'y to Gen Bruce, in Historical Officer's misc. file.
3. Par 1, SO #42, WD, 16 Feb 42, Extract copy in AG file 201-Bruce (0).
4. P 1, "History of Billeting Section" prepared for CP Hood PRO. Copy in accts of post activities, in Historical Officer's file.
5. Notes on acquisition of Camp Hood reservation, Camp Hood reservation file,
6. Ltr to CC, TDTFC fr O/CE, CE-652-CEG-T, 24 Dec 41, subj: Standard Building Schedule for Tank Destroyer Battalion. Copy in AG file 600.1.
7. Par 1, SO #24, TDTFC, 24 Feb 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
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9. CO #5, TDC, 1 Jun 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
10. GO #1, TDTFC, 9 Mar 42.
11. GO #11, TDC, 15 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
12. Par. 5, SO #34, TDTFC, 11 Mar 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.

CHAPTER III (Cont'd)

13. GO 3, TDC, 22 May 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
14. Par 3, SO 99, TDC, 27 May 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
15. Par 2 c, Info Bul 10, TDC, 30 Mar 42. Copy in G-3 file 300.5.
16. (1) Info Bul 12 & 13, TDC, 11 Apr 42. Copy in G-3 file 300.5.
(2) "History of Training Brigade," Copy in Historical O's file.
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18. Memo for CG, AGF fr WDGS Org'n & Tng Div, WDGT 352 TD OCS (6-21-42), 26 Jun 42, subj: Establishment of TD Officer Candidate School. Copy in AG file 320.
19. GO's 13 & 14, TDC, 16 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 300.4
20. SO's 1 & 2, TDC, 16 Jul 42. Copy in TDS GO file.
21. Record of telephone conversation, 2 Jul 42. Copy in Records of Telephone Conversations, S-X, filed in office of C/S, TDC.
22. Record of telephone conversation, 3 Jul 42. Cf. 21.
23. Ltr to CG's Second & Third Armies, VI & VII Army Corps, C/AF, fr CG, AGF, 370.5/8 (Tank Destroyer) (R)-GNOFW(5-27-42), 27 May 42, subj: Movement of TD Bns to Cp Hood, Tex, for Training. Copy in AG file 370.5.
24. Tng Memo 2, UTC, 11 Jun 42, subj: Assgmt of Bns to 1st & wd Tng Groups and Establishment of Radio Nets. Copy in UTC Tng Memo file.
25. Cf. 10.
26. See Chap. VIII, pg. 44.
27. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, TD 320.12, 9 May 42, subj: Organization of Tank Destroyer Command. Copy in AG file 320.
28. Organizational Chart of Tank Destroyer Command, approved 23 May 42. Copy in AG file 320.
29. See Chap. VIII.
30. See Chap. VIII.
31. See Chap. VIII.
32. Ibid.
33. GO 18, TDC, 17 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
34. GO 33, TDC, 28 Nov 42. Copy in AG file 300.4
35. Par 4, Admin O 10, UTC, 19 Aug 42. Copy in UTC admin O file.
36. Cf. 10
37. SO 76, TDC, 30 Apr 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
38. SO 78, TDC, 2 May 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
39. Cf. 16 (2).
40. GO 6, TDC, 12 June 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
41. GO 8, TDC, 29 Jun 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
42. GO 9, TDC, 1 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
43. GO 11, TDC, 15 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
44. Cf. 16 (2)
45. GO 16, TDC, 15 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
46. GO 17, TDC, 17 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
47. GO 21, TDC, 21 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
48. 1st Ind to CG, TDIFC, fr CG, 38th CA, QM 320.2, 3 Mar 42. Copy in AG file 320.
49. SO 87, Cp Bowie, Tex, 1 Apr 42. Copy in files of QM Det., Cp Hood.
50. "Highlights of QM Operations," prepared by Cp Hood PRO. Copy in Accounts of Post Activities." Cf. 4.
51. "History of Ordnance Dept," prepared by Cp Hood PRO. Copy in "Accounts of Post Activities." Cf. 4.
52. Par 4, SO 54, TDC, 6 Apr 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
53. "History of 1848th Prov. Bn," prepared by Cp Hood PRO. Copy in Accounts of Post Activities." Cf. 4.

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54. "Judge Advocate's Duties," prepared by Post SJA. Copy in "Accounts of Post Activities." Cf. 4.
55. GO 6, Hq 3p Hood, 21 Jul 42. Copy in Hq Cp Hood GO file.
56. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 8 May 42, subj: Training of Loss Replacements for Tank Destroyer Units. Copy in G-3 file 322.
57. Cf. 28.
58. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 320.12 GWTDO, 2 Jun 42, subj: Organization of Tank Destroyer Command. Copy in AG file 320.
59. Memo for AG/S, G-3, WD, fr C/S, GHQ, 2 Sep 41, subj: Organization of Antitank Units in the Army. Copy in Gen Bruce's memo notebook, in Historical Officer's file.
60. 2d Ind to memo for C/S, GHQ, fr CG, TDIFC, TD/320.2, 7 Jan 42, dated 23 Jan 42. Original in AG file 320.
61. GO 1, TDIFC, 9 Mar 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
62. Memo for AG/S, G-3, WDGS, fr CG, AGF, 11 Jul 42, subj: Change in Status of Tank Destroyer Command. Copy of Draft in Historical O's miscellaneous file.
63. 1st Ind to memo for AG/S, G-3, WDGS, fr CG, AGE, 11 Jul 42. Copy of Ind in AG file 320.
64. Telegram to CG, TDC, fr CG, AGF, 20 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 320.
65. Record of telephone conversation, 22 Jul 42. Copy in Records of Telephone Conversations, SX. Cf. 21.
66. (1) Ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, AGF, 320.2(TD) GNGCT (7-11-42), 14 Aug 42, subj: Operation of the TD Comd. Copy in AG file 320.
(2) Ltr to CG's, etc, fr CG, AGF, 320x320.2 (TD Comd)-GNGCT, 16 Aug 42, subj: Operation of the TD Comd. Copy in AG file 320.
67. GO 17, TDC, 17 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
68. Cf. 13, Chapt. II.
69. Ibid.
70. Interoffice ref sheet to staff, TDC, fr CG, TDC, 23 Apr 42. Copy in AG file 320.
71. Ltr to CG, TDC, fr Col Thomas J Heavey, TD Bd, TDB 320.3, 12 May 42, subj: Narrative Report of Activities at Army War College, period April 27 to May 8, 1942. (S/O and Radio Conferences). Copy in TD Bd file 320.3.
72. Ltr to CG's, etc, fr WD AGO, AG 320.2 (5-20-42)MR-M-GM, 31 May 42, subj: Reorganization of Tank Destroyer Units. Copy in AG file 321.
73. Info Bul 9, TDC, 14 Mar 42. Copy in G-3 file 300.5.
74. Ltr to CG, AGF fr CG, TDC, 320.3-GNTDC, 11 Aug 42, subj: Tank Destroyer Organization. Copy in G-3 file 322.
75. GO 3, TDS, 14 Aug 42. Copy in TDS GO file.
76. (1) GO 21, TDC, 20 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
(2) See Chapt. VIII.
(3) Cf. 16.
77. See Chapt. XII.

CHAPTER IV

1. Cf. 76 (1), Chapt. III.
2. (1) List of Events, Opening Day of Camp Hood. Copy in G-2 file, Misc. Pub re Opening.
(2) Excerpts, address of Under Sec'y of War, 18 Sept 42. Copy in G-2 file, Misc. Pub re Opening.
3. Ibid.
4. SO 258, WD, 23 Sept 42. Extract copy in AG file 201-Bruce (0).
5. Memo for S-4, TDC, fr Hq TDC, 28 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 322, RTC.

