HEADQUARTERS
60th Tank Destroyer Battalion

APC 1403
30 November 1944

SUBJECT: After Action Reports
Against the Enemy

TO: The Adjutant General, Washington, D.C.

SECTION I - SUMMARY OF DAILY OPERATIONS AND ACTION.

SECTION II - INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS, USE OF SECTION'S, ETC.

SECTION III - LOGISTICS, SUPPLY PROCEDURES, PROBLEMS.

SECTION IV - PERSONNEL AND ALLIED ATTACHMENTS.

SECTION V - COMENDS, OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

SECTION I. SUMMARY OF DAILY OPERATIONS AND ACTION.

1. 1 November 1944. "A" Company in direct support 319th Infantry. Supported attack of 319th to clear out area made by hook in LA SELLA; MUR (S and 2 of river) by delivering both direct and indirect fires. First and 3rd Platoons moved to positions and delivered direct fire on FALL, LIETENANT, A1 (21), 21AIGNEUR, FALL, and the area of "C" and "D", expending 175 rds of APC. Second Plat delivered 101 rds of indirect preparatory fires and 117 rds of direct on 9 missions throughout day and night. Results of operations: 319th accomplished mission, "A" Company captured 5 prisoners. "B" and "C" Companies continued to provide defense for 318th and 317th Infantry regiments, respectively, with two Platoons each, one Flat from each company firing indirect harassing and interdictory fires; expended 282 rds of indirect fire on 23 missions.

2. 2 November - 23 November 1944. During this period 8th Division attacked to N and E, crossing LA SELLA; MUR, and pushing to the MURCELAGE LINE via ROLACH and the LINE 112-1430. Area, a distance of approximately 35 kilometers. Battalion was employed with one company attached to each T: "A" Company to 315th, "B" Company to 316th, and "C" Company to 317th. One section of each Ron Plat attached to each line company, 2d Section, 2d Plat in reserve. Initially "A" and "B" Companies were under regimental control, but under battalion control, a Flat attached to each Infantry BN. In the morning of the attack, 8 November, "B" and "C" Companies delivered direct supporting fire, expending 170 rds of indirect. "C" Company ceded with knocking out four pill boxes and two mortars. "A" Company (1st and 2d Platoons, attached to 903 PA 8th, 1/4 in) fired 192 rds of indirect fire as part of arty preparation. "B" and "C" Companies crossed the river the afternoon of the 8th. On the 9th "A" Company delivered the attack delivering both direct and indirect fires, expending 115 rds of 432 mm and 17 rds of indirect, knocked out enemy 66 mm gun at range of 2500 rds. Displaced across river with 318th. "B" Company's 1st Plat was caught by rising water of LA SELLA; MUR and half its guns and vehicles were temporarily stranded. "C" Company moved with advance of 317th and knocked out two 50 mm guns at range of 2500 and 2200 rds, killing 10 enemy. On 13 November "B" Company knocked out another 60 mm gun. 15 November, 1st and 2d Platoons "A" Company relieved attachment to 905th PA 8th, one Plat attached to each Infantry BN. 20 November, Ron Platoons in reserve. 22 November, 1st Ron...
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Flot assigned mission of road reconnaissance to "A" and "B". During advance of division company provided 2d and defense, moving with advance and taking positions always safe to the front. In one instance "A" Co carried infantry in half-tracks into town and provided covering fire with 50 cal M1s. A total of 113 prisoners were captured during this operation.

3. 30 November - 30 November 1944. During this operation Division breached the SHAFFER LINE. 115th INFANTRY replaced 110th INFANTRY and pushed on to VIC. ARMSVILLE. On Div order "A" relieved of an attachment to 31st and attached to 30th Div Arty, "prepared to Spf Atk on Forts of IX TROOPS FIRE by direct fire." Companies attack to S/2 PA Rcn: "A" to 90th FA, "B" to 311th FA and "C" to 313th FA. On the 8th Sptd Atk with 1st and 2d Platoons (minus base piece of each) of "D", Co and one section of 1st and 2d Platoons of "B" Co in direct fire positions; remaining guns of "A" and "B" Companies and "C" Company occupied indirect positions. 2h 5 rds 405 and 139 rds APC direct fire were delivered on Forts, rail box and targets of opportunity; "A" Co also fired 20 Can 3" Spf Atk. 30 known enemy killed. 278 rds 405 were fired indirect on 14 missions. During remainder of period companies disposed with 2/3 battalions and delivered indirect reinforcing fire, occupying a total of 2160 rds on 100 missions. On 29 November a small tank threat developed and "C" Company moved its 3d Plt and two guns of the 2d Plt into direct fire positions.

