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OPERATIONS OF TASK FORCE "A"
IN THE BRITTANY PENINSULA
1 AUGUST to 22 SEPTEMBER 1944

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On verbal orders from the Commanding General, VIII Corps, Task Force "A" was formed on 31 July 1944, with Brigadier General Herbert L. Earnest, who commanded the 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade, in command.

The seizure and safeguarding of important bridges on the double-tracked Brest-Rennes railroad was the principal objective of Task Force "A" upon its organization. The prevention of enemy demolition of bridges at St. Brieuc and Morlaix was an important part of the preservation of this principal rail artery.

The initial goal of the task force was successfully reached by 8 August. Other missions kept the task force in being and it was not until 53 days following its organization that TFA was dissolved. In that period it completed eight missions, of vital importance to the Brittany campaign as a whole.

TFA was composed of the following troops: Headquarters, 1st Tank Destroyer Brigade; 15th Cavalry Group consisting of Group Headquarters and the 15th and 17th Cavalry Squadrons; Headquarters, 6th Tank Destroyer Group; 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, 159th Engineer Combat Battalion; and 509th Engineer Light Pontoon Company. (1)

The route of the planned advance on Brest was to follow the principal north coastal highway through Pontorson, Dol, Dinan, Lamballe, St. Brieuc, Guingamp, Morlaix and Lesneven, where terrain favored the employment of a light armored, fully mobile force of the type of TFA. This highway, referred to hereafter as Route A, generally lay several miles from the coast. It was crossed throughout its length by a network of trans-peninsula paved roads, generally well-maintained, which offered opportunities to bypass localized strongpoints of resistance.

The enemy had available for commitment in Brittany 12,500 infantry, marines and coastal defense troops, variously estimated from 20,000 to 50,000 and miscellaneous labor battalions of foreign personnel.

General Earnest on 1 August visited Third Army, VIII Corps, and 6th Armored Division Headquarters. He discussed TFA's mission and plan of driving as rapidly as possible along the north coastal highway, bypassing pockets of stubborn enemy resistance.

General Earnest foresaw the need for close infantry support of the task force's mission in view of the number of enemy troops in the northern portion of the peninsula, the additional elements that would be shoved north by the drive of the 6th Armored Division through the center of the peninsula, and the probability that the enemy could use terrain advantages to establish road blocks or strong points astride the route which his force would be unable either to breach or bypass without great delay. The decision of VIII Corps was not to attach an infantry increment to TFA at the outset of the mission.

The 79th Infantry Division, scheduled to support TFA in its drive, was diverted for an attack on Fougères, and its original mission was given to the 83d Infantry Division. The 8th Infantry Division, assigned to follow and support the 6th Armored Division along Route B toward Brest, remained with the 4th Armored Division for the attack on Rennes and the securing of the Rennes-Quiberon escape route.

This diversion of infantry support, followed by the later tying down of the 83d Division for the attack on St. Malo and Dinard, was later to affect the mission of TFA in the western end of the peninsula.

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In its first field order, the advance of the task force on Brest was ordered in the zone astride Route A to secure the key railroad bridges en route. (2)

A meeting of unit commanders was held on the afternoon of 1 August, at TFA headquarters, and a summation of the mission, resistance expected, and tactics to be used was given by General Earnest. (3)

Air support for the mission was supplied by the XIX Tactical Air Command, and the air support party of nine men, with Capt. Mischelow in charge, arrived at 1330 hours on 1 August, to provide radio communication with supporting planes. (4) The air mission was to supply air coverage for the column and to provide bombing and strafing missions on request. If the column became isolated from contact with friendly elements, which appeared highly probable in view of the rapid drive planned and the large number of enemy-held points to be bypassed or pushed through, supply service was to be maintained by air.

No provision was made in the organization of TFA for a task force surgeon, collecting company, or ambulances to provide evacuation services for the wounded.

The duties of task force surgeon were assumed by Capt. William S. Parker, dental officer of the 15th Cavalry, and the 429th Collecting Company, was secured and attached to the task force on 8 August. Capt. Parker organized the facilities in such a manner that wounded personnel were quickly evacuated, although his problem was magnified by the long distance between the combat units and rear installations where proper medical treatment could be obtained. For his work, Capt. Parker was recommended for the award of the Bronze Star.

TFA MOVES ON MISSION

Movement orders were received from VIII Corps at 2100 hours, 2 August, and General Earnest and Lieutenant Colonel Louis C. Cadenhead, Jr., S-3, departed with the advance elements of TFA from the bivouac area one-half mile north of Equilly (274341) at 2250 hours. At 0200 hours, 3 August the remainder of the task force moved out of the bivouac area.

The 15th Cavalry Group, with Company B, 159th Engineers, and Company C, 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, attached, all without trains, led the move on Avranches and in the direction of Pontorson on Route A.

The 6th Tank Destroyer Group, less trains, with attached troops including the remainder of the tank destroyer and combat engineers, and the light pontoon company, all without their trains, the task force trains, and the TUSA Information Service Detachment followed in that order along Route A, prepared to reinforce the cavalry, to take over and hold bridges or intermediate objectives, and to install bridging as required. Groups were made responsible for flank security while the 6th Tank Destroyer Group was charged with responsibility for the rear guard.

The only hostile air activity of the operation occurred during the night of 2-3 August, while the columns were on the road from Avranches to Pontorson. Bombing and strafing by enemy planes delayed the advance for three hours at the critical traffic point and bridge north of Pontaubault (2810). Approximately 12 enemy planes, operating in groups of three, held up the task force at this point, but inflicted no casualties. No friendly air coverage operated during the night to protect this traffic bottleneck. (5)

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Initial contact with the enemy was made at 0710 hours, 3 August, by the 17th Cavalry which encountered a road block of iron rails, heavily mined, and defended by small arms and automatic weapons fire on highway N176 (028027) immediately east of Dol (6). This resistance was bypassed to the south.

Cavalry patrols probing in the direction of Dol received varied reports from French resistance forces of the strength of German elements in that vicinity. Total enemy strength was estimated at one battalion by Capt. Arthur P. Nelson, S-2, and a request was made at 1255 hours to the commander of the 83d Infantry Division for a motorized combat team to carry out the reduction of the Baguer-Pican and Dol defenses.

Colonel John B. Reybold, cavalry group commander, the initial casualty of the campaign, was reported missing following the cavalry's advance towards Dol. (7)

The following changes were then made in the command function of TFA: Colonel Logan C. Berry, then commanding the TD Group, was placed in command of the Cavalry Group; Colonel Frank T. Searcy, TFA executive officer, was placed in command of the tank destroyers, and Lieutenant Colonel Cadenhead assumed the duties of Executive Officer, TFA.

ENEMY PLANS CHANGE MISSION

Plans of the strong enemy forces in the St. Malo area (8015) to move westward and join the concentration in the vicinity of Brest became known to VIII Corps and resulted in a change of TFA's mission on the afternoon of 3 August. The task force was directed to probe toward St. Malo.