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6. GO 27, TDC, 3 Oct 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
7. See Chapt. VIII.
8. GO 33, TDC, 28 Nov 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
9. Ltr to CG's, etc. fr CG, AGF, 331.1(TD)-GNGOT (10-21-42), 21 Oct 42, subj: Training Inspections, TD Units. Copy in AG file 333.
10. Memo to CG, TDC, fr Eng Inspector, TDC, 26 Oct 43, subj: Inspecting Team. Copy in AG file 333.
11. GO 23, TDC, 1 Sept 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
12. GO 28, TDC, 13 Oct 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
13. GO 31, TDC, 24 Nov 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
14. 2d Ind to ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 16 Sept 42. Copy in AG file 320.21.
15. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr WD AGO, AG 320.2(9-16-42)PO-M-SPGAO, 7 Nov 42, subj: Allotment of Officers for Duty with the AGF (TD Section). Copy in AG file 320.21.
16. (1) Ltr to CG, TDC, fr Comdt, TDS, 320.2 GNVDM, 22 Oct 42, subj: Increase in Allotment of Officers for TDS. Copy in AG file 320.21.
(2) 1st Ind to ltr to CG, TDC, fr Comdt, TDS, 22 Oct 42. Cf. 15 (1).
17. 3d Ind to ltr to CG, R&SC, fr CG, TDC, 5 Dec 42, 320.2-GNVDP, subj: Increase in Allotment of Officers for TDS. Copy in AG file 320.21.
18. Ibid.
19. 6th Ind to ltr to CG, R&SC, fr CG, TDC, 5 Dec 42. Cf. 17.
20. (1) TDRTC Off Strength Rep for wk ending midnight, Friday, 23 Oct 42. Copy in AG file 320.21.
(2) Verbal statement of G-1, TDC.
21. (1) NO 13, TDRTC, 26 Apr 43. Copy in TDRTC GO file.
(2) TDRTC Officer Strength Rep for wk ending midnight, Friday, 23 Apr 43. Copy in AG file 320.21.
22. Ltr to Col C K Kreams, R&SC, fr G-1, TDC, 210.33-GNVDP, 1 Dec 42, subj: Conf. of Tel. Conversation. Copy in AG file 320.21.
23. Ltr to CG, R&SC, fr CG, TDC, 210.31-GNVDP, 27 Nov 42, (C), subj: Asgt Jurisdiction. Copy in AG classified file.
24. Ltr to CG, R&SC, fr CG, TDC, 300.4-GNVDP, 27 Nov 42, (C), subj: Travel Orders. Copy in AG classified file.
25. (1) 1st Ind to ltr to CG, R&SC, fr CG, TDC, 27 Nov 42, (C). Cf. 23.
(2) Cf. 24.
26. Ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, R&SC, 320.2 GNRSP. 15 Mar 43, subj: Command Status, TDS and TDRTC. Original in G-3 file 322.
27. GO 112, 8th SC, 5 Dec 42. Copy in MRU file MR 370.5.
28. Ltr to CG's, etc. fr CG, AGF 352.11/422-GNGOT (11-18-42), 18 Nov 42, subj: TD Indoctrination Courses. Copy in G-3 file 352.11.
29. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 352.11/22 GNVDO (3-1-43), 1 Mar 43, subj: TD Special Observers Courses. Copy in G-3 file 352.11.
30. Weekly Report to C/S, TDC, fr G-3, TDC, 1 Feb 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
31. Info Bul 7, TDC, 19 May 43. Copy in AG file 300.5.
32. Report of Special Armored Vehicle Board, 5 Dec 42, (C). Copy in TD Board classified file.
33. Par 4, pg 2, Chapt. I.
34. 1st Ind (AGF, 22 Jul 42) to ltr to CG, AGF fr CG, TDC, 472.1-GNVDC, 25 Jun 42. Copy in AG file 472.
35. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 472.1-GNVDC, 9 Nov 42, subj: Revision of T/O's, TD Units. Copy in T/O file of T/O & T/E Sctn, Pub Dept, TDS.
36. Ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, AGF, 320.2/383 (S)-GNGCS (11-12-42), 12 Nov 42, (C), subj: Reduction of Personnel and Vehicles. Copy in AG clas file.
37. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 320.2-GNVDO (12-1-42), 1 Dec 42 (C), subj: Reduction of Personnel and Vehicles. Copy in AG classified files.

CHAPTER IV (Cont'd)

38. Final Report, Test of Towed Tank Destroyer Bn Equipped with 3 inch gun, M-1, TD Bd project 114, 12 Mar 43. Copy in TD Bd file 320.3.
39. (1) TC 18-5, 27 Jan 43.
(2) Unnumbered Memo to All Units, AUTC, 31 Mar 43, subj: TD Pnc (Towed). Copy in UTC unnumbered memo file.
40. T/O 18-35, 7 May 43.
41. OCS Charts. Originals in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Regt, TDS.
42. See Chapt. IX.
43. See Chapt. IX.
44. Par. 6, SO 106, TDS, 23 Dec 42. Copy in TDS SO file.
45. See Chapt. IX.
46. MTP 18-1, WD 1 Apr 42.
47. Cf. 27, Chapt. III.
48. Cf. 11.
49. See Chapt. X.
50. Unnumbered Memo, AUTC, to All Gp and Bn CO's, 29 Oct 42. Copy in UTC unnumbered memo file.
51. See Chapt. X.
52. See Chapt. X.
53. Weekly Report to CG, TDC, fr CO, AUTC, 25 May 43. Copy in UTC file 319.1.
54. GO 21, TDC, 21 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
55. (1) GO 38, TDC, 15 Dec 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
(2) G) 5, TDC, 20 Feb 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
56. (1) See Chapt. XI.
(2) Pp 3, 4, Memo on Ord Activities. Copy in Historical Officer's file.
(3) Memo to all Units, TDC fr CG, TDC, 400.4. GWTDA, 27 Apr 43, subj: Ord Service to Units in Cantonment at Camp Hood and North Camp Hood. Copy in AG file 400.4.
57. GO 19, TDC, 17 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
58. GO 2, TDC, 4 Feb 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
59. GO 29, TDC, 25 May 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.

CHAPTER V

1. GO 29, TDC, 25 May 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
2. Order of the Day, fr Maj Gen Orlando C Ward, CG, TDC, 19 Oct 43. Copy in AG file 312.
3. (1) Tng Memo 10, Prov AT Bn, 32d Div, 10 Oct 41. Copy in Historical Officer's misc file.
(2) Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 353 GWTDC, 28 Aug 43, subj: Battle Plays. Copy in AG file 353.
4. Verbal statement of Col Guy S. Meloy, C/S, TDC.
5. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 210.3-GWTDP, 27 May 43, subj: Assignment of Officers and Non-commissioned Officers. Copy in AG file 210.3.
6. Weekly report to C/S, TDC, fr G-3, TDC, 30 Aug 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
7. Cf. 4.
8. (1) Unnumbered Memo, UTC, to All Units, UTC, 16 Aug 43, subj: Battle Conditioning. Copy in UTC unnumbered memo file.
(2) Memo on Battle Conditioning Course, prepared by Maj Ralph W Sleator, UTC, Dir of Battle Cond. Copy in Historical Officer's memo file.
9. Ltr to C/S, WD, thru CC, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 452 GWTDO, 22 Sep 43, subj: Organic Liaison Planes for Tank Destroyers. Copy in AG file 452.
10. Ltr Order, TDC, 25 May 42. Copy in AG file 360.

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11. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 373-GWIDO, 18 Jul 42, subj: Organic TD Obsv. Copy in AG file 360.
12. Cf. 9.
13. 1st ind to ltr to C/S, WD, thru CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 432 GWIDO, 22 Sept 43. Cf. 9.
14. GO 47, TDC, 12 Jul 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
15. GO 73, TDC, 4 Nov 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
16. GO 54, TDC, 13 Aug 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
17. Ltr to CG, TDC, fr TAG, 322 OB-I-GWGCT-M, 2 Oct 43, subj: Discontinuance of TD BUTC, Camp Bowie, Texas. Copy in G-3 file 322.
18. Sections I & II, GO 66, TDC. Copy in BUTC GO file, TDC.
19. GO 68, TDC, 16 Oct 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
20. GO 74, TDC, 5 Nov 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
21. Par 22, SO 198, TDC, 18 Aug 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
22. Par 1, Weekly Directive 23, AGF, 8 Jun 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
23. (1) Sec III, GO 56, WD, 14 Sept 43.
(2) Ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, AGF, 250.4 (1 Oct 43) GWGAP, 1 Oct 43, subj: GCM Jurisdiction. Copy in AG file 250.4.
24. Record of tel conv 18 May 42. Copy in Recs of Tel Convs, S-I, filed in office of C/S, TDC.
25. (1) GO 17, TDC, 13 Apr 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
(2) GO 28, TDC, 25 May 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
(3) GO 34, TDC, 1 Jun 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
26. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CO, WAAC Det, TDC, 3 Jun 43, subj: Replacement of Male Military Personnel by WAAC Personnel. Copy in AG file 320.2.
27. 4th ind to ltr to CG, AGF, fr CO, WAAC Det, TDC, 3 Jun 43. Cf. 26.
28. Verbal statement of Lt Col Asa C. Black, S-1, TTRTU.
29. (1) Ltr to CG's, R&SC, TDC, fr WD, AGO, AG 320.2 (WAC) (22 Sep 43) PR W GWGCT, 25 Sept 43, subj: Orgn & Reorgn of Certain WAC Units. Copy in AG file 320.2.
(2) Ltr to CG, AGF fr CG, TDC, 320.2 (WAC) GWIDP, 14 Oct 43, subj: Orgn and Re-orgn of Certain WAC Units. Copy in AG file 320.2.
30. (1) Weekly rep to C/S TDC, fr G-4 TDC, 6 Jul 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
(2) Weekly rep to C/S TDC, fr G-4 TDC, 20 Oct 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
31. Wkly rep to C/S TDC, fr Sig Sctn TDC, 19 Jul 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
32. Wkly rep to C/S TDC, fr Sig Sctn TDC, 19 Oct 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
33. Wkly rep to C/S TDC, fr G-1 TDC, 2 Aug 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
34. Wkly rep to C/S TDC, fr G-4 TDC, 22 Jun 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
35. (1) Wkly rep to C/S TDC, fr G-1 TDC, 14 Dec 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
(2) Wkly rep to C/S TDC, fr G-1, 22 Sept 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
36. Verbal statement of Col Brenner P Purdue, dir, tactics Dept TDS. Typed copy in Historical Officer's interview file.
37. See Chapt. VIII.
38. See Appendix - Chapt. V - ltr 12 Oct 43.
39. WD G-3/43107 - G-3 JTD, 19 Apr 41.
40. Wkly rep to C/S TDC, fr G-3 TDC, 21 Sep 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.
41. Wkly rpt to CofS TDC, fr G-4 TDC, 11 Aug 43. Copy in AG file 319.1.

