

HEADQUARTERS
701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION
APO 464, c/o Postmaster, N.Y., N.Y.

1 August 1944

SUBJECT: Intelligence Report

TO : Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C., (thru channels)

1. In compliance with the requirements of paragraph 10, AR 345-105, dated March 10, 1943, the following intelligence report of the 701st Tank Destroyer Battalion covering the period, 1 July 1944 to 31 July 1944, is herewith submitted.
2. The intelligence covered in this report are statements from the Unit Journal and the Battalion Dairy, and supporting evidence for said statements is attached.
3. Previous intelligence report submitted and including 30 June 1944.

For the Commanding Officers

Jesse B. Wray
JESSE B. WRAY
Capt., 701st T.D. Bn.
Adjutant.

INTELLIGENCE REPORT OF THE 701ST TANK DESTROYER BATTALION

Period - 1 July - 31 July 1944

Locations of 701st T.D. Bn. beginning of period:

Map - Italy, 1/50,000
Sheets 158-I, IV, GSGS 4229

Bn CP - 527127. Bn Trains - 594035
"A" Co - CP - 512122; A1 - 508161; A2 & 3 - 512122
"B" Co - CP - 604122; B1 & 2 - 602172; B3 - 624167
"C" Co - CP - 480140; C1 & 3 - 398220; C2 - 448176
Rcn Co - CP - 513125; 1st Rcn Plt. - 599090 (w/Co Mn);
2nd Plt. - 508162; 3rd Plt. - 504168

OUR OPERATIONS:

Initially the battalion was attached to the Howze Force, CC "A" and CC "B", but midway during the period was attached to the 88th Infantry Division. Little armor was encountered during the period, and our activity was directed mainly at personnel, machine gun nests, enemy strong points in houses, etc. During the period OP's were established and successfully directed fire upon enemy personnel and vehicles. On the 24th of July our

SECRET

units were relieved, and withdrawn from the line, returning to the First Armored Division bivouac area.

ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Armor: Throughout the period the enemy used armor sparingly, but always operating in groups of 2 or more. The enemy used his tanks during the period as a defensive weapon, using them occasionally in an offensive role. Mk VI's, IV's, and SP's were used in anti-tank and artillery roles, delaying our advancing forces as long as possible, and then retreating before our destroyers could bring effective fire upon them. The enemy's use of considerable numbers, as compared with the previous period, of Mk VI tanks and heavier caliber SP guns was a definite shift from his use of Mk IV's and light and medium caliber SP guns; that is, the emphasis was upon heavier caliber guns using them in anti-tank and artillery roles. In the few instances in which armor was used, in enemy counter-attacks, they were used in small numbers, and were easily dispersed by our TD's and artillery.

ARTILLERY:

Although the enemy concentrations were just as heavy as in previous periods, in general, the enemy artillery was lighter than in the previous period. Supplementing his artillery pieces with SP's and increased Nebelwerfer activity, and making good use of available armor, the enemy was able to protect the slow retreat of his infantry, and slow down our advance considerably. The enemy again used his artillery mostly to harass and interdict rear areas as well as placing heavy concentrations on our forward areas.

ENEMY TROOP ACTIVITY:

Enemy action throughout the period was defensive, with a few exceptions in which he counter-attacked unsuccessfully. Enemy opposition throughout the period was comparatively light, but the enemy made excellent use of demolitions, mines, both anti-tank and personnel, road blocks, and intensive small arms and

machine-gun fire to slow down our forces. He practiced his usual delaying tactics employing well placed groups of infantry with an abundance of automatic weapons, SP's, heavily mined roads and avenues of approach, and numerous road blocks. Mines were found at times to be 3 deep, and so well covered by machine-gun and small arms fire that our advance was delayed for considerable periods of time. Enemy movements, harrassed by artillery, aircraft and partisan activity, were much lighter than in the previous period. Valuable information on enemy activity, mines, dispositions of artillery pieces, tanks, etc. was supplied by friendly partisans operating behind the enemy lines. The enemy made good use of well organized defensive positions, and made strong points of strategically located houses. From the units identified it was quite evident that the enemy was finding it extremely difficult, and often impossible, to withdraw his units, or divisions, long enough to reorganize. However, he did the next best thing, collecting the remnants of decimated units, and putting them under experienced commands, thereby getting the maximum benefits possible under the circumstances.

Few of the enemy were captured, as compared to the previous period, but those taken again represented a motley group from all parts of Europe, many of whom were deserters who volunteered much valuable information. However, there was a noticeable stiffening resistance by the enemy, even though the morale of the troops captured indicated complete resignation to ultimate defeat.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
SECRET

SECRET