Brigade headquarters of TFA went into assembly area at (9201) on Highway N176, five miles north of Lanhelin, at 1500 hours on 3 August. Reconnaissance units of both cavalry squadrons, supported by a combat engineer platoon were ahead of the column approximately three miles and made contact with the enemy at the east side of the village of Le Vx. Bourg (8698).

None of the troops had been in contact with the enemy other than at Dol and upon receiving fire from 88mm guns, fell back toward the assembly area. (9)

A dismounted counterattack was quickly organized and the troops advanced to the outskirts of Miniac before night fall.

For the operations on 4 August, the 329th Regimental Combat Team of the 83d Infantry Division was attached to TFA.

Patrols of the 15th and 17th Squadrons began operating at 0630 hours on 4 August, and by 1200 hours had reached a line extending east from (8303) on the Rance River Estuary and passing south of the canalised area to a point (9103) about 600 yards directly west of the village of Landrieux. Cavalry and tank destroyer units followed in close support on highway N137, and the 329th RCT, not deployed, was close behind the cavalry.

This advance was held up when heavy artillery fire, beginning at 1400 hours, was received from coastal guns, located along the estuary, and from gunboats on the estuary. Air support mission was requested and air strikes were carried out against the gunboats at 1614, 1630, and 1930 hours. The boats were left burning and artillery fire from them was silenced. (10).

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The enemy had inundated all the canalised area to the south and east of Chateauneuf, limiting the cavalry and tank destroyer units to the few roads in this vicinity. The combat team began passing through the cavalry to begin development of the inundated area, but its advance was halted completely after gains of 600 yards had been made. A road block on highway N137 at (851045) held up all advance from the south toward Chateauneuf.

Gains were made by cavalry and engineer units during the evening of 4 August. Company B, 159th Engineers, reduced the enemy strongpoint at Le Val Hervelin (8496) and 17th Cavalry patrols captured intact an ammunition dump at 8996.

The assault was continued on the morning of 5 August with a co-ordinated attack launched at 0830 hours from a line of departure running along the 04 east-west grid line, with the 1st Bn of the 329th RCT on the left of the road block, the 2d Bn on the right, supported by four light tank units, a tank destroyer company, and one platoon of assault engineers. The troops moved forward under intense small arms and automatic weapons fire and were unable to penetrate beyond the road block that held up the previous day's advance.

Lieutenant Colonel Templeton, in command of tank destroyer units at the scene of the block, led the attack on the obstacle and effected its eventual removal. (11)

For his leadership and gallantry in this action, and for leading a counterattack on the preceding day Lieutenant Colonel Templeton was recommended for the award of the Silver Star.

The advance moved rapidly against light resistance, once the road block and the positions surrounding it were eliminated, and cavalry units by 2200 hours had penetrated up Highway N176 to reach a point 1,000 yards northwest of the village of Les Gatines (8307), and on Highway GC 76 to (875082), in the direction of La Gouesniere. (12)

The task force was withdrawn from its mission against St. Malo at 2200 hours. The 83d Infantry Division was left to continue the operation. Six hundred and sixty-five prisoners had been taken in the Chateauneuf operation. A withdrawal was made to assembly areas in the vicinity of St. Pierre de Plesguen (857920) for regrouping preparatory to resuming the original mission toward Brest. (13) Company C, 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was attached to the 83d Infantry Division for the attack on St. Malo.

MISSION CONTINUED

A considerable force of enemy troops was reported by French patriots to be in strongly fortified positions around Dinan, while a force of 400 Germans with six tanks was reported in the area between Dinan and Evran (8085). A deviation from Route A was ordered, so that enemy troops at Dinan could be bypassed to the south. A thorough combing of the area around Evran was planned in order to destroy the enemy left in that sector by the rapid passage of the 6th Armored Division. (14)

The 3d Battalion of the 330th Infantry Regiment, and Battery C, 323d Field Artillery Battalion, both from the 83d Infantry Division, were attached to TFA for the coming operations. A combat team of the cavalry group, one platoon of tank destroyers and Company L of the infantry was organized to lead the advance toward Evran on 6 August.

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Leaving the IP at Lanhelin (9192), the column moved rapidly to the southwest through the village of Plesder (8488) and on to Evran, which was occupied without opposition. A bridge spanning the D'Ille River in Evran had been blown up, but a bypass was constructed by engineers and the movement continued.

By 1200 hours on 6 August, cavalry patrols had pushed as far west as Yvignac (6582), meeting no enemy resistance, and during the afternoon the advance continued westward through Collinse, Moncontour and the vicinity of Ploeuc (2284).

15th Cavalry patrols drove northwest up Highway N12 to Lamballe, which was entered at 1745 hours. No enemy was found in the town. Other patrols pushed on to enter St. Brieuc at 1800 hours, again without encountering resistance. Here, the three railroad bridges were secured undamaged.

These bridges were considered of such importance that Company A, 159th Engineer Battalion, was detached to guard them.

A regrouping of the task force for action on 7 August, with an advance planned toward Chatelaudren and Guingamp, was effected during the night of 6 August. Both cavalry squadrons were to put screens forward in the zone of advance and the reconnaissance company of tank destroyers was to reconnoiter the route of advance for the infantry.

Heavy action was expected during the course of the advance. Intelligence reports had estimated a force of from 400 to 500 Russian troops in the vicinity of Chatelaudren, a force of 2,000 Germans in and around Guingamp, and small pockets of resistance expected in the entire operational area. (15)

15th Squadron patrols contacted a company of enemy at the village of Pleto (1008), 2½ kilometers northeast of Chatelaudren, but quickly overran this resistance with a platoon of light tanks. A road block consisting of upright logs emplaced in the road, laced with barbed wire and heavily mined, offered more trouble, as it was covered by fire from machine guns and one 75mm gun. Fire from 37mm guns silenced the automatic weapons and artillery, while a reconnaissance platoon dismounted to deliver covering small arms fire for the engineers who removed the block. (16)

Enemy positions in Chatelaudren were reduced by 1140 hours, and pursuit of enemy forces withdrawing westward toward Guingamp in horse drawn vehicles continued.

Guingamp apparently served as a central strongpoint and supply base for the north central portion of the Brittany peninsula. (17) It was approached from the east on Highway N12 and from the south on Highway N167 by units of the 15th Squadron, which by 1200 hours reached a line extending from Bourbriac (9201) to Plouagat (0606).

Defenses at Guingamp included mines scattered along all roads which entered the town, and angle steel rails, concrete blocks, and wire set between concrete barricades on each road entrance. These were removed by engineer units, or were blown up if booby traps were discovered among the mines.