CHAPTER VI

1. See Appendix for Chapt. VI.
2. Excerpts fr ltr to Gen Hester fr Gen McNair, 25 Oct 43. Copy in CG's file.
3. Ibid.
4. Ltr to CG TDC, fr CG AGF, 320.2(TDC)(R)(13 Feb 44) GWICT, 13 Feb 44, subj: Reorg of the TD Center. Copy in AG file 320, TDC.

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5. Ltr to CG TDC, fr CG AGF, 320.2(TDC)(R)(13 Feb 44) GNGCT, 14 Feb 44, subj: Reorg of the TD Center. Copy in AG file 320, TDC.
6. Verbal statement of Col Meloy, C/S TDC.
7. Ibid.
8. Ltr to CG, Second Army, fr CG AGF, 321/101 (TD Unit)(R)(21 Feb 44) GNGCT, 21 Feb 44, subj: Inactivation of Hq & Hq Co, 2d TD Brigade. Copy in AG file 321 TD Units.
9. Hereafter referred to as ODT Section.
10. Ltr fr CG AGF to CG TDC, 320.2 (TDC)(R)(13 Feb 44) GNGCT, subj: Reorganization of the TDC, 13 Feb 44. Copy in AG file 320.
11. In accordance with ltr, 333.1/1504 (22 Aug 43) GNGCT, Hq AGF, subj: Eng Inspections, AA, Armored and TD Units, 22 Aug 43.
12. Ltr fr CG R&SC to CG TDC, 320.2 (TDC)GNGCT, subj: Delegation of Comd Responsibilities, 23 Mar 44. Copy in AG file 300.
13. Letter Orders No. 1 fr Hq TDC to Maj Gen John H. Hester, 210.453, GNRNA, subj: Travel Orders, 8 Apr 44.
14. See ltr 3 Sept 43. Chapt. VI Appendix.
15. GO 1, Hq IRTC, 10 Mar 44. Copy in file Hq IRTC.
16. Verbal statement by Gen A O Gorder to TDC Historical Officer 1-9-45.

CHAPTER VII

1. GO TDC 26 Jun 44.
2. Verbal statement of C/S TDC in interview with Historical O, 25 Oct 44.
3. (1) For complete list of personnel present at those conferences see Annex "C".
(2) Ltr to CG's, Second and Fourth Armies, III and XVIII Corps, Airborne Center, R&SC, TDC, fr Hq AGF 337/420 (9 Jun 44) GNGCT, subj: Conference, 9 Jun 44. Copy in AG file 337.
4. 2d Ind to ltr fr TDC to CG AGF, subj: Proposed Conf at Cp Hood for Army Corps & Div Commanders, 14 Jul 44. Copy in AG file 337.
5. Ibid.
6. Statement by TDC Historical Officer who attended conferences and noted questions raised.
7. For references see file 370.5, 609th TD Battalion file.
8. Letter Orders No. 37 (OITD), TDC file GNRIN 353, dtd 20 Aug 44.
9. Extract of TWX fr Hq TDC to CG AGF, 23 Sep 44. AG file 337.
10. Ltr to Comdt, Armored Sch, fr CG R&SC, 352 GNRST, subj: Consolidation of Armored, Cavalry (Mech) & TD OCS's at Ft Knox, Ky, 5 Oct 44. Copy in AG file 352 General.
11. Ltr fr Hq AGF to CG TDC, 475/243 (C)(22 Sep 44)GNGCT-1/96978, subj: Review of Developments, 22 Sept 44.
12. Ltr Hq TDC, GNRNS 475, 25 Oct 44, subj: Review of Developments. Copy in AG file 475.
13. Copy of Letter in Appendix, Chapt. VII.
14. Ltr Hq TDC, 2 Dec 44, subj: Review of Developments, copy in AG file 475.
15. Ltr Hq AGF, 320.3/1 (Redpl)(S)(10 Feb 45)GNGCT-3/15347, 10 Feb 45, subj: Redeployment T/O's & T/E's, copy in AG file 320.3.
16. Ltr Hq TDC, 320.3 GNRNC (16 Feb 45)(S) 16 Feb 45, subj: Redeployment T/O&E's, copy in AG file 320.3.
- * Other improve. ts indicated by this study and review are recorded in Appendix I.
17. FM 18-5, 16 Jun 42; War Dept Training Circular 88, 24 Jun 43; FM 18-5 (Revised), 18 Jul 44.
18. Ltr Hq AGF, 353/5 (TD)(R)(5 Feb 45)GNGCT, 5 Feb 45, subj: Continuance of Instruction on Towed TD's. Copy in AG file 353, General, 1945.

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19. Ltr Hq AGF, 334/127 (R)(13 Dec 44)GWRQT, 13 Dec 44, subj: Army CF Bdn. Copy in TDC AG file 334.
20. Ltr Hq R&OC, 320.2 GNRST (TD Center) 28 Dec 44, subj: Delegation of Comd Responsibility. Copy in AG file 320.2.
21. Memo by C/OLT to TDC Historical Officer, subj: Activities ODT Section 1 May 1945. Copy in Interview File TDC.
22. Ibid.

CHAPTER VIII

1. GO 1, Hq TDC, 19 Mar 45, copy in AG general order file, 1945.
2. TWX, 14 Mar 45, copy in AG file, 201-Dawley.
3. Ltr CG TDC fr Hq AGF, GWRQT-5, 319.1 (8 May 45) subj: Status of Tanks & TD's in Post War Army, and enclosures of copies of letters frn CG's ETO - 319.1 TDC, Gen Gorder's file.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Cf. 4, P. 73; cf. 18, P. 74; cf. 12, P. 82.
7. Gen Gorder's statement to Historical Officer 4/1/45.
8. Cf. 4, P. 90.
9. Ibid.
10. Memo to Historical Officer by ODT Section. Historical file 210.31 TDC.
11. (1) Verbal statement, Chief ODT Section TDC to JDC, Historical Officer, 5/1/45.
(2) ODT Report - June 45 - TD Historical file 210.31.
12. Ltr fr Gen Bruce to Lt Col E A Dunnam. Copy to TD Historical file (exopt).
13. ODT Report to Historical Officer TDC, 2 Jun 45. TDC Historical file 210.31.
14. Ibid.
15. Statement by Lt Col V W Pyland. Copy in TD Historical Journal 14 May 45.
16. Ltr Hq AGF, 353/101 (Assault)(C)(21 May 45)GWRQT 6/27508, 21 May 45, subj: Test on Japanese Field Fortifications, in AG file 353.
17. Ibid.
18. Verbal statement Col Pyland to TDC Historical Officer, July 45.
19. Ibid.
20. Weekly report, TD Board, 6 Jun 45.
21. Ltr Hq AGF, 353 (Assault)(23 May 45) GWRQT 6/27702, 23 May 45, subj: Ref Material for Japanese Field Fortifications Project. AG file 353.
22. Ltr Hq AGF, 353/101 (Assault)(S)(29 May 45)) GWRQT-6/28361, 29 May 45, subj: Test o of Materiel Against Japanese Field Fortifications. AG file 353.
23. Ibid.
24. Ltr, CG, TDC, to Col George M Dean, Hq, AGF, 31 May 45, AG file 353.
25. Par 3, SO 57, Hq TDC, 11 Jun 45 (S). TDC SO file.
26. Ltr Hq TDC, GNRNO 353, 15 Jun 45, subj: Combined Arms Tests in the Reduction of Japanese Field Fortifications. AG file 353.
27. Ltr Hq AGF, 353/101(Assault)(S) (29 May 45) GWRQT-6/28361, 29 May 45, subj: Test of Materiel Against Jap Field Fortifications, AG file 353.
28. Ltr Hq AGF, 353/101 (S)(Assault)(26 Jun 45) GWRQT-6/31892, 26 Jun 45, subj: Test of Materiel Against Japanese Fortifications. AG file 353.
29. Verbal statement of Lt Col E A Dunnam, TDC Historical Officer who acted as S-4 for Sphinx Project.
30. Verbal statement of Gen Althaus to Td Historical Officer, 1 Aug 45.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.