SECTION II. INTELLIGENCE OF RENOS, USE OF SECTIONS, ETC.

1. 30 October 1944. In preparation to crossing the SHAFFER LINE both Rec Plts were assigned the mission to reconnoiter the river for possible fords from OR to 101. The mission was accomplished by 1200 hours 3 November.

2. 8 November 1944. One section of Rec Plt was attached to each company to aid in crossing the SHAFFER LINE with mission to keep companies informed on movement of enemy front lines, condition of roads, and to sweep for mines around gun positions. Each section had direct communication with the company with which they worked. Information concerning any other company was sent over the battalion command net. 2d Sec of the 2d Rec Plt was held in 3d reserve.

12 November 1944. 2d Sec of 2d Rec Plt was attached to Company "A".

20 November 1944. Both Rec Plts were called under control of 3-2.

21 November 1944. 1st Rec Plt was assigned the mission to reconnoiter the roads YAKEY, OAK HILL, ROYALTY, WILLOW, WILLOW, and RED HICKORY to establish an OP in that area. At this time this area was very much exposed. Platoon was called in 1000 hours 22 November.

29 November 1944. 1st Rec Plt was assigned the mission to reconnoiter the roads north of 1 A Way and to contact the 22d Cavalry Squadron on our left. The 2d Rec Plt was assigned the mission to reconnoiter the roads to the SE from 1 A Way and to contact the units on our right. Both missions were completed by 1000 hours 29 November.

30 November 1944. 1st Rec Plt was assigned a route reconnaissance, 1 A Way, OAK HILL, 30th TAKING, CEP, ROYALTY, PART "Hawaiii", ALP. 2d Rec Plt assigned a zone reconnaissance of an area 3000 yards north east of 1 A Way. Both missions were completed by 1000 hrs.

2. Instructions. Between 3 and 6 November the 3-2 section gave classes to the Rec Plt on mine and firing devices, grenades, and the use of the mine sweeper.
On 13 November 192-2 section started publication of daily intelligence summary compiled from various sources, and Division G-2 reports and information gained from front gun companies and ten Flats. It also contained a short summary of the news of the Western Front. Distribution was made to each Flat.

3. Sources of information for this period.

(1) Division G-2 reports.
(2) Corps G-2 reports.
(3) Division Engineers.
(4) Gun Companies.
(5) Reconnaissance platoons.

4. Maps used for period.

Battle maps - 1:50,000
'' 1:25,000
Battle Map Maginot Line - 1:5,000

5. Codes for the period.

Division map code.

Slide for radio and telephone communication - new Slide code issued 5 November.

Geographical codes #3 and #4 published by Division.

SECTION III. LOGISTICS, SUPPLY PROCEDURE, PROBLEMS.

1. Logistics.

a. Ammunition expended from 1 November to 30 November inclusive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammunition</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; H.E.</td>
<td>6129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; H.E. (Reduced Charge)</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; APC</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 Cal. F.G.</td>
<td>2530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Cal. F.G.</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. Gasoline expended during period: 16,365 gallons.

c. Ration percentage consumed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ration</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;B&quot; Ration</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;10 in 1&quot;</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day Reserve &quot;G&quot;</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day Reserve &quot;K&quot;</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day Reserve &quot;10 in 1&quot;</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d. Vehicles and primary weapons replaced during period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vehicle</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Half Tracks</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; Guns</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/4-ton Truck</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Procedure.

a. General.
(1) In S-l remained a member of the forward C.P.

(?7) Company Supply Sergeants worked in rear echelon with Battalion Supply making frequent visits to companies and going forward to assist in determining losses involving such equipment, either organizational or individual.

(3) The communications officer controlled all items of Signal equipment requisitioned. Companies requested needs from him, be consolidated and worked with Battalion Supply crew in procuring and distributing equipment.

b. Class I.

(1) Battalion Supply continued to request rations from Division quartermaster daily using the strength of companies reported on morning reports.

(2) Battalion Supply drew rations from Division Class I Supply Point and delivered them to the companies at the Battalion Rear Echelon. In cases where company could not get truck back Battalion Supply delivered rations to Company C.P.

(3) Another day of reserve rations (10 in 1) was authorized during this period so that the companies were required to keep three days reserve ration on hand.

(4) On Thanksgiving Day every man in the Battalion was fed a "M" ration with turkey.

c. Class II.

(1) Battalion Supply accepted informal requisitions from companies. Company Supply Sergeants kept a record of individuals or platoons to which requisitioned items should be sent upon receipt.

(2) Battalion edited, consolidated and forwarded requisitions and in event items were not received on initial request, back-ordered for the companies.