After a very stiff engagement with the enemy, in which a coordinated attack by all arms was launched against the City of Guingamp, resistance ended at 2000 hours, and the task force passed through the city, leaving French resistance forces in charge. By 2400 hours, patrols had moved along Highway N12 as far west as Belle-Isle-en-Terre. A total of 398 enemy troops had been taken prisoners in Guingamp and Chatelaudren. (18)

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A sub task force was formed to move at 0600 hours on 8 August toward Morlaix to secure the railroad bridges there without delay. The 17th Cavalry, plus a tank destroyer company with reconnaissance platoon attached, a company of infantry, and one platoon of combat engineers made up the special force. (19) The remainder of TFA was to follow on highway N12 to consolidate the gains made.

The sub task force jumped off at the assigned time, but all roads were found mined, which slowed the advance. Air support was necessary to clear a column of enemy vehicles off the highway ahead of the reconnaissance units. Plouigneau was reached at 1150 hours, and 20mm gun emplacements, with field of fire extending down the highway on both sides of town, were encountered. Emplacements west of Plouigneau had no ammunition, but guns to the east used thermite ammunition effectively until the positions were silenced by fire from light tanks.

Contact with German troops one mile east of Morlaix was made at 1350 hours, and removal of road blocks and entrance into the center of the city was effected by 1645 hours. Resistance was centered in a castle in the central part of Morlaix, which was defended by two 4cm guns, one machine gun, and mines. (20)

Defenses east of Morlaix were dealt with by the 17th Cavalry. Two 40mm guns, located on either side on the highway immediately east of the railroad bridge (468160), east of Morlaix, were destroyed by 37mm and machine gun fire from a light tank. A 20mm gun mounted on a truck covered the road curve just west of the bridge but was knocked out by a .30 calibre machine gun fire from the lead jeep of the element. Another 20mm gun around the succeeding curve was destroyed by 37mm fire. One road block, of steel rails and anti-tank mines, blocked entrance on this road and was removed by a platoon of engineers. (21)

German troops, resisting in the castle, surrendered after fire had been placed on them by the infantry. A total of 397 prisoners was taken in Morlaix.

The 17th Cavalry Squadron with one company of 159 Engineer attached remained in Morlaix to secure the railroad bridges and keep open the lines of communication.

Up to 2400 hours, 8 August, casualties of all the elements comprising the task force totalled 21 killed, 42 wounded, and 14 missing in action. Rapid movement of the units and the fact that only radio communication was employed made day-by-day reports of casualties impracticable. No estimate was made of the enemy losses in killed and wounded, but prisoners taken during this period totalled 1,460. (22)

In pursuit of the mission on Brest, the task force moved to the vicinity of Plouvorn (3017) to bivouac on the night of 8 August. The trains of the 15th Cavalry remained in the vicinity of Plouigneau and were attacked at 0930 hours 9 August by a German force employing 20mm and anti-tank guns. (23) Two armored cars and a jeep were knocked out, and a small number of casualties sustained. Air support was called on for a bombing mission on enemy positions, and a troop of cavalry and one platoon of tanks were sent back for additional support. Two of the tanks were hit and burned out in the assault which knocked out two enemy anti-tank guns. Bombing of the town, in which one fighter-bomber was shot down, allowed the trains and supporting troops to disengage from the fight and move west to the assembly area of Task Force "A" at 1013, south of Ploudaniel, from where the 6th Armored Division was contacted. Task Force "A's" casualties on 9 August included one killed, seven wounded, and three missing.

A large group of prisoners was taken single-handed by Major Ralph K. Johnson, TFA's S-1 and S-4, on 9 August. (24)

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NORTHERN AREA CLEARED

At 2100 hours on 9 August, TFA received a new mission from Corps: to clear the area north of the 6th Armored Division and then to drive east on the supply route to contact American troops at Rostrenen.

Enemy units that had been scattered into small elements and pushed north and south of the 6th Armored Division's route had begun to concentrate and reoccupy towns near the central highway and constituted a threat to the main supply route. (25)

An immediate regrouping of the task force for the mission was carried out.

Troop A, of the 15th Cavalry, of Group A, gained contact with the enemy at Plougerneau at 1320 hours on 10 August and received heavy mortar fire from strongly manned positions while awaiting support from the infantry-artillery tank destroyer team. The team began its assault at 1500 hours and by 1800 hours had pushed to the center of town through mine fields and anti-tank defenses. Remnants of the German forces withdrew in the face of this advance to coastal defensive positions. An additional contact was reported at 1406 hours by 15th Cavalry elements at Kerizoc (9925). An 88mm gun was blasted by light tank fire here and 80 prisoners were taken. (26)

Five hundred and fifty prisoners were taken in the day's operations north and west of Lesneven, while TFA casualties amounted to one killed, six wounded, and one missing.

During this attack orders were received by TFA to proceed on another mission without delay. (NOTE: Orders were received thru the medium of radio link, a distance of 108 miles. This was the greatest overland distance known to have been covered by this type of equipment up to this time.)

TASK FORCE SECURES BEACHES

The withdrawal, which left some enemy positions intact west of Plougerneau, came when a message from VIII Corps, received at 1810 hours, ordered: "Get in and hold St. Michel-en-Greve, five miles southwest of Lannion tomorrow morning. Pay particular attention to beaches. We want to use them." (27)

Task Force "A", without rest, made a night march and closed in St. Michel-en-Greve without incident by 1200 hours, 11 August.

The beach was gained without opposition during the afternoon of 11 August, and a perimeter defense to secure it was installed by infantry, artillery, and tank destroyer elements, while cavalry units conducted a reconnaissance of the Morlaix-Guingamp-Treguier and Lannion area to locate and contain enemy pockets of resistance.

Combat engineers began a survey of German beach defenses and found 100 obstacles placed against seaward approach, the majority of which were mined, extensive mine-fields around all high points in the beach area, and road blocks and mines on all exits. (28) The beaches were desired for the beaching and unloading of LST's carrying ammunition, fuel, and rations. (29)

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Removal of beach defenses and mines by engineers continued on 12 August, while the cavalry reconnaissance brought back reports of known enemy forces at Penvenen, Lezardrieux, Pleubian, and Paimpol. Air support bombed and strafed installations, including railroad guns, at Paimpol during the afternoon. Two of the guns were reported knocked out.

Capt. Nelson drove to Penvenen under a white flag the morning of 12 August and asked the German Lieutenant, in charge of the garrison of 200 men, to surrender. The commander refused after contacting his commanding officer at Paimpol. (30)

589 prisoners were captured on 11 and 12 August in the Lannion area.