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33. Verbal statement of Gen Althaus and Gen Gorder to Ground Historical Officer, 24 Jul 45.
34. War Department TC No. 34, 11 Aug 45.
35. Personal ltr, Hq MIF from Maj Gen A W Waldron to CG, TD Sphinx Project. Copy in TDS Sphinx file.
36. History of 5th TD Group. Historical file TDC.
37. History of 704th TD Bn. Historical file TDC.

CHAPTER IX

1. (1) Verbal statement of Col Ray C Montgomery to TD Historical Officer, 1 May 1945.
(2) Memo in Gen Bruce's notes on historical record. Copy in TDC Historical file - Gen Bruce's notes.
2. Cf. 9, pg 14, Chapt. II.
3. Cf. 45, pg 25.
4. GO 1, TDT&FC, 9 Mar 42. Copy in TDC AG file 300.4.
5. Ibid.
6. Info Bul 10, TDC, 30 Mar 42. Copy in AG file 300.5.
7. Cf. 13, p 5, Chapt. I.
8. Memo No. 18, 24 Feb 42, RJ1/cs-Automotive Test & Research Divsn, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. Copy in TD Bd Vehicle file.
9. Notes & memos Gen Bruce to Pres. TD Bd - TD Bd file T70 - M18.
10. (1) Copy memo fr AC/S, G-3, to AC/S, G-4, G3/46176, 30 Jul 41, TD Bd file Military Characteristics.
(2) Copy memo fr AC/S, G-3, to AC/S, G-4, 3/46176, 11 Aug 41, subj: Mil characteristics for dev of new eqipt, a SP mount, for large cal. antitank gun, TD Bd Mil Characteristics file.
11. Memo TDTFC, 2 Dec 41. Vehicle Digest file, TD Bd.
12. Cf. 10.
13. (1) Verbal statement of Col Montgomery to TDC Historical Officer, 1 May 45.
(2) OCM Item 18039, discussion of characteristics, 3 Apr 42. Copy OCM Records, TD Bd.
14. Verbal statement, Bd Recorder Lt Col Crosby to TDC Historical Officer, 1 May 1945.
15. Copy ltr fr Capt Cushman to CG TDC, 24 April 1942, subj: Dev of T49, TD Bd file 473.1/15 C85.
16. OCM Item 18039, 3 Apr 42. Copy OCM Records, TD Bd.
17. Cf 11, p 14, Chapt. II.
18. Cf 26, p 20, Chapt. II.
19. Cf 14-15-16, pp 7, 8, Chapt. I
20. Cf 25, p 20, Chapt. II.
21. Cf 29, p 21, Chapt. II.
22. FO/E - TD Bn, 5 Jun 42.
23. List of Board Projects - Appendix, Chapt. IX.
24. Weekly Progress Reports TD Bn - Jan, Feb, Mar 1942.
25. Verbal statement of Col B F Purdue, Director of Tactics Dept, TDS. Copy in Historical Officer's Interview file.
26. Cf. 25.
27. P 12, Memo on TD Bd Activities, prepared by Col H L Hoyt, TD Bd. Copy in Historical Officer's memo file.
28. Ibid.
29. PP. 10, 11, Memo on TD Bd Activities. Cf. 27.
30. T/O 18-26, 8 Jun 42.

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31. Ltr to CG TDC fr CG AGF, 472.1/158 GNRQT (6-25-42) 22 Jul 42, subj: TD Weapons. Copy in AG file 472.
32. P 11, Memo fr Col Jones. Copy in Historical Officer's file.
33. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 472.1/GNIDC, 9 Nov 42, subj: Revision of T/O's TD Units. Copy in AG file 472.
34. Ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, AGF, 320.2/383(S) GNGCS (11-12-42) 12 Nov 42 (C), subj: Reduction of Pers & Vehicles. Copy in AG classified file.
35. T/O 18-25 & T/E 18-25-M, 27 Jan 43.
36. (1) Ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, AGF, 320.2/180 (TD) GNRQT T/26840 (1-1-43), 1 Jan 43, subj: Formation of Towed TD Bn for Test Purposes. Copy in AG file 320.
(2) P 7, Memo fr Col Jones. Cf. 32.
37. T/O 18-35, 7 May 43.
38. Pp. 1, 2. Memo fr Col Jones. Cf. 32.
39. T/O 18-10-1, 5 Jan 42.
40. P 10, Memo fr Col Jones. Cf. 32.
41. T/O&E 18-10-1, 26 May 43.
42. P 9, Memo fr Col Jones. Cf. 32.
43. P 11, Memo fr Col Jones. Cf. 32.
44. Verbal statement of Col Hoyt to TDC Historical Officer.
45. (1) TD Bd Historical file - Bd Procedure.
(2) Monthly Progress Reports, Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr. TD Bd Progress Reports file
46. Project File - TD Bd. Apr 1942.
47. Cf. 9, pg 14.
48. SO 115, Hq AGF, 31 Jul 42, Copy in AG file 201-Montgomery.
49. Memo fr Col Montgomery to CG, TDC, 9 Sept 42, approved by CG, TDC, 11 Sep 42. subj: Reorganization TD Bd. Copy in TD Bd organization file.
50. Verbal statement of Lt Col Crosby, recorder, TD Bd, to TDC Historical Officer, 1 May 45.
51. Project No. 264, list of projects, Appendix, Chapt. IX.
52. Verbal statement by Col Ray C. Montgomery, Pres. TD Bd. 1 May 45.
53. P. 14, Memo on TD Bd Activities. Cf. 27.
54. TD Bd Project No. 188. Subj: Test of Telescopic Sight 108. 10 Feb 43. Copy in TD Bd project file.
55. P. 33, Memo on TD Bd Activities. Cf. 27.
56. TD Bd Project 155, subj: Test of Azimuth Indicator for 3" GMC M-10. 2 Aug 43. Copy in TD Bd project file.
57. Memo on TD Bd Activities. Cf. 27.
58. Ibid.
59. P. 41, Memo on TD Bd Activities. Cf. 27.
60. Pp. 41, 42, Memo on TD Bd Activities. Cf. 27.
61. P. 42, Memo on TD Bd Activities. Cf. 27.
62. P. 43, Memo on TD Bd Activities. Cf. 27.
63. Cf. 61.
64. TD Bd informal project. Subj: Study of Radio Maintenance, 31 Jul 43. Copy in TD Bd file 413.44.
65. Cf. 62.
66. TD Bd Projects 68, subj: Test of AT rocket grenade launcher M-1, 8 Oct 42. Copy in TD Bd project file.
67. Ltr to CG TDC, fr CG AGF, 461 GNRQT/19882(10/22/42) 22 Oct 42, subj: Prep of Tng Literature on Use of Rocket AT 2.36" M6 & M7. Copy in TD Bd file 461.
68. WD Training Circular 104. 15 Dec 42.
69. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG TDC, 473.1, 31 Mar 42, subj: TD Guns & Motor Carriages. Copy in AG file 473.1.

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70. Cf. 27.
71. SO 169, Hq AGF, 25 Feb 42. SO file TDC 1942.
72. Correspondence file, TD Bd and Lt Col W. E. Sherwood. File project 109, TD Bd.
73. Pp. 25-26, Memo on TD Bd Activities. Cg. 27.
74. Ltr fr CG AGF, 2 Jul 42, subj: Redesignation of T49. TD Bd file 473.1/15.
75. Memo for record, subj: Pilot Model Test of T49, 3 Sep 42. Copy in Vol I Lt Col Col W. E. Sherwood file, T49 - Project 109.
76. Verbal statement of Col R. C. Montgomery.
77. OCM Item 19185, 19 Nov 42. TD Bd OCM file.
78. Memo for record, 22, 23 Dec 42, subj: Conference on Proposed GMC 76mm Gun at Detroit, Mich. Copy in W. D. Sherwood memo file, Vol II, TD Bd file, project 109.
79. Item 19438, OCM Items.
80. Project file 109, TD Bd project file.
81. Special reports on T70 Production Models. Project file 109, TD Bd.
82. Verbal statement of Col Westover, C/S TDC, 1 May 45 to TDC Hist. O.
83. Projects 110, 198, 215, 223, TD Bd project file.
84. Americal Press, Temple Daily Telegram, 21 May 45.