(3) Upon receipt of items, Company Supply Sergeants tagged them for platoon and/or individual and sent them forward on the ration truck.

d. Class III.

(1) Daily reports of gasoline on hand were made to Division G-4 and the Battalion received allotments in accordance to requirements while this item was rationed. When units began to move in attack, required amounts were picked up daily from Division Class III Supply points.

(2) Can for can exchange was carried out within this Battalion whenever possible.
e. Class IV.

(1) Demolitions were requisitioned and received for use of Battalion Reconnaissance elements in clearing paths through mine fields.

f. Class V.

(1) Basic ammunition load was maintained at all times. Headquarters Company personnel and vehicles maintained the Division Supply and each line company drew its required amount from the Battalion Ammunition Dump with 1 1/2-ton ammunition vehicles.

g. Miscellaneous:

(1) Engineer Water Point locations were sent to Companies and water picked up by company kitchen trucks from these points.

(2) Motor vehicular maintenance.

   (a) Thousand and six-thousand mile checks were performed as normal when in a static position; when in movement they were completed at first opportunity.

   (b) Company motor maintenance crews travelled with the companies normally. During a portion of the period the company maintenance section worked several miles behind the Company C.P., but this lengthened the communication lines and slowed up the maintenance and evacuation of vehicles and was discontinued.

   (c) A mechanic from Battalion maintenance was kept with the forward C.P. to keep constant check on the C.P. vehicles. Any mechanical difficulties he could not fix were sent to the rear echelon for repair.

(3) Upon receipt of instructions from Third U. S. Army the following items of C.P.'s property were turned in:

   Apparatus, decon., 3 - gal.
   Alarm, gas
   Curtain, gasproof
   Disinfectant, gas, mask
   Impregnate, shoe
   Paint, liquid vesicant detector
   Fuser, liquid vesicant detector
   Sack, gas resistant
   Sign, gas warning

(4) Duffle bags and gas masks were moved for and as required to make them easily accessible to troops. Duffle bags of men killed in action were inventoried and personal effects forwarded to C.P. Effects.

(5) Evacuation

   (a) Vehicular evacuation was handled by the Battalion wrecker crew when Company maintenance could not evacuate.

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(b) Deceased were evacuated through Combat Teams which units were supporting.

(c) Prisoners were evacuated to Combat Team P.W. enclosures.

(d) In accordance with instructions from Third United States Army, socks were picked up from companies daily and turned into Division Class I Distributing Point.


a. Preparation of "B" ration was handicapped by a shortage of condiments, particularly salt.

b. Shortages of tires, tubes, and patches has made the job of "keeping them rolling" increasingly difficult for maintenance crews. The following list of shortages as of 30 November 1944 will help to elucidate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Short</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tires, 600 x 16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 750 x 20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 900 x 20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 900 x 16</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tubes, 600 x 16</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 750 x 20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 900 x 20</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 900 x 16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hot patches</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

c. Shortage of half-track winch cables (12 short in BN at end of period) made cross-country movement of guns more difficult.
SECTION IV. PERSONNEL AND ALLIED ADMINISTRATION (S-1)

1. Replacements.

a. During the period of this report the Battalion has drawn a total of thirty-two men from replacements pools.

b. The Battalion has had five (5) men killed, nineteen (19) wounded, twenty-nine (29) men hospitalized through sickness, fifteen (15) of which have been returned as replacements mentioned above.

2. Special Services.

a. From 1 November 1944 to 8 November 1944 one of the line companies continued to send approximately thirty (30) men to the rear echelon each day for baths, a motion picture, and passes to PONT-A-MOUSSON, a chance to listen to the radio, etc. The other two line companies during this period continued having a motion picture every other day, which was operated by Battalion Headquarters at the Company CP.

b. On or about 9 November the Division started attacking and pushing forward, and since that time the companies have been continually with the attacking forces with very little opportunity for shows or other forms of entertainment.

c. During the month the Battalion was allotted a quota of eight (8) enlisted men and one (1) officer for a forty-eight hour pass to Paris. These passes were divided among the companies equally and the men selected by lot.

3. Medals. During the month fourteen (14) recommendations for the Bronze Star were sent to the 80th Infantry Division, of which number eight (8) have been received and awarded to the men concerned. The men who have received the awards are: Sergeants Joseph J. Vetashick, Headquarters Company, John N Hooker, Company A; Corporals Jessie R. Walton, Boris Angoff, Company A; Tec 5 Marvin T Wilkes, Company A; Pfc's Brownie Woodlee, Headquarters Company, Bus McNeal, Company A; and Private Francis D. Lightfoot, Company A.

4. Graves Registration. The five (5) men killed were evacuated through the combat teams to which the companies were attached at the time.