A new mission was assigned the task force when the enemy situation in the Guingamp-Rostrenen-Carhaix-Morlaix area was reported unstable. Previous thrusts of the task force, had broken up organized resistance in this area and it had been left to the Maquis to guard, but the enemy had tended to regroup and many individuals and small groups were attempting to infiltrate to the west, French sources said. Intelligence reports placed the total of enemy troops in the area at 2,100. (31)

However, a thorough reconnaissance of the entire area on 13 August encountered no enemy troops from south of Morlaix to Route B from Rostrenen to Carhaix. (32)

Intelligence reports that 300 Germans, from a total force of 3,500 concentrated in the Paimpol-Lezardrieux-Pleubian area, had broken through a screen of 1,500 French Maquis on the Lannion peninsula and captured Treguier (3536) and were threatening Lannion and Perros-Guirec (7540), brought the task force to the north on 14 August to control the enemy threat. (33)

TFA was regrouped. The leading element was ordered to leave the bivouac area in the vicinity of Callac (7096) and move in column to Begard (8519) and then begin a patrol to the north as far as a line extending through Lanvollon (0717), Pointreux (9525), La Roche Derrien (8831), and Lannion. The 17th Squadron was held at Morlaix and St. Michel to provide security for these areas.

Movement began at 0730 hours on 14 August, and one troop of cavalry established a screen across the planned line at 1000 hours. Other elements of Group A moved on Treguier, which they reached at 1600 hours, and engaged hostile units estimated to include 350 troops. The highway bridge over the Jaudy River immediately east of Treguier (919356) was bombed by air support at 1600 hours to block the enemy's escape from the town, but without success. The enemy later used this bridge in his withdrawal to the east. The bridge was later destroyed by our engineers. (34)

Enemy troops, behind strongly protected road blocks, put up a stubborn defense of the town, but following a heavy artillery preparation by tank destroyer units at 1825 hours, infantry troops, aided by a force of 300 Free French, assaulted the defenses and pushed the enemy back; 130 enemy casualties were inflicted. By 2400 hours, the entire peninsula northeast of Lannion and west of the Jaudy River was cleared of all enemy resistance.

A discussion between Major General Troy H. Middleton, commanding general of VIII Corps, and Colonel Eon, of French Forces of Brittany, resulted in plans for the task force to further develop the Lezardrieux peninsula. The discussion dis-

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closed the desire of the Germans to hold the ports of Lezardrieux and Paimpol, and continue the occupation of the Ile a Bois at the mouth of the Trieux River, in order to supply the garrisons on the Channel Islands. (35)

An ultimatum to surrender was extended to the German commander in Paimpol by General Earnest at 1550 hours on 14 August but it was declined. (36) The Ile a Bois was bombed by air support at 1806 hours, and enemy troops were forced to evacuate the island.

ASSAULT ON LEZARDRIEUX AND PAIMPOL

A tank destroyer, cavalry, and engineer team began a reconnaissance in force at 1130 hours on 15 August and engaged the enemy near Lezardrieux at 1305 hours. Defenses on the outskirts were forced by light tanks of the 15th Cavalry, but all vehicles were barred entrance to the town by mine fields. Infantry units moved in and, after heavy fighting, overcame resistance at 1900 hours. Prisoners totalled 364, with an estimated 200 escaping to the north. TFA's losses were two killed and four wounded.

Mop up of the area northeast of the Treguier-Lezardrieux highway between the Jaudy and Trieux Rivers continued on 16 August, and strong points at Pleubian (9841) and Lamodez (0041) were reduced by elements of TFA.

The remainder of TFA secured a crossing of the Trieux River at Lezardrieux and established a screen line across the base of the Paimpol peninsula, extending from Pontrieux (8525) and Lanleff (0424) to Plehedel (0624), which shut off all enemy escape from the area.

Assault of the Paimpol area was planned for the following day, 17 August, but steady progress against an enemy-held strong point west of Plounez (3302) influenced the decision to attack late on the afternoon of 16 August. (37)

Elements of TFA were committed at 1730 hours on 16 August in an attack on the west flank of the position. The Plounez position quickly collapsed and 100 prisoners were captured.

Operations on 17 August were of the mop-up type, and only light resistance was met in Paimpol and the peninsula extending east to the Point de Guilben. Organized resistance was over in the Paimpol area by 1200 hours on 17 August.

Low morale of the enemy personnel was evident here, as a much more stubborn defense was possible. A total of 300 rocket projectors, fully loaded, were sited in the woods around Paimpol, but were not fired and were left unprotected to await capture. (38)

Task force casualties on 16-17 August amounted to one killed and 20 wounded, while 231 prisoners were secured in the Plounez-Paimpol area, to bring the total of the four-day's campaign, since the attack on Treguier, to 987.

In regrouping for a mission to secure and hold bridges, and establish patrols between Landivisiau (3710) and Landerneau (1304), the 15th Cavalry relieved the 17th Cavalry of the mission of safeguarding the bridges at Morlaix. TFA moved on 18 August to a new bivouac area, three miles west of Landivisiau.

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The bridges spanning the Elorn River were secured intact, and infantry, supported by tank destroyers were placed on guard at each bridge. Continuous patrolling of the Landivisiau-Landerneau road was carried out and a daily reconnaissance was made to Chateaulin (2275) and Pleyben (3278), without enemy contact. (39)

DEVELOPMENT OF PLOUGASTEL-DAOULAS PENINSULA

The 15th Cavalry rejoined the main force of TFA on 19 August and took part in the extension of patrols on 20 August to the Plougastel-Daoulas peninsula. The task force moved to the vicinity of Kerantoux (1399) and began plans for a reconnaissance in force of the peninsula after contacts with small enemy groups were made by patrols operating as far west as Loperhet (0897). Reconnaissance by cavalry units during the morning of 21 August fixed the enemy MLR. German mortar and artillery positions were located. Penetration of patrols beyond the line was stopped by machine gun fire from heavy concrete emplacements.

The enemy's main line exploited terrain features of this portion of the peninsula to the utmost. The northern extremity was anchored on the 50-foot bluffs running along the south bank of the Elorn River Estuary. The line followed the eastern slopes of Hill 154 (0699) on which were emplaced concentrations of heavy and light machine guns and mortars. It extended south and east along ridge tops to the village of Loperhet and then southeasterly through a hilly and wooded section to the town of Daoulas (1194) where the south flank was protected by the Daoulas River.

German artillery, largely 88mm guns, had registered on all road intersections facing the line. Movement of task force patrols through the net of secondary roads became difficult due to the fire accurately directed from the OP's established on the ridges.

It was clear that an infantry assault would be needed to penetrate the hostile line. While TFA was making preparations for a reconnaissance in force, VIII Corps decided to form TF "B" to reduce the resistance on the Plougastel-Daoulas Peninsula.

TFB became operational at 1200 hours on 21 August under command of Brigadier General James A. Van Fleet, Assistant Division Commander of the 2d Infantry Division. It was given the mission of clearing the Daoulas peninsula and protecting the left flank of VIII Corps.

General Earnest's task force was included in the TFB command. (40) TFA was ordered to take over the 50th Armored Infantry Bn., with the 83rd Armored Field Artillery Bn, in support, and operate on the southern flank.