CHAPTER X

1. P 1, Cir, TDC, Apr 42. Copy in historical file, OCS Regt, TDS.
2. (1) Ltr to CO, TDTCF, fr WD AGO, AG 320.2(11-5-41)MR-M-C, 27 Nov 41, sub: Orgn of TDT&FC. Copy in AG file 320.
(2) SO 3, TDTCF, 3 Dec 41. TDS SO file.
3. (1) Verbal statement by Lt Col E. J. Howell, Sec TDS. Hist file, OCS Reg't, TDS.
(2) SO 9, TDC, 27 May 42. TDS SO file.
1. Ltr to CO, TDTCF, fr WD AGO, AG 320.2(11-5-41) MR-M-C, 27 Nov 41, subj: Organization of TDT&FC. Copy in AG file 320.
2. P 1, Cir, TDC, Apr 42. Copy in historical file, OCS Reg't, TDS.
3. SO 3, TDTCF, 3 Dec 41, Copy in TDS SO file.
4. (1) Verbal statement by Lt Col E. J. Howell, Sec'y, TDS. Copy in historical file, OCS Reg't, TDS.
(2) SO 9, TDC, 27 May 42. Copy in TDS SO file.
5. Cf. 1.
6. (1) Ltr to CO TDTCF, fr A/Comdt TDS, 15 Jan 42, subj: Courses of Inst, TDS. Copy in TDS file 352.
(2) Verbal statement by Brig Gen H. T. Mayberry, Comd't TDS. Copy in Historical Officer's interview file.
8. List of personnel assigned to TDC, 20 May 42. Copy in notebook of Mrs. Ruth Richmond, sec'y to Gen Bruce. In Historical Officer's file.
9. Ltr to TAG, fr CO TDTCF, 20 Jan 42, subj: Request for Officer Personnel, TDS. Copy in AG file 320.21.
10. Memo on School problem by Col Logan Berry to TDC Historical Officer, 9 Oct 45. Copy in TD Historical Officer's interview file.
11. Ibid.
12. (1) Ibid.
(2) Cf. 11, Chapt. IX.
13. Cf. 4 (1).
14. (1) Ltr to CG's, All Corps Areas & AF, C's of WD Arms & Services, fr TAG, AG 320.2 (6-28-41) MT-A-M, 8 Jul 41, subj: Rotation of Instructors at RTC's and Service Schools. Copy in TDS file 320.
(2) Ltr to CG's R&SC, AA Comd, AF, TDC, fr CG AGF, 353.16/2 GNGAP, 7 April 1942, subj: Instructors at Service Schools & RTC's. Copy in TDS file 320.

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15. Cf. 4, (1).
16. Cf. 6, (2).
17. Ltr to CG AGF, fr A/Comdt TDS, 24 Mar 42, subj: Orientation Course for Officers. Copy in TDS file 352.
18. Ltr to A/Comdt TDS fr CG AGF, 353/43 (TDS) GNTRG (4-8-42), 8 Apr 42, subj: TD Orientation Course, 4 May-30 May 42, Cp Hood, Tex. Copy in TDS file 352.
19. Enrollment records of Officers Orientation courses. Original in sec'y's office, TDS.
20. See Chapt. III.
21. Cf. 4 (1).
22. Cf. 16 (2) Chapt. III.
23. (1) Ltr to A/Comdt TDS, fr CG AGF, 352.11-18 (TDS) GNTRG (4-27-42) 27 Apr 42, subj: 2d TD Orientation Course. Copy in TDS file 352.
(2) Cf. 19. (3) Par 1, SO 104, TDC, 2 Jun 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
24. CO 5, TDC, 1 Jun 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
25. (1) Ltr to CG AGF, fr A/Comdt TDS, 26 Mar 42, subj: Book Shop at TDS. Copy in TDS file 461.
(2) 2d Ind to ltr to CO TDS fr CG AGF, 26 Mar 42, Cf. 25 (1).
(3) Ltr to CG, SOS, fr A/Comdt TDS, 16 Apr 42, subj: Reproduction Plant, TDS. Copy in TDS file 413.
(4) Ltr to WFB fr GAG, SPQNOP 400/312 (Cp Hood) REQ, GN 537-14-42, 30 Apr 42, subj: Printing Equipment Required - TDS. Copy in TDS file 413.
(5) Cf. 4 (1).
26. Ltr to CG TDC fr A/Comdt TDS, 27 Apr 42, subj: Program of Instr, OCS. Copy in TDS file 352.
27. Memo for CG AGF fr WDCS Orgn's & Tng Div, WDGCT 352 TD OCS (6-21-42), 26 June 42, subj: Establishment of TD OCS. Copy in AG file 320.
28. GO's 11, 12, TDC, 15 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
29. GO's 13, 14, TDC, 16 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
30. GO's 1, 2, TDS, 16 Jul 42. Copy in TDS GO file.
31. Memo for PRO, 7 Oct 42. Copy in Acad Records sectn gen file, OCS Reg't. TDS.
32. See Chart in Appendices, Chapt. X.
33. (1) Ltr to CG & R&SC fr CG TDS 6 Aug 43, subj: Inactivation of Acad Division TDS. Copy in TDS file 352.
(2) GO 3 TDS, 7 Sep 43. Copy in TDS GO file.
34. Ibid.
35. Telegram to CG TDC fr CG AGF 30 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 320.
36. Ltr to CG TDC fr CG R&SC 320.2 GNRSF, 15 Mar 43, subj: Comd Status, TDS & TDRTC. Orig in G-3 file 322.
37. Ltr to CG TDC fr CG R&SC, GNRSP 320.2, 11 Nov 43, subj: Comd Status, TDS & TDRTC. Orig in AG file 300.
38. Ltr to CG TDC fr CG R&SC, 320.2 GNRST (TDC) 28 Dec 44, subj: Delegation of Comd Resp. Copy in AG file 321.2.
39. Ltr to all comdrs concerned fr Sec'y of War, WD, AG 352(7-4-42) NO-GN-PS-N, 11 Jul 42, subj: Quotas for TD OCS, Class No. 1. Copy in TDS file 352.
40. GO 3, TDS, 14 Aug 42. Copy in TDS GO file.
41. OCS Charts. Originals in acad records section gen files, OCS Regt, TDS.
42. Cf. 27.

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43. (1) P. 18, Report of Proceedings of Faculty Bd, TDS, 19 Nov 42. Copy in acad records sectn dead files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
(2) Memo to All OC's fr Comdt TDS, 2 Oct 42, subj: Academic & Leadership Standards. Copy in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
(3) Memo to CO, OCS Reg't, fr director, OCS dep't, 12 Dec 42, subj: Reports on Officer Candidates. Original in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
(4) Ltr to AT Officer, Western Defense and 4th Army, fr CG TDC, 19 Aug 42, subj: Educational and Experience Standard of Applicants for TD OCS. Copy in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
44. Cf. 43, (1).
45. P. 3, Memo to CO, OCS Reg't, TDS, fr Director, OCS Dep't, TDS, 12 Dec 42, subj: Reports on Officer Candidates. Copy in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Reg't TDS.
46. See efficiency reports, Appendices Chapter X.
47. Ltr to TAG, fr CG, P&SC, 352 (TD) GNRST, 22 Dec 42, subj: Officer Candidate Course, TDS, Camp Hood, Texas. Copy in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Reg't TDS.
48. OCS Weekly Schedule, 11 Apr 43, TDS. Copy in acad records sectn dead files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
49. (1) Ltr to CG, TDS, fr CG AGF, 352 (AAA-OCS) (5 Jul 43) GNAGS, 28 Jul 42, subj: Volunteer Officer Candidates. Copy in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
(2) Ltr to Comd't TDS, fr TAG 352 (TDS) GNEST, 24 May 43, subj: Officer Candidate Course, TDS, Camp Hood, Texas. Copy in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
50. Master Schedule, OCS, Course, 8 Jul 42. Copy in operations dep't master schedule and master program file, TDS.
51. Master Schedule for OCS Courses, TDS, 9 Mar 43. Copy in acad records sectn dead files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
52. (1) Cf. 49 (1).
(2) OC Weekly Schedule, TDS, 12 Jul 43. Copy in acad records sectn dead files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
53. (1) Revised Master Schedule for OCS Courses, 6 Nov 42. Copy in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
(2) Summary of Hours with Practical Work in Schedule of OCS as compiled fr OCS Master Schedule, 2 Jul 43. Copy in acad records sectn gen files, OCS Reg't, TDS.
54. See Annex "D".
55. (1) Consolidated Daily Strength Return, 15 Nov 43. Copy in TDS file 320.2.
(2) Report of Status of OCS, 15 Nov 43. Copy in TDS file 320.1.
56. Study (R), TD School Classification Department, 20 Dec 43, subj: Personnel Research Report -- Experiment in Combat Adaptability. 3 Parts.
57. GO 5, TDS, 15 May 44.
58. (1) Master Schedule for Officers' Automotive Maintenance Course, No 1 (17 Aug to 6 Nov 42) TDS, 18 Jul 42. Copy in oper dept master sched & master program file, TDS.
(2) Master Schedule for Officers' Pioneer Course No. 1 (17 Aug to 12 Sep 42) TDS, 16 Jul 43. Copy in oper dept master sched & master program file TDS.
(3) Schedule for Officers' Tactical Course, 14 Sep 42. Copy in oper dept master sched & master program file TDS.
(4) Master Schedule for Enl Pioneer Course No. 1 (17 Aug to 12 Sep 42) TDS, 16 Jul 42. Copy in oper dept master sched & master program file TDS.
(5) Ltr to CO, 3d TD Gp, fr CO, TDS, 22 Aug 42. Copy in TDS file 352.11.