5. Personnel Administration. The Personnel Section continued to operate with the 80th Infantry Division rear echelon and continued to handle most of the paper work for the companies and part of the paper work for the Battalion CP.
1. During initial part of period Army ammunition continued to be very
critical and sharply rationed. Consequently this BN and the tank BN attached to
division provided virtually all harassing and interdiction fires for the division.
The Army provided each company with a shell mark and the companies ran their
own position area surveys. The Army gave concentrations direct to
themselves by the company TDC. Occasionally Div Army gave concentrations direct to
the BN. In such cases BN plotted the concentrations and assigned them to the
appropriate company. Whenever visibility permitted the Artillery endeavored to register
the company by plane. However, because of the difficulty of observing the burst
of the 3" shell, it was frequently impossible to register in this manner.
Accordingly registration was usually accomplished by the company commander from a
forward CP using FD methods.

2. Normally in the 60th Division we have been employed to provide AT defense
with one company attached or in support of each Combat Team. In a fast moving
situation, as during the drive across the S XII RIVER to the MACNOT LINE, we have
found it advisable to have the platoons attached to the battalions rather than have
the company under regimental control. This, in effect, gives each platoon a
sector equivalent to the infantry battalion sector and enables the platoon to
occupy positions promptly as the infantry organizes an area, being well forward and
in position to repel any armored counter-attack. This method is particularly
effective in river crossings as the TD's cross with the battalion, usually immedi-
ately after the organic AT guns. On the other hand, when the company is under
regimental control there is difficulty in getting the TD's forward promptly,
obtaining necessary road priority, etc. In a defensive situation, however, the
better solution is to have the company under regimental control. This permits
better coordination of fields of fire, mutual support, etc.

3. In the reduction of fortified areas where the TD's are called upon to
deliver direct fires on pill boxes and emplacements and supporting fires, their
fires should be closely coordinated by the artillery and directed by observers
with the infantry. The observers may be the artillery observers or may be
furnished by the TD's, but it is essential that there be observers in front with
the infantry. In the reduction of the MACNOT LINE in the vicinity of ST AVOLD
each company was attached to a D/S artillery battalion. One company had two
platoons in direct fire positions and one in indirect positions supporting the
attack. The artillery battalion assigned sectors of fire for the platoons, letter-
ing each sector. The artillery observer called for direct fire (by radio) as the
situation required. The result was that the fires were extremely effective and
were delivered continually until the objectives were seized. One of the companies
was also employed to deliver direct fire but the B/S artillery battalion made no
effort to coordinate its fires with the result that the company was unable to fire
after the infantry had advanced into a tree line because of uncertainty as to the
location of our friendly troops. This experience emphasizes the fact that there
should be one centralized authority to coordinate the supporting fires.

4. The SCR 608 radio has been taken from Headquarters Company and each line
company given two 608's. This enables the company commander to use one radio at
his CP for his executive and at the same time maintain constant communication with
Battalion and his platoons wherever he may be. This has resulted in better
communications, since there is always one radio available in case of a breakdown.

5. We have prepared Graphical Firing Tables for 3" HE (Reduced Charge)
which were printed by the Topographical Engineer Battalion thru the offices of Lt.
Colonel Waldo Walker, XII Corps, ATC. We have fired 109 rounds of the reduced
charge ammunition.
6. Our 3-2 publishes a daily Intelligence Summary for the companies. The summary contains information on minefields, roads, general and specific enemy information, numbers of enemy captured, enemy material destroyed and items of general interest, including progress of the front. Sufficient copies are issued so that each platoon receives a copy. The men receive these reports with great interest, and they have been a prime factor in stimulating their interest in the "big picture".

7. Battalion maintenance made a grousers for a half-track. The supporting maintenance company (129th Ordnance Co) is now in the process of making enough for the battalion. Basis of issue: twenty grousers per half-track.

8. An electric arc welding unit should be issued to a T.P. En due to the large number of armored vehicles authorized.

9. When the Battalion was moving forward rapidly a "mobile" Battalion Ammunition Dump was tried with good success. The necessary vehicles were dispatched forward to a centrally located point and the coordinates of the location sent to the companies. The ammunition was issued to the companies off the 6 x 6's.

11. One unit in the organization turned one of its 1 1/2-ton vehicles into a gasoline vehicle, primarily, with all the cans in the company pooled. Thus the Company commander could dispatch gas as needed to his platoons and was always sure that in a moving situation he could take care of the platoon which had the least need.

11. In the attack, in close support of infantry, each platoon carried ten rounds of 75 mm with the normal fuse removed for quick application of fuse (1-10).