The 3d Bn., 330th Infantry Regiment, with Battery C, 323rd Field Artillery Bn., had been deployed in front of Hill 154 on the morning of 21 August. These units were attached to TFB for the attack on the north flank of the line. Companies B and C of the 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion were in support of the attack on the north.

Other elements operating under the new task force included the 38th Infantry Regiment; Hq., 174th Field Artillery Group, the 2d and 561st Field Artillery Bns., Co. A, 68th Tank Bn.; Co. A, 603rd Tank Destroyer Bn., with engineer and medical attachments.

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TFB moved to secure Hill 154 on the morning of 22 August and immediately was engaged in heavy close-in fighting. TFA elements advanced westward against moderate resistance, captured the town of Loperhet, and secured Le Faou (1687). A screen of patrols was continued on the left flank as far south as Chateaulin. (41)

In continued heavy fighting on 23 August, TFB captured Hill 154, while TFA extended the cavalry screen as far south as Rosnoen (1583). The remainder of TFA moved west from Loperhet to within $2\frac{1}{2}$ kilometers of the village of Plougastel-Daoulas on to a line extending from (070960) to (065977).

The advance of TFA on 24 August was continued against light resistance and gains of approximately 1,000 yards were made in the direction of Plougastel-Daoulas (0397). Cavalry reconnaissance was continued to Chateaulin and throughout the Terrenez peninsula.

Cavalry squadron units and the TD reconnaissance company extended the patrolling of the Crozon peninsula as far south as Douarnenez (0365) on 25 August. Estimates from French resistance forces placed approximately 10,000 enemy troops in the Crozon area.

Infantry and attached elements of TFA operating in the Plougastel-Daoulas peninsula continued a steady advance against light opposition, with gains of 1,200 yards being made.

Group A, of TFA, composed of the Cavalry Group, with the reconnaissance company and Co. A of the 705th TD Bn and one platoon of Co. A, 35th Engineer Combat Bn, which replaced the 159th Engineer Combat Bn. in TFA during the Plougastel operation, moved on the morning of 26 August to establish a counter reconnaissance screen extending from Kergouan (0972) along the stream to St. Giles (1273) following the stream to Launay Coffee (0473) along the stream junction at (162725) to Gorre Toulhoat (1774) to Kerrot (1775), Le Rest (1777), Dineault (1778), and Cincily (2078). The screen was established but no contact with the enemy was made. (42)

Attack on the western part of the Daoulas peninsula was resumed at 0800 hours, 26 August, but no progress was made in the face of artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons fire from Hill 63 (0494). Efforts in the late afternoon to take the hill failed when advance units were pinned down by machine gun fire from its south slope. (43)

Tank destroyer and engineer elements of TFA were pinched out by the TFB advance down the narrowing peninsula during the afternoon of 27 August, and reverted to control of TFA. The 50th Infantry with Co. B, 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion attached, remained to operate with TFB. TFA casualties on the Daoulas peninsula amounted to six killed and 28 wounded. A total of 69 prisoners were taken by TFA on this peninsula.

THE DRIVE ON MENEZ HOM

Further penetration of Crozon Peninsula by patrols on the afternoon of 27 August uncovered enemy troops on Hill Menez Hom (1279), with an outpost line established along the southeast and northeast slopes. (44)

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The hill, 330 feet in elevation, was the dominating terrain feature of the entire peninsula and commanded observation of all approaches. The hill rose steeply from the Aulne River at the northern edge of the peninsula through a thickly wooded section, cut by small streams and sharp defiles. Small fields with thick hedgerows were found on the gentler southwestern slopes, toward the Bay of Douarnenez. The principal road, Highway N787, extended through the center of the peninsula from Chateaulin through the town of Crozon (9383) and circled Menez Hom about half way up its southern slopes.

Cavalry patrols on 28 August probed to the base of the hill and past it on the south to reach the Bay of Douarnenez at Kergors (0875). Continued probing brought the capture of 32 prisoners, all Russians, on the north and south sides of the hill.

The assault of the cavalry squadrons, attacking abreast on either side of Highway 787, ran into heavy artillery, machine gun, and mortar fire across the southwestern slopes from (110780) to (100770) on the morning of 29 August. They were unable to penetrate beyond this line. (45) Fifty Russian prisoners gave themselves up, but resistance stiffened throughout the day, and an enemy counterattack was delivered at 1850 hours. It was stopped without the loss of appreciable ground.

Action to 1200 hours on 30 August was limited to patrols, with no movement of main forces on either side. Air support subjected the enemy positions to heavy bombing and strafing, and in the afternoon a reconnaissance in force definitely established a strongly prepared line extending from Landrein (0775) around the eastern base of the hill to Brigneur (1480) on the Aulne River estuary.

Resistance from this line was heavy in the early afternoon, but indications of disintegration were apparent at nightfall. Russians, in small groups, finally totaling 106, filtered into TFA lines and surrendered. They brought reports of other Russians on the north slopes of the hill engaging Germans in battle. (46)

TFA patrols at 1800 hours advanced on the northern slopes of Menez Hom almost to the crest, as the fighting between Germans and Russians continued. A Russian unit of one officer and 35 men killed several Germans and delivered 20 as prisoners. The group returned to the enemy lines, reduced another pocket of enemy, and freed other Russians. Through the aid of this unit, 132 Prisoners were taken in the vicinity of Brigneur during the day. (47)

As a result of the gap made in the German line by the desertion of the Russian troops, the enemy withdrew to the line (017861), (011850), (020842), (020893), (009819), (015811), and (013798). (48) General Earnest requested a battalion of infantry from VIII Corps to enable him to exploit this withdrawal, but none was available to reinforce the task force at that time.

Three companies of Russians, Poles, Caucasians, and Luftwaffe troops were left behind the retreating Germans to fight rear guard actions. Cavalry patrols advanced against little resistance with the main forces following closely behind. Hill Menez Hom fell at 1505 hours, and patrols at nightfall on 1 September advanced to a line running across the peninsula from (040782) to (091853). A total of 324 prisoners were taken during the day. (49)

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Task force casualties during this four day period of fighting on the Crozon Peninsula were one killed, 35 wounded, and three missing.

The advance, resumed on 2 September, met little opposition until a hostile outpost line was encountered. This line roughly approximated the 02 north-south grid line. Patrols were stopped by medium artillery, mortar, and light machine gun fire.

Patrol operations continued on the morning of 3 September, and one platoon of Troop A, 17th Cavalry, entered the town of Telgruc (0381). A heavy bombardment and strafing of the town by friendly air support caught the platoon and inflicted numerous casualties. (50) Slow progress was made throughout the balance of the day against defended road blocks and mine fields.

Enemy artillery fire limited activity on 4 September to patrol activity along the line of (990809), (01984), and (010860).