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59. (1) Cf. 58 (1).
(2) Master Schedule for Officer's Automotive Maintenance Course, 29 Jul 43, TDS. Copy in oper dept master sched & master program file TDS.
(3) Ltr to CG R&SC fr CO TDS, 352.11 GWTDR, 11 Aug 42, subj: Initial Courses at the TDS. Copy in TDS file 352.11.
(4) Ltr to CO, 3d TD Gp, fr CO, TDS, 22 Aug 42. Copy in TDS file 352.11.
(5) Cf. 4.
(6) Cf. 58 (2).
(7) Cf. 59 (3), (4) & (5).
(8) Ltr to CG R&SC, fr Comd't, TDS, 352.11-GWTDM, 23 Sep 42, subj: Off & Enl Pioneer Courses, TDS. Copy in TDS file 352.11.
(9) 2d Ind to ltr to CG R&SC, fr Comd't TDS, 352.11-GWTDM, 23 Sep 42. Cf. 59 (8).
(10) Cf. 58 (2).
(11) Cf. 58 (3).
(12) Cf. 59 (3), (4), & (5).
60. (1) Master Schedule for Officer Orientation Course - Basic, TDS. Copy in oper dept master sched & master program file, TDS.
(2) Statistical Report of Students, TDS, 1 Dec 43. Copy in acad records sectn "Statistical Report of Students, TDS" file, TDS.
61. (1) Memo to CG AUTC, pres, TD Bd, CG, Tng Brig, CO TDMTC, CG TDS, CO BUFC, fr CG TDC, 352.11, 28 Nov 42, subj: Officers Orientation Courses. Copy in TDS file 352.11.
(2) Charts of Courses, TDS, Original in acad records sectn gen files, TDS.
62. Master Schedule for Officers' Orientation Course-Advanced (4 wks, 192 hrs), TDS, 5 Dec 42. Copy in oper dept master sched & master program file TDS.
63. Ltr to CG TDS, fr CO 818th TD Bn, 5 Feb 43, subj: Officers' Advanced Tactical Course, TDS. Copy in TDS file 352.3.
64. Master Schedule for Officers' Adv Tactical Course, TDS, 25 Jan 43. Copy in oper dept master sched & master program file, TDS.
65. Ltr to CG R&SC, fr Comd't TDS, 26 Jun 43, subj: Revision of Master Schedule for Officers' Advanced Course. Copy in TDS file 352.3.
66. 6th Ind to ltr to CG R&SC, fr Comd't TDS, 26 Jun 43. Cf. 63.
67. (1) 7th Ind to ltr to CG R&SC, fr Comd't, TDS, 4 Aug 43, subj: Revision of Master Schedule for Officers' Adv Course. Copy in TDS file 352.3.
(2) 8th Ind to ltr to CG R&SC, fr Comd't, TDS, 4 Aug 43. Cf. 67 (1).
(3) Master Schedule for Officers Adv Tactical Course, TDS. Copy in oper dept master sched and master program file. TDS.
68. (1) Ltr to CG R&SC, fr Comd't, TDS, 10 Feb 43, subj: Officers Communications Course, TDS. Copy in TDS file 352.26.
(2) 7th Ind to ltr to CG R&SC, fr Comd't, TDS, 10 Feb 43. Cf. 68 (1).
(3) Master Schedule for Officers' Communications Course, TDS, 12 Apr 43. Copy in operations dept master schedule and master program file, TDS.
69. (1) Ltr to CG AGF, fr CG TDC, 352 (TD) GWTDO, 18 Aug 43. Subj: Advanced Automotive Course 76mm Gun Motor Carriage T-70. Copy in TDS file 352.2.
(2) 2d Ind to ltr to CG AGF, fr CG TDC, 352 (TD) GWTDO, 18 Aug 43. Cf. 69 (1).
(3) 2d Ind to ltr to CG TDS, fr CO 647th TD Bn, 13 Oct 43, subj: Enl Course. Copy in TDS file 352.2.
(4) Master Schedule for Officers' Adv Automotive Course, TDS. Copy in oper dept master sched & master program file, TDS.
70. Ltr to TAG, fr CG R&SC, GNRST 352, 16 Sep 43, subj: Full-Track Vehicle Course (Formerly Adv Automotive Course) TDS. Copy in TDS file 352.2.
71. Monthly Strength Report, TDS, 1 Jan 1943. Copy in TDS file 320.2.

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72. Ltr to CG TDC, fr CO TDS, 319.1 GNRFA, 14 Feb 44, subj: Weekly Report, 14 Feb 44. Copy in OS file 14.1 TDS.
73. Verbal statement, Capt F E Smith, Adj TDS, to TDS, Hist O, 1 Nov 45.
74. Weekly Strength Report From HQ Morning Reports 1 Mar and 31 Oct 1944.
75. (1) GO 8, TDS, 30 Jun 44. Copy in TDS GO file.
(2) Verbal statement of TD Historical Officer who attended demonstrations of TD employment.
76. TDS GO 11, 17 Nov 44. TDS GO file, 1944.
77. AGF ltr file 370.5/129 TD Units (R) 10 Nov 44, GNRCT, subj: Trf of 606 TD Bn.
78. Memo on TDS problems by Col. Logan Berry to TDC Historical Officer, 9 Oct 45. Copy in TD Historical Officer's interview file.
79. Statement by General Althaus to TD Historical Officer, 6 Nov 45.
80. Cf. 78.

CHAPTER XI

1. GO 1, TMTFC, 9 Mar 42. Copy in GO file, TDC, 1942.
2. Memo for the CO 93d AT Bn, fr AG/S, G-3, WD, G-3/46351, 28 Jul 41, subj: Test of TD Bn. Copy in Historical Officer's misc. file.
3. MFP 18-1, WD, 1 Apr 42.
4. Chart of Original Plans for Organization of UTC, 20 Mar 42. Copy appended to this Chapt. as chart "A".
5. List of Organizations Trained in UTC, prepared for Historical Officer by Hq UTC. Copy in Historical Officer's file.
6. Record of tel conv, 3 Jul 42. Copy in Records of Tel Convs, S-X filed in office of C/S, TDC.
7. Par 3, SO 101, TDC, 29 May 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
8. Memo on UTC Activities, prepared by Col Noble J. Wiley Jr, SX, UTC. Copy in Historical Officer's memo file.
9. Memo on BCC, prepared by Maj Ralph W Sleator, UTC, Director of BCC. Copy in Historical Officer's memo file.
10. (1) TM 1, UTC, 10 Jun 42. Copy in UTC Training Memo file.
(2) TM 3, UTC, 1 Aug 42. Copy in UTC Training Memo file.
11. Ibid.
12. Cf. 10.
13. Ibid.
14. Cf. 8.
15. (1) Cf. 8
(2) Par 1, Unnumbered Memo, UTC, to All Gps and Bns, UTC, 15 Jun 42. Copy in UTC unnumbered memo file.
16. TM 2, UTC, 11 Jun 42. Copy in UTC TM file.
17. TM 3, UTC, 1 Aug 42. Copy in UTC TM file.
18. See Chapt. XIV.
19. Cf. 33, Chapt. III, GO 18, TDC, 17 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
20. GO 33, TDC, 1 Sep 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
21. Unnumbered Memo AUTC, 14 Sep 42. Copy in UTC Unnumbered Memo file.
22. TM 6, AUTC, 13 Mar 43. Copy in UTC TM file.
23. GO 28, TDC, 13 Oct 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
24. Cf. 16.
25. Unnumbered Memo, AUTC, to All Group and Bn CO's, 29 Oct 42. Copy in UTC Unnumbered Memo file.

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26. (1) Cf. 8, p. 163.
(2) Training Schedules of UTC Tng Sched File.
(3) Tng Schedules of EUTC in EUTC Sched Files.
(4) MTP 18-2, 11 Jul 45, TDRIC MTP file.
27. Tng Memo 4, 2d Tng Gp, 30 Jul 43. Copy in UTC file 353.4.
28. Ibid.
- XX Note: A few of the highlights of the Training Groups and Battle Conditioning Department activities are recounted here so that the reader may compare their activities with subject matter of MTP 18-5, 11 Jul 45.
29. Weekly Report to CG, TDC, fr AUTC, 18 Mar 43. Copy in UTC file 319.1.
30. Weekly Report to CG, TDC, fr CG, AUTC, 29 Jun 43. Copy in UTC file 319.1.
31. Cf. 9.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. (1) Unnumbered Memo, UTC, to All Units, UTC, 16 Aug 43, subj: Battle Conditioning. Copy in UTC unnumbered memo file.
(2) Cf. 9.
36. Verbal statement by Maj. Ralph W. Sleator, director, BC Dept., UTC.
37. (1) Cf. 10.
(2) Wkly Report to CG, TDC, fr CO, AUTC, 20 Jul 43. Copy in UTC file 319.1.
(3) Wkly Report to CG, TDC, fr CO, UTC, 28 Sep 43. Cf. (2).
38. (1) Cf. 35.
39. Ibid.
40. Cf. 9.
41. Memo "A", 1st TD Tng Gp, 6 Mar 43. Copy in UTC file 353.01.
42. Memo "B", 1st TD Tng Gp, 6 Mar 43. Copy in UTC file 353.01.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. TM 5, AUTC, 2 Nov 42. Copy in UTC TM file.
46. Unnumbered Memo, AUTC, to All Group and Bn CO's, 16 Nov 42. Copy in UTC Unnumbered Memo file.
47. SO's 2, 3 and 5, TDRIC. Copies in TDC SO file, TD Sch.
48. (1) GO 31, TDC, 24 Nov 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
(2) GO 35, TDC, 7 Dec 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
49. Tng Memo 1, AUTC, 5 Jan 43. Copy in UTC tng memo file.
50. (1) TO 18-5, 27 Jan 43.
(2) Unnumbered Memo to All Units, AUTC, 31 Mar 43, subj: TD Bns (Towed). Copy in UTC unnumbered memo file.
51. Unnumbered Memo, AUTC, to All Units, AUTC, 1 May 43. Copy in UTC Unnumbered Memo file.
52. GO 1, AUTC, 5 May 43. Copy in UTC GO file.
53. Weekly Report to CG, TDC, fr CO, UTC, 25 May 43. Copy in UTC file 319.1.
54. GO 54, TDC, 13 Aug 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
55. Wkly Report to CG, TDC, fr CG, AUTC, 24 Feb 43. Copy in UTC file 319.1.
56. Unnumbered Memo to All Unit CO's, AUTC, 9 Jul 43. Copy in UTC Unnumbered Memo file.
57. Unnumbered Memo, AUTC, to CG's 1st & 2d TD Brigades, CO all Groups & Bns, subj: Specialist School. Copy in UTC file 220.63.
58. Ltr orders 1, TDC, 210.72, 1 Jan 44, subj: Assumption of Comd, AG file 210.72.
59. Ltr to CG fr CG, AGF, 360.09/1 (P) (26 Aug 43) subj: Combat Intel Tng Test, 26 Aug 43. Copy in AG file 350.09.
60. Ltr to CG TDC, fr CG AGF, 320-2(TDC) (R) (13 Feb 44) subj: Reorg of TDC. Copy in AG file 320 TDC.

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61. GO 47, WD, 18 Aug 43.
62. GO 48, TDC, 12 Jul 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.

CHAPTER XII

1. GO 1, TIMFC, 9 Mar 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
2. P. 1, "History of Training Brigade," prepared by Maj Milton H. Baughn, Jr. S-3, Tng Brig. Copy in Historical Officer's file.
3. Telegram to CG TDC, fr C/AF, 3 Apr 42. Copy in AG telegram file.
4. SO 76, TDC, 30 Apr 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
5. SO 78, TDC, 2 May 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
6. Cf. 2.
7. Par. 12, SO 138, 31st Infantry Division, 1 June 42. Copy in Tn Brig correspondence
8. P. 3, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
9. GO 5, TDC, 1 Jun 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
10. P. 4, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
11. GO 8, TDC, 29 Jun 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
12. P. 8, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
13. GO 15, TDC, 15 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
14. GO 9, TDC, 1 Jul 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
15. GO 21, TDC, 21 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
16. SO 26, TDC, 1 Oct 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
17. P. 15, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
18. (1) GO 38, TDC, 15 Dec 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
(2) GO 5, TDC, 20 Feb 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
19. P. 16, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
20. P. 17, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
21. P. 19, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
22. GO 47, TDC, 12 Jul 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
23. GO 73, TDC, 4 Nov 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
24. Supplement of "History of Training Brigade," prepared by Maj Milton H. Baughn, Jr., S-3, Tng Brig. Copy in Historical Officer's file.
25. P. 12, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
26. Ibid.
27. Cf. 25.
28. P. 1, Memo on Ord Activities, prepared by Capt James T. Lewis, Jr., Ord Dept. Copy in Historical Officer's file.
29. Pp 1, 2, Memo on Ord Activities. Cf. 28.
30. GO 29, TDC, 19 Oct 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
31. Pp 3, 4, Memo on Ord Activities. Cf. 28.
32. GO 12, TDC, 19 Mar 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
33. P. 13, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
34. P. 14, Memo on Ord Activities. Cf. 28.
35. Ibid.
36. P. 1, Memo on Ord Activities. Cf. 28.
37. P. 2, Memo on Ord Activities. Cf. 28.
38. Memo to All Units, TDC fr CG TDC, 300.4 GWTDA, 27 Apr 43, subj: Ord Serv to Units in Cantonment at Cp Hood & No Cp Hood. Copy in AG file 400.4.
39. P. 3, Memo on Ord Activities. Cf. 28.
40. P. 5, Memo on Ord Activities. Cf. 28.
41. Ltr to CG, RADC fr CG, AGP, 451.01, 22 Jul 43, subj: Spare Parts Policy for Ground Force Units. Copy in AG file 451.

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42. P. 6, Memo on Ord Activities. Cf. 28.
43. P. 7, Memo on Ord Activities. Cf. 28.
44. Ibid.
45. GO 6, TDC, 12 Jun 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
46. P. 5, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
47. GO 2, TDC, 4 Feb 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
48. GO 55, TDC, 12 Aug 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
49. GO 17, TDC, 17 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
50. P. 9, "History of Training Brigade." Cf. 2.
51. Ltr to CG's, 4th, 5th, 6th, and 8th SC's fr WD AGO, AG 322, OBI-SPMOJ-M, 7 Aug 43, subj: Reorg and Redesign of 374th, 375th, 377th and 379th Engineer Bns, Separate. Copy in Adj files, 374th Eng Gen Serv Regt.
52. Cf. 9.
53. GO 16, TDC, 15 Aug 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
54. GO 24, TDC, 2 Sep 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
55. (1) Par. 4, SO 78 TDC, 2 May 42. Cf. 5.
(2) Par. 10, SO 256 TDC, 28 Nov 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
56. (1) Par. 1, SO 246, TDC, 16 Nov 42. Copy in AG file 300.4.
57. (1) Par. 14, SO 46, TDC, 22 Feb 43. Cf. 56 (2).
(2) Par. 13, SO 107, TDC, 4 May 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
58. (1) Par. 14, SO 107, TDC, 4 May 43. Cf. 57 (2).
(2) Par. 16, SO 173, TDC, 20 Jul 43. Copy in AG file 300.4.
59. Par. 17, SO 173, TDC, 20 Jul 43. Cf. 58 (2).
60. Par. 1, GO 5, TDC, 17 Feb 44. Copy in AG file 300.4.