MLR CONTAINED

The progress of Task Force "A" on Crozon peninsula was completely stopped by the enemy main line of resistance. This was described at the end of the operation by General Middleton as follows: "In all my military experience, I have never seen anything quite so good as the fortifications in the Crozon area. They are the most highly organized I have ever seen."

The enemy main line faced open ground on the north flank, and low, swampy ground on the southern flank, and both offered good fields of fire. Fire lanes were cleared for light and heavy machine guns and numerous observation points in the hilly terrain provided for accurate direction of mortar and light and medium artillery fire. (51)

The enemy artillery concentration was heavy in the northern sector of the line, particularly from the vicinity of the airfield (9787), where one 155mm, two 105mm, and two 75mm batteries were located. (52)

Elements of the 804th Anti-aircraft Artillery Bn. defended the central sector with two batteries of 88mm flak guns, one 105mm, one 76.2mm, and one 75mm batteries, and light machine guns and mortars were located behind road blocks and barbed wire.

Mine fields and wire were thick in the southern sector with strong points organized around block houses. Artillery included one 105mm and four 77mm batteries, and at least five mortar positions.

TFA COMES UNDER NINTH ARMY

The Task Force passed to control of the Ninth U.S. Army on 5 September, when VIII Corps was attached to that Army.

It was impossible for sufficient infantry to be diverted to the Crozon Peninsula. At this time, the 2d, 8th, and 29th Infantry Divisions were fully committed to the attack on Brest.

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Elements of TFB had by now returned to support the Brest assault. The Daoulas Peninsula was cleared of enemy resistance on 30 August. The 50th Armored Infantry and the 3rd Bn., 330th Infantry with attachments, remained there to provide against possible re-occupation from the Brest garrison.

TFA immediately set up a counter reconnaissance screen to contain the enemy west of the line extending from St. Efléz (9985), St. Laurent (9883), and Keradenec (9682). The almost total absence of an east-west road net in the sector immediately facing the enemy line made the organization of dismounted patrols necessary. Approximately 350 cavalry troops were dismounted and employed as infantry. Their personal weapons of carbines and sub-machine guns were not practical for this purpose, and request was made for rifles to adequately arm them. (53)

Dismounted patrols made contact with the fortified line on 5 September, but withdrew to allow a bombardment of located strong points by fighter-bombers.

An attack on the positions was made the following day, after tank destroyer units fired a heavy barrage. It served only to drive in the enemy outposts, and no penetration of the main line was made. (54)

The task force was, by necessity, committed to a security mission until reinforcements could be made available and moved to the peninsula. (57) This was carried out by constant probing of the enemy line with small patrols, but never with sufficient force to invite a counterattack on a large scale. Tank destroyers were employed for daily harassing fire. Fighter-bombers were continuously in the air, weather permitting, during this period, and strong points in the vicinity of St. Laurent and the air field were given heavy poundings.

8TH INFANTRY DIVISION ARRIVES

This situation continued through 13 September. By 12 September, the 8th Infantry Division was pinched out of the Brest operation and given the mission of clearing the Crozon Peninsula. Preparations were made for the move on 14 September. However, the 2d Battalion, 28th Infantry Regiment, was sent to Crozon on the night of 13 September to be held in reserve in event of a German attack. (58)

The mission given TFA was to maintain contact between the 28th and 121st Regiments, and mop up enemy resistance left behind the infantry advance in the valley of the Rau de Keroch.

The task force was relieved in the center of the peninsula on 17 September by the 2d Ranger Battalion and withdrew to an assembly area southeast of the town of Crozon and prepared to attack to the south and southwest to clear the Cap de la Chevre sub-peninsula. (59)

TFA, with the 83rd Armored Field Artillery Bn., less one battery, in support, moved at 1100 hours, 18 September, to clear enemy resistance from the Cap de la Chevre. Rapid progress down the 7,500 yard length of the sub-peninsula was made, and the scattered strong points and light to moderate small arms fire were overcome by a combat team consisting of the Cavalry Group, Companies A and B of the 35th Engineers and 1st and 2d platoons of Company A, tank destroyers.

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Hasty fortifications had been undertaken by the enemy, but the peninsula had been kept under constant artillery fire during the night of 17 September, and full organization of ground defenses was impeded.

By 1730 hours, penetration to the strongly fortified southern tip of the Cap de la Chevre was made, and contact with a member of the staff of General Rausch, commander of the 343rd Infantry Division, was made by Capt. Nelson. The surrender of General Rausch, with his staff, was received at 1800 hours by General Earnest, and organized resistance on the sub-peninsula ceased at this point. Further mop-up of scattered enemy groups was continued the following morning.

From the entrance of the 8th Division in the Crozon fighting, on 15 September, the task force suffered only four casualties, three killed and one wounded, with two of the fatalities coming on the final day of action. Prisoners taken by TFA during the entire operations on Crozon totaled 1,679.

DOUARNENEZ PENINSULA

The 121st Infantry Regiment took over the security of the Crozon sub-peninsula on the morning of 19 September, and TFA moved to the vicinity of Plonevez-Porzay (1168) to clean up an enemy force composed principally of marines and estimated to number 250. The enemy was concentrated in the Douarnenez Peninsula, south of the town of Audierne (8759). Patrols during the afternoon of 19 September advanced west of the town of Douarnenez along roads in the central and northern parts of the peninsula as far as Point du Raz without gaining contact.

Several previous requests for surrender had been transmitted to the commander of the troops by members of prisoner of war interrogation teams, and had been refused, but a further effort was made on the night of 19 September. Major Johnson met the German commander in Audierne and presented a letter from General Earnest demanding surrender.

The offer was refused and Major Johnson gave until 0800 hours, 20 September, for reconsideration. No attack on the strongly fortified German position was to be made until that time.

Movement toward the position began the morning of 20 September at 0600 hours, with half of the 15th Cavalry Squadron followed by the tank destroyers and engineers on Highway N165 through Confort (9661), Point Croix (9160) to Audierne.

Remaining elements of the 15th Cavalry Squadron followed a route along the northern part of the peninsula through Poullan (9764), Beuzac (8964), as far west as Lannuign (8662), where the route of march was changed to the south and southwest, in the direction of Audierne. The 17th Cavalry Squadron followed this northern route to Lannuign (8662), and then fanned out with patrols extending to the western tip of the peninsula. The 17th Cavalry then advanced on Audierne from the west, prepared to participate in the assault.

The 83rd Field Artillery took up positions east of the Goaven River extending from (930590) to (920555).

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A fifteen minute artillery preparation began at 1145 hours, after fighter-bomber air support missions had been requested for 0930 hours. The planes did not arrive until 1300 hours, when it was impossible to use them as planned, due to the presence of TFA troops in the target area. (61)

At 1350 hours, tank destroyer units supported dismounted engineers in the removal of the first road block barring entrance to the area, which included the southern outskirts of Audierne. The obstacle, of logs, barbed wire, and mines, was removed without damaging small arms fire being received.

No indications of the enemy's willingness to defend the position were apparent, and after the removal of the road block, the first group of enemy, totaling 27, emerged from an underground shelter and surrendered. Other groups put up white flags as cavalry, engineers, and tank destroyers moved quickly through successive road blocks and barricades to the central strong-point of well-sited and camouflaged gun positions and pill boxes.

The position was entirely mopped up within an hour and a half, with 322 prisoners taken, a majority of whom were marines. (62) There were no American casualties. (63)

No casualties were sustained by enemy troops, who took cover in reinforced concrete dugouts throughout the artillery preparation and remained there when TFA advanced, evidently in expectation of a bombing and strafing attack from fighter-bombers, which by this time had arrived, and circled the area through the remainder of the operation.

The task force returned to the Plonevez-Porzay bivouac for the night of 20 September, and the following day moved to the vicinity of Bodilis (2312), where by VIII Corps order, it was dissolved, effective at 1200 hours on 22 September.

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FOOTNOTES

1. FO No. 9, VIII Corps, 1 August.
2. FO No. 1, TFA, 0200, 2 August.
3. General Earnest; Instructions, TFA, 1 August.
4. G-3 Journal, No. 13, 2 August.
5. General Earnest to Lt. Hart, 13 September.
6. G-3 Periodic Report, 1200, 3 August.
7. Colonel Reybold was checking and following movements of his troops toward Dol and was last seen by Major Hellier, Group S3, with the point of the leading cavalry squad at the time contact with the enemy was made. No further confirmed report concerning Colonel Reybold had been received, but his vehicle, riddled by .50 caliber machine gun bullets, was later found just east of Dol. Lieutenant Colonel Cadenhead to Lt. Tucker, 24 September.
8. G-3 Journal No. 7, 1255, 3 August.
9. Lt. Haggerty to Lt. Hart, 13 September.
10. Situation report No. 3, 1300, 4 August.
11. "The road block consisted of angled steel bars placed in concrete in the road, with concrete barricades on either side. It was impossible to bypass the road block, as a ditch, impassable to anything but foot troops, ran parallel to the front.

"The infantry company that attacked the previous afternoon was rather badly shot up after moving only 600 yards in the afternoon's action. It was imperative that this road block, which barred entrance into Chateaufneuf, be removed before we could successfully reach the objective.

"The reconnaissance company was formed into dismounted troops, and an engineer platoon was attached for the attempt to remove the block. Many of the reconnaissance troops were killed and wounded, and it was necessary to send up support. Additional dismounted patrols were formed from the security and headquarters company, mortars were moved to a position a few hundred yards from the road block, and 15 to 18 - 76mm self-propelled guns went forward and fired direct fire into the block and supporting positions to enable the engineers to move forward.

"Enemy small arms fire harassed our foot troops to the extent that they were unable to remove the road block and a light tank from the 15th Cavalry was sent forward with a group of engineers riding on it. They were able to place a TNT charge in the block, but even this did not demolish the obstruction.

"I then ordered an M32 retriever tank to crush the road block, and this means proved successful, as all the blasting previously had removed the temper from the rails, and the retriever was able to move on over them. The road block was removed at approximately 1500 hours, and the town was occupied shortly thereafter." Lt. Col. Templeton to Lt. Tucker, 21 September.

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12. Situation Report No. 10, 2400, 5 August.
13. Situation Report No. 11, 0600, 6 August.
14. Lt. Haggerty to Lt. Hart, 15 September.
15. FO No. 4, TFA, 1159, 6 August.
16. Lt. Col. Quinn to Lt. Tucker.
17. Lt. Haggerty's notes, 7 August.
18. Situation Report No. 16, 2400, 7 August.
19. G3 Journal No. 40, 0030, 8 August.
20. G3 Journal No. 36, 1645, 8 August.
21. Lt. Col. Quinn to Lt. Tucker, 21 September.
22. Major Johnson to Lt. Hart, 13 September.
23. Major Newberry to Lt. Tucker, 20 September.
24. Major Johnson, leading a column of five light tanks and three trucks, which were replacements and were unmanned except for ordnance drivers, was attempting to rejoin the main body of Task Force "A".

French civilians stopped the column at the village of Plounevez-Moedec (7311) and informed Major Johnson that German troops were blocking the highway ahead. One tank crew was organized out of ordnance drivers, and the remainder of the convoy was left in the town, protected by French troops, and the tank set out to make contact with the enemy.

Terrain became too rough for the tank to move further, and Major Johnson started alone on foot, carrying a white panel. Upon making contact with the German troops, he convinced them their plight was hopeless and secured the surrender of the entire unit, totaling four officers and 107 enlisted men.

Major Johnson was recommended for the Bronze Star for this action. Lt. Haggerty to Lt. Hart, 20 September.

25. G-3 Journal No. 54, 2100, 9 August.
26. Situation Report No. 36, 2400, 10 August.
27. G3 Journal No. 52, 1810, 10 August.
28. Situation Report No. 36, 1800, 11 August.
29. Lt. Haggerty's notes, 11 August.
30. Capt. Nelson to Lt. Hart, 20 September.
31. FO No. 9, TFA, 1700, 12 August.
32. Situation Report No. 38, 1200, 13 August.
33. FO No. 10, 2300, 13 August.
34. Situation Report No. 43, 2400 14 August.
35. G-3 Journal No. 21, 1530, 14 August.
36. G-3 Journal No. 90, 1550, 14 August.
37. General Earnest to Lt. Hart, 15 September.
38. Lt. Monaco to Lt. Hart, 14 September.
39. FO No. 16, TFA, 1130, 29 August.
40. Memo to CG, TFA, from Gen. Van Fleet, 21 August.
41. Situation Report No. 73, 1200, 22 August.
42. FO No 21, TFA, 2200, 26 August.
43. G3 Journal No. 91, 2400, 27 August.
44. Situation Report No. 97, 1200, 28 August.
45. Situation Report No. 103, 2400, 29 August.

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46. IPW Team Report, 31 August.
47. Capt. Nelson to Lt. Hart, 14 September.
48. Ibid.
49. Situation Report No. 115, 2400, 1 September.
50. Capts. Joseph M. Levine and Philip M. Stark, of 35th Engineer Bn., and 2nd Lt. Harold T. McKenna and six enlisted men of the 17th Cavalry were killed. Three officers and 21 enlisted men of the 17th Cavalry Squadron were wounded. Approximately 50 French civilians were killed.-- Report of 429th Collecting Co. 3 September.
51. Capt. Nelson to Lt. Hart, 12 September.
52. G-2 Overlay to accompany FO No. 26, TFA.
53. Lt. Haggerty to Lt. Hart, 12 September.
54. G-3 Periodic Report, 1200, 6 September.
55. Lt. Col. Templeton to Lt. Hart, 11 September.
56. General Earnest to Lt. Hart, 12 September.
57. Only after the strong German defensive line stabilized the fighting on Crozon and committed TFA to a period of infantry patrolling, did the troops have time fully to care for their personal needs.