CHAPTER XIII

1. Cf. 15, P. 16.
2. Cf. 16, P. 16.
3. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 8 May 42, subj: Tng of Loss Repls for TD Units. Copy in TDC G-3 file 322.
4. Cf. 58, P. 40.
5. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, R&SC, 320.2 GNRST, 19 Aug 42, subj: Establishment of TDRTC. Copy in TDC AG file 320.
6. GO 27, TDC, 3 Oct 42. Copy in AG file 320.
7. Par. 1, SO 5, TDRTC, 14 Oct 42. Copy in TDRTC SO file, Hqs TDRTC.
8. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, R&SC, 320.2 (TD) CHRSSE, 17 Aug 42, Subj: Size of Proposed TDRTC. Copy in G-3 file 322.
9. Telegram to CG, TDC, fr CG, AGF. Copy in file 201-Gillfillan, J. E.(O), Hqs TDRTC.
10. Cf. 26, p. 53.
11. P. 1, "TDRTC Sch, Chronological Events." Copy in Documentation of History, TDRTC.
12. Ibid.
13. Ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, TDRTC, 319.1, 16 Nov 42, subj: Weekly Reports. Copy in AG file 319.1.
14. MTP 18-1, WD 1 Apr 42.
15. Cf. 13.
16. (1) Par 1, GO 9, TDRTC, 23 Dec 42. Copy in TDRTC GO file.
(2) P. 7, History of TDRTC. TDC Historical file.
17. P. 4, MTP 18-2, copy in Documentation of History, TDRTC.
18. TDRTC Tng Schedules - Jan, Feb, Mar 43. TDRTC Tng Sched file.
19. SO 60, TDRTC, 17 Dec 42. Copy in TDRTC SO file Hq TDRTC.
20. Psychiatric Orient. Lectures. Copy in Documentation of Hist, TDRTC.

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21. Par 1, GO 24, TDRTC, 30 Sep 43. Copy in Documentation of Hist, TDRTC.
22. Par 1, Memo 68, Hq, Cp Hood, 12 Mar 43. Copy in Documentation History in TDRTC file.
23. P 1, TDRTC Sch Chronological Events. Copy in Documentation of History, TDRTC.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. P 2, TDRTC Sch Chronological Events. Copy in Documentation of History, TDRTC.
27. Ibid.
28. GC 1, TDRTC, 25 Apr 43, copy in Documentation of Hist. TDRTC file.
29. Info Bul's A, B & C, TDRTC, 28 May 43, subj: Opening of No Cp Hood, Texas. Copy in Documentation of History, TDRTC file.
30. P. 62.
31. P. 14, "History of TDRTC, 1 Sep 42-Oct 43," prepared by Colonel Christian Hildebrand, SX, TDRTC. In Historical Officer's file.
32. Par 1, GO 15, TDRTC, 29 May 43. Copy in Documentation of History, TDRTC. In Historical Officer's file.
33. P. 14, "History of TDRTC." Cf. 31.
34. Par 1, GO 17, TDRTC, 8 Jun 43. Copy in Documentation of History, TDRTC. Cf. 32.
35. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, R&SC, 320.2 GNRST, 22 May 43, subj: Redesignation of TD Tng Bns in the TDRTC. Copy in G-3 file 322.
36. Par. 1, GO 21, TDRTC, 4 Aug 43. Copy in "Docum. of Hist. TDRTC." Cf. 32.
37. Par 1b, ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, TDRTC, 319.1, 16 Oct 43, subj: Weekly Report. Copy in AG file 319.1.
38. Ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, R&SC, 320.2/02, TDRTC, 1 Oct 43, subj: Reorg of RTC, Cp Hood, Texas. Copy in G-3 file 322.
39. Map of Proposed ASTP. Copy in "Docum. of Hist. TDRTC." Cf. 32.
40. Par 2, ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, TDRTC, 319.1, 16 Oct 43, subj: Weekly Report. Copy in AG file 319.1.
41. P. 16, "History of TDRTC." Cf. 31.
42. P. 16. "History of TDRTC." Cf. 31.
43. Par 1b, ltr to CG, TDC fr CG, TDRTC. Cf. 37.
44. Ibid.
45. Ltr to CG, TDRTC, fr CG, R&SC, 233 GNRST (ASTP-BTC), 16 Nov 43, subj: Org of the ASTP BTC, Cp Hood, Tex. Copy in 353 ASTP file TDRTC.
46. Ltr to CG, ASTP-BTC fr CG, R&SC, 322 GNRST (ASTP-BTC), 9 Dec 43, subj: ASTP. Copy in 353 ASTP TDRTC file.
47. Ltr to CG, TDRTC, fr CG, R&SC, 322 GNRST (TDRTC) 23 Nov 43, subj: Standardization of RTC. Copy in 322 file TDRTC master plan.
48. Ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, TDRTC, 322 GNRHP, 16 Nov 43, subj: Retention of Officers beyond their Release Date under the Rotation Plan. Copy in 352.16 TDRTC file.
49. GO 34, TDRTC, 3 Dec 43. Copy in GO file, TDRTC.
50. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr WD A/C AG 220.3, 14 Jan 44, subj: EM-Utilization of Manpower based on Physical Capacity. Copy in 220.3 TDRTC file.
51. GO 7, TDRTC, 15 Feb 44. Copy in GO file, TDRTC.
52. Ltr, Hq R&SC, 21 Dec 44, GNRST 353, subj: Org and Adv Tng of TDRTC Graduates. Copy in "Documentation of History, TDRTC" file.
53. R&SC Monthly Ineffectives Report.
- * Cf. MTP, WD, 1 Apr 42 and MTP, 11 Jul 45.

CHAPTER XIV

1. Final Report, TDITC (General, p. 2). Copy in Historical Officer's file.
2. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 320.2/03, 26 Sep 42, subj: Activation of Hq & Hq Co, Activation and BUTC, TDC. Copy in G-3 file 322.
3. Ltr to TAG fr CG, AGF, 320.2/138 (TD) GNGCT/11856 (10-22-42), 22 Oct 42, subj: Orgn of TD BUTC. Copy in G-3 file 322.
4. Ibid.
5. F. 50 Chapt. IV.
6. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 600.1 GWTDC, 17 Sep 42, subj: Request for Construction and Authorization. Copy in G-3 file 322.
7. Cf. 8, p. 50.
8. Ibid.
9. Cf. 1.
10. Ibid.
11. Final Report, TDITC (General, p. 2; Appendix 8, a-3). Cf. 1.
12. GO 3, TDITC, 18 Feb 43. Copy in BUTC GO file, TDC.
13. Ltr to CG, AGF, fr CG, TDC, 353.01/9-GWIDO (2-17-43), 17 Feb 43, subj: Tng of TD Bns with Negro Enl Pers. Copy in Historical Officer's Misc. file.
14. Final Report, TDITC (General, p. 3; Appendix 8, a-1). Cf. 1.
15. Final Report, TDITC (General, incl D, p. 4, par 6). Cf. 1.
16. Final Report, TDITC (General, incl D, p. 5, par e). Cf. 1.
17. Final Report, TDITC (General, incl D, p. 6, par f). Cf. 1.
18. Final Report, TDITC (General, incl D, p. 5, par d). Cf. 1.
19. Ibid.
20. Verbal statement by Lt Col Geo. T. Cunston, S-3, ITC.
21. Par 35, SO 105, TDC, 1 May 43. Cf. 18.
22. Final Report, TDITC (General, p. 4). Cf. 1.
23. Ltr to TDC fr CG, AGF, 321/7 (TD Units) (R) (GNGCT) (5-8-43), 8 May 43, subj: Reorg of TD Units in Accordance with New T/O's. Copy in G-3 file 322.
24. Final Report, TDITC (General, incl B, p. 9). Cf. 1.
25. Final Report, TDITC (General, incl D, p. 7). Cf. 1.
26. Par 7, ltr to CG, TDC, fr CG, AGF, 353.01/68 GNGCT, 4 Jun 43, subj: Tng Periods. Copy in G-3 file 322.
27. GO 54, TDC, 13 Aug 43. Copy in BUTC GO file, TDC.
28. Final Report, TDITC (General, p. 4). Cf. 1.
29. Ltr to CG, TDC, fr TAG, 322 OB-I-GNGCT-M, 2 Oct 43, subj: Discontinuance of TP BUTC, Camp Bowie, Texas. Copy in G-3 file 322.
30. Final Report, TDITC (General, p. 4). Cf. 1.
31. Final Report, TDITC (General, p. 5). Cf. 1.