For the previous month, in the rapidly moving advance only odd moments were available for the maintenance of machines and personal hygiene of men.

In the traditional custom of the cavalry, "mounts" had the first priority. First and second echelon maintenance was carried out piecemeal whenever a few minutes offered opportunity to check or inspect one or more operations. Thus when night fell every vehicle had received all of its required services. This care was reflected in the total absence of mechanical failures.

Men maintained a high standard of personal cleanliness although baths, other than the helmet variety, were unknown until late in the campaign. Ingenuity provided hot water for shaving when the situation made it impossible to have fires or use the small stoves issued to units. Canteens were hung at the ends of exhaust pipes to make boiling water available in a short time.

After Crozon was reached, regular hot meals were served to all units and B rations were available for the menu. Prior to that time, the men ate rations from 10-in-1 packs, often cold, but usually with hot coffee. The men were able to supplement their rations by obtaining eggs, butter and bread from the French.--Interviews by Lt. Hart.

58. Lt. Colonel Cadenhead to Lt. Hart, 13 September.
59. Lt. Colonel Beck, 8th Div. G-3 to General Earnest, 1845, 17 September.
60. Major Johnson to Lt. Hart, 20 September.
61. Report of Lt. Colonel Cadenhead on air support, 20 September.
62. Prisoners of War statistics by operations:

<u>Place</u>	<u>Number</u>
Dol, Chateaufneuf, St. Malo	275
St. Brieuc	390
Morlaix	397

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<u>Place</u>	<u>Number</u>
Lesneven	550
Guingamp	398
Lannion-St. Michel	589
Penvenen-Treguier-Lazardrieux	756
Paimpol-Plouez	231
Plougastel Peninsula	69
Crozon Peninsula	1679
Douarnenez Peninsula	<u>322</u>
Total	5656

List furnished to Lt. Hart by Capt. Nelson, 21 September, 63
TFA killed and wounded from 1 August to 22 September were by days.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>
1-8 Aug.	21	42
9 Aug.	1	7
10 Aug.	1	6
11 Aug.	2	6
12 Aug.	2	6
13 Aug.	2	0
14 Aug.	1	0
15 Aug.	1	4
16 Aug.	0	12
17 Aug.	1	8
18 Aug.	0	1
19 Aug.	0	1
20 Aug.	1	6
22 Aug.	0	1
23 Aug.	2	11
25 Aug.	1	2
26 Aug.	2	7
27 Aug.	0	1
28 Aug.	0	8
29 Aug.	0	11
30 Aug.	0	6
31 Aug.	0	3
1 Sept.	1	6
3 Sept.	9	24
4 Sept.	1	1
5 Sept.	0	1
6 Sept.	0	2
8 Sept.	1	3
9 Sept.	0	8
11 Sept.	0	2
12 Sept.	1	0
13 Sept.	1	4
14 Sept.	0	1
15 Sept.	1	0
18 Sept.	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
Total	55	201

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Casualty tabulations from S-1 records of Major Johnson, 22 September.
64. Lt. Hart.

M A P S

St. Brieuc - Rennes	1:200,000 road map. Sheet 59
Brest - Quimper	1:200,000 road map. Sheet 58
Avranches 6 G/1	1:50,000
Granville 6 F/5	1:50,000
Antrain 6 G/3	1:50,000
Dol-De-Bretagne 5 G/2	1:50,000
Combourg 5 G/4	1:50,000
St. Malo 5 G/1	1:50,000
Dinan 5 G/3	1:50,000
Lamballe 4 G/4	1:50,000
St. Brieuc 4 F/6	1:50,000
Guingamp 4 G/1	1:50,000
Quintin 4 G/3	1:50,000
Belle Ile En Terre 3 G/2	1:50,000
Carhaix 3 G/4	1:50,000
Sizun 3 G/3	1:50,000
Morlaix 3 G/1	1:50,000
Lannion 3 F/6	1:50,000
St. Pal-de-Leon 3 F/5	1:50,000
Plonguerneau 2 F/6	1:50,000
Landerneau 2 G/2	1:50,000
Trequier 4 F/5	1:50,000
Ile Brehat 4 F/3	1:50,000
Chateaulin 3 G/5	1:50,000
Donarnenez 2 G/6	1:50,000
Ile-de-Sein 2 G/5	1:50,000
Quimper 2 H/2	1:50,000

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NOTES OF GENERAL EARNEST, CG OF TASK FORCE A.

RECAPITULATION

OPERATIONS OF TASK FORCE A

- 1 Aug 44: TFA began assembling vicinity Equilly (?T1799). Gen. Patton outlined plan and instructed Gen. Earnest to report to Gen. Middleton.
- 2 Aug 44: Troops assembled and FO No. 10 received from VIII Corps.
- 3 Aug 44: TFA left bivouac, moved south to Ayranches at 0200 hours. Contact with enemy at (FO28029) at 0710 hrs vic Dol. By-passed resistance and moved SW.
- 4 Aug 44: TF probed toward St. Malo. Probed to a line south of Chateauneuf and established Cav Screen. Reinf by Inf RCT.
- 5 Aug 44: TFA broke through defenses south of Chateauneuf. TF withdrew from mission against St. Malo, assembled in vicinity of Le Vx Bourg, at 2200 hours.
- 6 Aug 44: Resumed advance on Brest at 0600. TF occupied St. Brieuc at 2205 hrs. Enemy had withdrawn to west.
- 7 Aug 44: Enemy infantry defense position overrun at Chateleaudren, at 1200 hrs. Reduced enemy resistance and strongpoints in Guingamp. Resistance ceased at 2000 hrs.
- 8 Aug 44: In contact with enemy at Morlaix at 1350 hrs. Resistance ceased 1700.
- 9 Aug 44: Cav trains attacked at Plouguineau 0930 hrs. Atk repulsed at 1245.
- 10 Aug 44: Closed into bivouac area vicinity Lesneven. Contact with enemy Plougerneau at 1320. Resistance Plougerneau ceased 1630, 500 prisoners.
- 11 Aug 44: Secured beaches St. Michel-en-Greve 1200 hrs. Three LST's landed 1215 hrs. No enemy resistance.
- 12 Aug to
- 14 Aug 44: TF continued mop up and security mission.
- 14 Aug 44: Engaged enemy Treguier at 1600. Resistance in Treguier ceased at 2400 hrs.



DOUARNENEZ PENINSULA--TASK FORCE "A"--705 TANK DESTROYER BN--20 SEP 1944

Audierne



COMBAT ENGINEERS SUPPORTING 705 TANK DESTROYER BN, 20 SEP 44.